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ABSTRACT
FROM OPTIMIZATION TO EQUILIBRATION:
UNDERSTANDING AN EMERGING PARADIGM IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE
LEARNING
MAY 2019
IAN GEMP
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHWESTERN
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHWESTERN
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHWESTERN
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sridhar Mahadevan
Many existing machine learning (ML) algorithms cannot be viewed as gradient
descent on some single objective. The solution trajectories taken by these algorithms
naturally exhibit rotation, sometimes forming cycles, a behavior that is not expected
with (full-batch) gradient descent. However, these algorithms can be viewed more
generally as solving for the equilibrium of a game with possibly multiple competing
objectives. Moreover, some recent ML models, specifically generative adversarial net-
works (GANs) and its variants, are now explicitly formulated as equilibrium problems.
Equilibrium problems present challenges beyond those encountered in optimization
v
such as limit-cycles and chaotic attractors and are able to abstract away some of the
difficulties encountered when training models like GANs.
In this thesis, I aim to advance our understanding of equilibrium problems so as
to improve state-of-the-art in GANs and related domains. In the following chapters,
I will present work on
1. designing a no-regret framework for solving monotone equilibrium problems in
online or streaming settings (with applications to Reinforcement Learning),
2. ensuring convergence when training a GAN to fit a normal distribution to data
by Crossing-the-Curl,
3. improving state-of-the-art image generation with techniques derived from the-
ory,
4. and borrowing tools from dynamical systems theory for analyzing the complex
dynamics of GAN training.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) focuses on the design of agents that act rationally. The
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) principle formalizes the behavior of a rational
agent as the solution to an optimization problem: max
action
E[U(action)]. This principle
has pulled optimization to the center of attention in AI and Machine Learning (ML),
however, a new paradigm is emerging. Many existing algorithms such as those in
Reinforcement Learning (RL) or inference in graphical models can be viewed as solv-
ing for an equilibrium rather than an optimum. Moreover, some recent ML models,
specifically generative adversarial networks (GANs) and its variants, are now explic-
itly formulated as equilibrium problems.
Equilibrium problems present their own set of unique difficulties. One common
difficulty of equilibrium problems not shared by optimization is the existence of cyclic
or oscillatory behavior during the solution process. Properties like these pose real
challenges for ML researchers tackling an equilibrium approach to ML. In fact, the
domains described above all exhibit important, practical problems caused by the
nature of equilibration: “divergence of...TD” [35]; “One of the main problems with
loopy belief propagation is nonconvergence...often due to oscillations” [60]; “[GANs
are] known to be notoriously hard to train” [74].
Optimization has been studied within the context of ML for decades, leading to
new algorithms and even the study of new problems such as Online Optimization.
Traditionally, equilibration has not seen the same attention, however, it has risen to
the forefront recently with the advent of GANs. GANs have highlighted our lack
of theoretical and empirical understanding of these problems. In order to improve
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upon the performance of current equilibration-based models, we must elevate our
understanding of equilibration, especially within the context of ML.
In my thesis, I aim at both theoretical and empirical advances in equilibration
within the context of ML. Theoretical advances necessarily focus on simpler domains
where analysis is tractable. The hope is that advances here will transfer to useful
heuristics in more complex domains. I also develop tools for analyzing more complex
domains—these tools should be useful, especially when intuitions derived from a
simpler theoretical understanding fail.
The first contribution of the thesis is Online Monotone Equilibration
(OME), a framework for studying monotone equilibrium problems in an online (pos-
sibly adversarial) scenario. As comparison, the Online Optimization framework can
be used for studying optimization-based machine learning models that are expected
to learn as they consume data from a (possibly adversarial) data source. This is par-
ticularly useful in this era of Big Data where models must process data in a streaming
fashion to ensure realistic training times. An analogous framework for equilibration
is lacking. The OME framework subsumes the well known Online Convex Optimiza-
tion framework and defines a notion of regret that applies to both optimization and
equilibrium problems. A close inspection of this framework motivates an algorithm
presented in the second chapter.
The second contribution of the thesis is an analysis of the Linear-Quadratic
GAN (LQ-GAN), as well as an algorithm with convergence guarantees for equi-
librating this model. The Linear-Quadratic GAN has recently been proposed as
an important test problem for equilibration. Solving the LQ-GAN is equivalent to
fitting a multivariate-Gaussian to data, making this a fundamental generative mod-
eling problem as well. Despite the simplicity of the task, this model is deceptively
complex. Technically speaking, the corresponding equilibrium problem is not even
quasi-monotone. Despite this challenge, our analysis reveals that there exists an el-
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egant solution to this problem that may generalize to more complex domains; we
call the successful technique Crossing-the-Curl . A specific aspect of our solution
technique supports a practical approach for training neural network based GANs that
we explore in the next chapter.
The third contribution of the thesis is Generative Multi-Adversarial
Networks (GMAN), a framework that extends GANs to multiple discriminators.
A GAN is modeled as a two-player minimax game, but equilibration is more generally
studied with N players. We show that introducing more discriminators into the
standard GAN framework reduces variance of the minimax objective, improves the
quality of the resulting samples that are generated, and accelerates convergence of the
GAN to a steady-state minimax loss. In the final chapter, we examine the dynamics
at the end of training and study whether convergence of the loss implies convergence
of the weights.
The fourth contribution of the thesis applies an analytical tool, Lyapunov
Exponent Computation (LEC), to very large, stochastic equilibrium problems.
Lyapunov exponents (LEs) are vectors that concisely summarize the behavior of a
dynamical system (DS). For instance, if an LE associated with a certain region of
a DS contains N leading zeros, all initial states in that region of the DS converge
to an N -torus. Information like this could prove valuable to judging the tractability
of GAN variants, studying weight initialization, and more. The number of weights
learned in a GAN is in the thousands and millions. Lyapunov Exponent (LE) com-
putation is typically used to study the dynamics of deterministic physical systems
(i.e., 3-D). Extending LEC to GANs requires streamlining traditional LEC by way of
approximations.
The chapters are organized in order of the contributions listed above. Each chapter
begins by discussing the purpose (importance) of the research topic and then presents
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work towards the intended contribution. The chapter then concludes with a summary
of results.
4
CHAPTER 1
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATING
PROBLEMS
In this chapter, we will provide some useful tools and results from convex anal-
ysis, online convex optimization, game theory, GANs, variational inequalities, and
monotone operator theory.
1.1 Optimization
We will now formalize and abstract the meaning of a continuous optimization
problem. Discrete or combinatorial optimization lies outside the scope of this thesis.
Let f : X → R be a function that maps each input in the set X to a real number.
The set X may be Rn or it may be a subset of Rn. In the case that X ⊂ Rn, the
optimization problem is called a constrained optimization problem. The optimization
problem is to find the x ∈ X that minimizes f(x), written as
min
x∈X
f(x), (1.1)
where f(x) is called the objective function. Note that we can equivalently formulate
this problem as a maximization problem with
max
x∈X
−f(x). (1.2)
We denote any x that minimizes f(x) as x∗, also written as
x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈X
f(x). (1.3)
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As an example, consider the ordinary least squares method for linear regression.
This is one of the most common and well studied techniques in discriminative pre-
diction. Assume we have a dataset of n input-output pairs, (x, y), where x ∈ Rm+1
is a vector augmented with a 1, and y ∈ Rp is also a vector. The goal is to learn
the parameters of a function, f(x) = Ax, that minimize the sum of squared errors
between the true outputs and the outputs predicted by the function. Let X be a
matrix whose columns consist of the x’s and let Y be a matrix whose columns consist
of the y’s. Let A ∈ Rp×(m+1) be a matrix containing the parameters of f(x). Note
that we can consider A to be the vector a ∈ Rpm+p reshaped. Then we can formulate
our goal of fitting a line to the data as the following optimization problem
min
a∈Rpm+p
||Y − AX||22 = min
A∈Rp×(m+1)
n∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
(
Yji −
m+1∑
k=1
AjkXki
)2
(1.4)
where || · || represents a norm. The squared Euclidean norm is given by || · ||22. We
typically write this as an optimization over A noting the equivalence between a and
A:
min
A∈Rp×(m+1)
||Y − AX||22. (1.5)
1.1.1 Convex Optimization
The example above actually has two very important properties. The first is that
the set X is convex. A set X is convex if and only if for every x0 ∈ X , xf ∈ X , and
t ∈ [0, 1],
(1− t)x0 + txf ∈ X . (1.6)
In other words, X is convex if any line segment connecting any two vectors in X lies
completely in X .
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Figure 1.1: This figure depicts the convex function f(x) = |x| and its epigraph: the
set defined by the space above the function. Note that any line segment connecting
two points in the epigraph is wholly contained in the epigraph—therefore the epigraph
of |x| is convex, therefore f(x) is convex.
The second important property is that the objective function is convex. The
convexity of a function can actually be defined similarly to above using its epigraph
(see Figure 1.1), but we will choose an alternate definition to better match other
properties that we will present later in this proposal. Before we define convexity
for a function, we first define its subdifferential. The subdifferential of a convex
function, f : X → R, at x, denoted ∂f(x), is the set of all subgradients at x, i.e.,
∂f(x) = {z : ∀x′ ∈ X , 〈z, x′ − x〉 ≤ f(x′) − f(x)}; in other words, a first order
Taylor series expansion about x using z ∈ ∂f(x) as the first derivative ensures that
the Taylor series approximation does not overestimate the function anywhere else.
Finally, a function, f , is convex if
∀x ∈ X , x′ ∈ X , z ∈ ∂f(x), z′ ∈ ∂f(x′),
〈z − z′, x− x′〉 ≥ 0. (1.7)
By appealing to finite difference approximations, we can also view this as requiring
the function to have positive semi-definite Hessian, H  0. Let v = x − x′ and
note that a Hessian-vector product can be approximated as H · v ≈ z − z′ where x,
x′, z, and z′ are defined as before. Then 〈z − z′, x − x′〉 ≥ 0 is implicitly requiring
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v>Hv ≥ 0 for all v but is well defined even when H is not available, i.e., f is not
twice differentiable.
A necessary first order condition for optimality of x∗ is
∃z∗ ∈ ∂f(x∗) such that 〈z∗, x′ − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x′ ∈ X . (1.8)
For convex optimization problems, this is also a sufficient condition. If the subdif-
ferential of f contains only a single subgradient at each x, ∂f(x) is more commonly
referred to as the gradient, written ∇f(x).
Convex optimization problems are of particular interest because there exist many
techniques to solve them that come with convergence guarantees. One of the most
popular algorithms for solving continuous convex optimization problems is projected
subgradient descent,
Algorithm 1 Projected Subgradient Descent (PSGD)
input: A scalar learning rate schedule, e.g., η = 1√
k
x1 = 0
for all k = 1, 2, . . . do
xk+1 = PX (xk − ηzk) where zk ∈ ∂f(xk)
end for
where PX (ξ) denotes the projection of ξ onto the set X . Note that the projection
operation is also defined as an optimization problem
PX (ξ) = arg min
x∈X
||ξ − x||. (1.9)
Projected subgradient descent has a convergence rate of O( 1√
k
). This means that
f(xbestk ) − f(x∗) is O( 1√k ), which implies that we need O( 12 ) iterations to achieve
f(xbestk ) − f(x∗) ≤  where xbestk is the iterate with the lowest error so far, i.e.,
xbestk = xk∗ where k
∗ = arg min{1,...,k} f(xk).
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When the projected subgradient algorithm is run on an unconstrained, differen-
tiable optimization problem, i.e., without the projection operator and using gradients
instead of subgradients, it is more commonly known as gradient descent. We will
refer to the projected subgradient algorithm more concisely as gradient descent from
now on. We refer the reader to the book by Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004] for a
comprehensive review of convex optimization.
1.1.2 Online Optimization
Online optimization is important for training machine learning models on stream-
ing datasets when we require the model to begin making predictions before seeing all
of the data. Fore example, consider the least squares linear regression problem again,
min
A∈Rp×(m+1)
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(
m+1∑
k=1
AjkXki − Yji)2. (1.10)
We can rewrite this more generally as
min
x∈X
R(x) +
n∑
i=1
fi(x). (1.11)
where R(x) = 0 in the above least squares problem. This particular form occurs
throughout machine learning with datasets whose samples are assumed to be inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). We typically want to minimize the sum
of errors for each data point in the dataset (just like least squares linear regression).
In this case, fi(x) is typically f(x, datai) where x represents the parameters (e.g., A)
and datai represents an (x, y) pair. The function, R(x), is called a regularizer and
was introduced to bias the solution x∗ towards an x with properties more desirable
to the specific problem at hand. We will consider a natural choice for R(x) later.
Now, assume we solve the least squares regression problem by minimizing the
above objective over n samples. We then decide to employ our linear regressor in
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production to start taking advantage of its predictive power. However, we continue
to receive more data. Should we choose to re-solve our least squares problem once
we meet some criteria such as “our dataset doubled in size” or “our predictions no
longer seem accurate”? Online optimization presents a framework for tackling this
dilemma and suggests a solution where we can train our regressor by simply adjusting
its parameters a small amount as every new (x, y) pair is observed.
If each fi is convex and R(x) =
1
2η
||x||22, it can be shown that there exists a natural
extension of gradient descent that is actually equivalent to resolving the least squares
linear regression problem on the entire dataset as the number of samples goes to
infinity. This framework is known as Online Convex Optimization, and it generalizes
beyond least squares linear regression to any sequence of convex losses. Online Convex
Optimization is presented below along with the algorithm described, online gradient
descent (note that in this case, x denotes the parameters being learned).
Framework 1 Online Convex Optimization (OCO)
input: A convex set X
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a convex loss function ft : X → R
suffer loss ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 2 Online Gradient Descent (OGD)
input: A scalar learning rate η > 0
x1 = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt+1 = xt − ηzt where zt ∈ ∂ft(xt)
end for
In the context of online learning, we often measure performance with regret. Regret
measures how much worse off we are by making our predictions online rather than
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waiting for all the data to arrive and computing the best parameters offline in batch
form. Regret is defined as
regret =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
ft(x) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− ft(x∗). (1.12)
We suggest the book by Shalev-Shwartz [2011] as a reference for online convex opti-
mization.
1.2 Equilibration and Game Theory
As discussed in the introduction, not all machine learning problems are formulated
and solved as optimization problems. We mentioned two in which solving a machine
learning problem amounted to finding an equilibrium point: reinforcement learning
and generative adversarial networks. We now formalize the notion of an equilibrium
within the framework of games.
We will begin at the intersection of optimization and game theory—1-player
games. In a 1-player game, player 1’s goal is to minimize its loss function, f (1)(x(1))
by adjusting the variables under its control, x(1). Player 1 can solve this as an opti-
mization problem
min
x(1)∈X (1)
f (1)(x(1)). (1.13)
If we generalize this to an N -player game, player 1’s loss may now additionally depend
on other players’ variables, f (1)(x(1)) becomes f (1)(x(1), . . . , x(N)). We write the vector
containing all N players’ variables concisely as x. In this case, x must belong to the
product space of the N players’ sets, i.e., X = X (1) × · · · × X (N). We denote the
vector containing all the player variables except player i as x(−i). Now we can say
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that, given all other players’ variables are fixed, the goal of each player i is to solve
the optimization problem
min
x(i)∈X (i)
f (i)(x). (1.14)
This is where optimization falls short in describing the problem. If player 1 solves
this problem with all other players fixed, the solution will likely be one that exploits
all the other players. For example, player 2 may be very displeased with the solution
found by player 1 and choose to fix player 1’s and all other players’ variables and
find a solution with lower f (2). Essentially, the problem with games is pleasing all
the players simultaneously. One such notion that captures this ideal is the Nash
equilibrium. The vector of player variables, x∗, constitutes a Nash equilibrium [83] if
no single player i can reduce their loss by deviating from x∗(i) with all other player
variables fixed. More formally, let x˜(i) be the vector of player strategies where player i
plays any x(i) ∈ X (i) and player j 6= i plays x∗(j). Then the vector of player variables,
x∗ ∈ X , is a Nash equilibrium if for all i and all x(i) ∈ X (i), f (i)(x˜(i)) ≥ f (i)(x∗). We
denote the set of all Nash equilibria by X ∗.
1.2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
As an example application of Nash equilibria to ML, consider generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs). The goal of a GAN is to learn a function capable of transforming
a noisy random variable, z, into a distribution that matches the true distribution of
some data source, pdata(x). Typically the transformation function used is a neural
network. The problem of learning this function is framed as a two-player minimax
game, a special type of game where f (1) = −f (2). In this game, the transformation
function is referred to as the data generator, G, and the other player is referred to as
the discriminator, D. The role of the discriminator is to predict whether or not the
data generated by G came from pdata(x). The game can be written as follows
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Figure 1.2: Our work presented in Chapter 4 can be used to accelerate training and
improve the quality of generated samples. On the left, we show samples drawn from
a generator G trained using techniques from this thesis on the MNIST handwritten
digits dataset [64]. The rows show how the generated samples improve in quality
throughout the training epochs. Our work motivated followup work [57] that led to
the extremely high sample quality on the right for the CelebA dataset [69]. Note that
the images shown are not of real celebrities—they were formed by the generator.
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)
[
logD(x)
]
+ Ez∼pz(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z)))
]
. (1.15)
Goodfellow [40] was able to show that the equilibrium point of this game is the
minimizer of the following optimization problem for the generator
min
G
− log(4) + 2 · JSD(pdata||pG) (1.16)
where JSD denotes the Jensen-Shannon divergence, and pG is the distribution defined
by applying the generator’s transformation function to pz(z). The Jensen-Shannon
divergence is always positive except when its two arguments are equal, so this opti-
mization problem is only solved when pdata = pG, i.e., when the generating distribution
matches the true distribution, which achieves the goal.
In this way, GANs formulate the solution to an optimization problem as the
solution to an equilibrium problem. In general, it is not yet clear why one would
prefer one formulation to another, but empirical results with GANs have shown them
to learn qualitatively more accurate distributions of the data. Later on, we give a
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theoretical motivation for why games may provide more representational power than
optimization.
1.2.2 Dynamical Systems
This thesis will focus on the interactions between the different players’ learning
algorithms when employed together in a game. In general, we will analyze the vector
field implied by the player’s learning algorithms. We will assume player i’s learning
rule can be written as x
(i)
k+1 = x
(i)
k − αF (i)(xk) where α > 0 is a learning rate hy-
perparameter. We can then represent the simultaneous learning of all N agents as
follows:
F (x) = [F (1)(x), . . . , F (N)(x)] (1.17)
xk+1 = xk − αF (xk). (1.18)
For instance, if F (i)(xk) = ∇x(i)f (i)(xk) where ∇v is Feynman notation for taking
the gradient with respect to the variable v only, then this update represents learning
using simultaneous gradient descent. We will refer to −F as the dynamics of the
game and F as the (vector) field or map represented by the game. The connection
to dynamical systems can be understood informally as reformulating the update in
Equation (1.18) and taking the limit as the learning rate goes to zero. First, replace α
with ∆t for convenience. Then let t = k∆t so that x indexed by k, xk, corresponds to
x evaluated at time t, x∆t(t), where ∆t denotes the conversion factor between index
and time. Then by definition,
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xk+1 = xk −∆tF (xk) (1.19)
⇒ xk+1 − xk = −∆tF (xk) (1.20)
⇒ xk+1 − xk
∆t
= −F (xk) for all ∆t 6= 0 (1.21)
⇒ x
∆t(t+ ∆t)− x∆t(t)
∆t
= −F (x∆t(t)) (1.22)
⇒ lim
∆t→0
x∆t(t+ ∆t)− x∆t(t)
∆t
= −F (x∆t(t)) (1.23)
⇒ dx
∆t
dt
= x˙∆t = −F (x∆t). (1.24)
This derivation is informal because a bijection between the natural numbers (indices)
and real numbers (times) does not exist. Nevertheless, it should appeal to intuition
and the connection is formalized in the book by Nagurney and Zhang [1996]. Unless
stated otherwise, we will assume simultaneous gradient descent is used for learning.
We suggest the book by Strogatz [2018] as an excellent introduction to dynamical
systems.
1.2.3 Variational Inequalities and Monotone Operator Theory
We now show how a specific class of equilibrium problems subsume continuous,
convex optimization problems. Just like in convex optimization problems, we will
assume X is a convex set.
The equilibrium problem can be formalized with the theory of variational inequal-
ities (VIs) [43]. The VI problem is to find x∗ such that
〈F (x∗), x′ − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x′ ∈ X , (1.25)
where F : X → Rm. Notice that this is a simple generalization of the sufficient
condition for the minimum of a convex function (i.e., replace F in Equation (1.8)
with ∇f). Also x∗ is a solution to the VI if and only if x∗ = PX (x∗ − ηF (x∗))
where PX is a projection on to X . Figure 1.3 provides a geometric interpretation
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Normal Cone
-F(x*)
F(x*)
x*x x-x*
Feasible set K
Figure 1.3: This figure provides a geometric interpretation of the variational inequality
V I(F,X ). The mapping F defines a vector field over the feasible set X such that at the
solution point x∗, the vector F (x∗) is directed inwards at the boundary, and −F (x∗)
is an element of the normal cone C(x∗) of X at x∗ where the normal cone C(x∗) at the
vector x∗ of a convex set X is defined as C(x∗) = {y ∈ Rn|〈y, x− x∗〉 ≤ 0,∀x ∈ X}.
of a variational inequality. In summary, the VI problem is to find an x∗ ∈ X such
that attempting to perturb x∗ by −F (x∗) either reveals that x∗ is “stuck” against the
boundary or F (x∗) = 0 meaning x∗ is a stationary point with respect to F .
If F satisfies the following property, it is monotone:
〈F (xˆ)− F (x′), xˆ− x′〉 ≥ 0 ∀xˆ, x′ ∈ X . (1.26)
Notice also that this is a simple generalization of convexity (i.e., replace F in Equa-
tion (1.7) with ∇f).
Therefore, to solve the convex optimization problem
min
x∈X
f(x) (1.27)
we can instead, equivalently solve the equilibrium problem that is to find x∗ such that
〈∇f(x∗), x′ − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x′ ∈ X . (1.28)
Nagurney and Zhang [1996] formalize the connection between projected dynamical
systems and VIs and provide a good introduction to VI theory.
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The motivation for considering monotone equilibrium problems rather than convex
optimization problems is that F does not have to be the gradient of any function. We
will exploit this generalization in Chapter 2, which will represent the first contribution
of this thesis.
1.3 Motivating Problems
As stated in the introduction, equilibrium problems have recently risen to the
forefront of ML research primarily due to the advent of GANs. Variants on the origi-
nal GAN formulation [40] have achieved state-of-the-art results in numerous domains
and applications. GANs have been successfully applied to image-to-image transla-
tion [124], pose transfer [72, 49], image super-resolution [65], text-to-image transla-
tion [122], image inpainting [28, 89, 118], and image anomaly detection [101]. Be-
sides image modeling tasks, GANs have also been applied to simulating high particle
physics [26], imitation learning for reinforcement learning (RL) [45], hybrid model-
based RL [10], improving variational autencoders [31], drug discovery [54], and more.
Each of these advances leverages the adversarial training paradigm presented in the
original GAN work. Therefore, any gains made in understanding adversarial training
more generally, i.e., equilibrium problems, can be shared to improve performance on
each of these tasks. We present one such contribution in Chapter 4. We also provide
tools for better visualizing adversarial training dynamics in Chapter 5 and explore a
fundamental GAN variant in Chapter 3 that illustrates the difficulty of adversarial
training.
Aside from GANs, equilibrium problems also appear in reinforcement learning
(RL), distributed network resource allocation, and market economy models. For
example, Li et al. [2018] present work on a market economy model where parameters
of the model may drift [67]. In Chapter 2, we present a framework that guarantees that
the economy will track the drifting equilibrium within a certain degree of accuracy.
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This framework applies more generally to some algorithms in RL and some resource
allocation policies as mentioned above.
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CHAPTER 2
ONLINE MONOTONE EQUILIBRATION
2.1 Purpose of Research
As mentioned in the introduction, online optimization is important for training
machine learning models on streaming datasets when we require the model to begin
making predictions before seeing all of the data. However, we argued that many
machine learning models are formulated as equilibrium problems. Therefore, we aim
to develop a framework for solving a specific class of equilibrium problems online.
The framework we develop, Online Monotone Equilibration (OME), subsumes the
popular Online Convex Optimization framework.
Spoiler : The study of the online setting (OME) leads to a new extragradient algorithm
with applications to Reinforcement Learning, specifically policy evaluation with linear
value functions. Our proposed framework also provides an alternative derivation of
Crossing-the-Curl (also known as Symplectic Gradient Adjustment [11]), a recently
proposed algorithm for solving GANs.
2.2 Introduction
The primary focus of this chapter is on solving monotone Variational Inequality
(VI) problems online. In order to develop an online framework suitable for evaluating
and designing algorithms, we need a way to measure performance. As stated in the
technical background of Chapter 1, the VI problem is to find x∗ such that
〈F (x∗), x′ − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x′ ∈ X (2.1)
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where F : X → Rm and X is a convex set. F is monotone if and only if it satisfies
the following property:
〈F (xˆ)− F (x′), xˆ− x′〉 ≥ 0 ∀xˆ, x′ ∈ X . (2.2)
Notice that unlike optimization problems, the problem definition of a VI does not
readily admit a performance metric for suboptimal predictions, x. In response, VI
research has developed gap functions. A gap function is a function ψ : Rn → R ∪
{+∞} which satisfies ψ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and ψ(x∗) = 0 if and only if x∗ solves
VI(F,X ). These are more commonly referred to as merit functions or loss functions
in the optimization and machine learning literature. Numerous gap functions have
been developed satisfying the properties above [32]. Despite their wide use, we opt
for designing a new gap function for our purposes. We do this because gap functions
are approximate in the following sense. We stated in the technical background that
VI(∇f,X ) is equivalent to the optimization problem minx∈X f(x). For this reason,
we desire a performance metric for VI(F,X ) that gracefully falls back to f(x) when
F = ∇f and gap functions generally do not satisfy this property.
In this work, introduce a new performance metric for VIs formulated as a path
integral. We show that this formulation facilitates the design of an Online Monotone
Equilibration framework equipped with no-regret algorithms. We also illuminate
the boundaries between monotone equilibrium problems and other well known types
of problems from the game theory literature. To demonstrate the utility of this
framework for machine learning applications, we perform an online analysis of the
family of GTD algorithms [106] for reinforcement learning. In summary, our primary
contributions are
• the definition of online monotone equilibrium problems,
• the definition of our path integral regret, with accompanying linear bounds,
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• algorithms that achieve sublinear regret,
• and examples of a variety of monotone equilibrium problems of interest.
2.3 Performance Metric
In order for a performance metric to be admissible for VI(F,X ), it must equal 0
at x = x∗ and it must be greater than 0 everywhere else. We also require that the
performance metric reduces to f(x) if F = ∇f .
Consider the following path integral:
∫
z:x∗→x
〈F (z), dz〉. (2.3)
where x∗ → x denotes a straight line path from x∗ ∈ X ∗ to x ∈ X . By definition,
this path integral equals zero when x = x∗, i.e. start = end. Next consider the
following useful integral upper bound over monotone maps (see Remark 3.10 in the
work of Romano et al. [1993] for a more rigorous proof).
Lemma 1 (Path Integral Bound). The path integral over a monotone map is bounded
by its linear approximations, i.e., 〈F (a), b− a〉 ≤ ∫
x:a→b〈F (x), dx〉 ≤ 〈F (b), b− a〉.
Proof. Let xi+1−xi = xn−x0n ∀ x0, xn and recall the definition of monotonicity, 〈F (xi+1)−
F (xi), xi+1 − xi〉 ≥ 0 ∀ xi, xi+1 which implies
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xi+1), xn − x0
n
〉 (2.4)
=⇒ 〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xj), xn − x0
n
〉 ∀ j ≥ i. (2.5)
Also,
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〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 = 〈F (x0),
n−1∑
i=0
xn − x0
n
〉 (2.6)
=
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (x0), xn − x0
n
〉 (2.7)
≤
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 (2.8)
=
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 as n→∞, (2.9)
and vice versa for the reverse direction, which implies
〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 ≤
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 ≤ 〈F (xn), xn − x0〉. (2.10)
If the map is strictly monotone, then the ≤’s can be strengthened to <’s. There-
fore, for strictly and strongly monotone maps, we have
0 ≤ 〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 <
∫
z:x∗→x
〈F (z), dz〉 (2.11)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of x∗ being a solution to VI(F,X ).
Finally, notice that when F = ∇f ,
∫
z:x∗→x
〈∇f(z), dz〉 = f(x)− f(x∗) = f(x), (2.12)
and we recover f(x) via the fundamental theorem of calculus for path integrals. We
have assumed f(x∗) = 0 without loss of generality. From now on, we will refer to the
path integral
∫
z:x∗→x〈F (z), dz〉 with f(x) as we have just shown that it is equivalent to
f(x) in the case of optimization and an explicit objective function is left unspecified
in the VI problem formulation, V I(F,X ).
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This path integral, f(x), satisfies all requirements for strictly monotone maps,
however, it does not satisfy the greater than 0 requirement for all monotone maps.
Consider the following monotone (but not strictly monotone) map: F (x) = Ax where
A = −A> is skew-symmetric. Clearly, x∗ = 0 solves VI(F,Rn) as 〈F (x∗), x − x∗〉 =
0 ≥ 0 ∀x. However, the path integral is equal to zero for any x:
∫
z:x∗→x
〈F (z), dz〉 =
∫ 1
0
〈F (x∗ + (x− x∗)t), (x− x∗)〉dt (2.13)
=
∫ 1
0
〈F (xt), x〉dt =
∫ 1
0
(Axt)>xdt (2.14)
= x>A>x
∫ 1
0
tdt =
1
2
x>A>x (2.15)
=
1
4
x>(A+ A>)x = 0. (2.16)
This is because this map with skew-symmetric A represents dynamics with pure
concentric cycles, i.e., the vector field is always perpendicular to the path from the
origin. In order to build an online framework applicable to all monotone maps, we
need to modify the path integral. We will assume the map is bounded, ||F (x)|| ≤ L,
and smooth, ||F (x)−F (y)|| ≤ β||x−y||. In addition, the following discussion assumes
X is Rn, however, this is just for sake of exposition; proofs in the Appendix follow
through for any convex X . Consider the modified path integral which first integrates
to a point xˆ = x− ηˆF (x) before continuing to x:
f(x) =
∫
z:x∗→xˆ
〈F (z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆ→x
〈F (z), dz〉 (2.17)
≥ 〈F (x∗), xˆ− x∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by def of x∗
+〈F (xˆ), x− xˆ〉 (2.18)
≥ 0 + ηˆ 〈F (xˆ), F (x)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
∃ηˆ>0 s.t. 〈·,·〉>0
(2.19)
> 0 for some ηˆ > 0 assuming x 6= x∗, (2.20)
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where the first bound follows from Lemma 1 and intuitively, if ηˆ is small enough,
F (x) and F (xˆ) will align. We give a formal proof in Appendix A.5 that considers
more general proximal updates, i.e., xˆ = prox(x). We omit a discussion of proximal
operators here to avoid complicating the exposition.
Also, note that xˆ = x∗ − ηˆF (x∗) = x∗ so both path integrals vanish when x = x∗.
Finally, maps that can be written as the gradient of some function, i.e., F = ∇f , are
known as conservative maps. Conservative maps are path-independent meaning the
value of the path integral is independent of the path. That is to say that any path
integral we choose, as long as it starts at x∗ and ends at x, will recover f(x) by way
of the fundamental theorem of calculus.
Therefore, this path integral satisfies all requirements for all monotone maps as-
suming ηˆ is chosen small enough (see Appendix A.5 for details).
2.3.1 Online Variational Inequality Problems
In this section, we formalize the problem of solving VI(F,X ) online where F (x) =∑
t Ft(x) and each Ft is a monotone map. Let x
∗ be the solution to VI(F,X ). Re-
peating the same path integral loss as before:
f(x) =
∫
z:x∗→xˆ
〈F (z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆ→x
〈F (z), dz〉 (2.21)
=
∫
z:x∗→xˆ
〈
∑
t
Ft(z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆ→x
〈
∑
t
Ft(z), dz〉 (2.22)
=
∑
t
[ ∫
z:x∗→xˆ
〈Ft(z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆ→x
〈Ft(z), dz〉
]
(2.23)
where xˆ = x− ηˆF (x). Unfortunately, in an online / streaming setting, at time t, we
will only have seen Fτ≤t. This means we cannot construct xˆ until we see the end of
the stream. Moreover, in most online settings, we assume that we only observe Ft
evaluated at a finite number of points, i.e., xˆt and xt, after which we throw the map
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away in order to avoid storing all maps in memory. For these reasons, we consider
the modified path integral loss for sums of maps:
fˆ(x) =
∑
t
[ ∫
z:x∗→xˆt
〈Ft(z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆt→x
〈Ft(z), dz〉
]
(2.24)
=
∑
t
ft(x|x∗) (2.25)
where xˆt = x − ηˆFt(x) and we introduce the abbreviation ft(x|x∗) to represent the
term above in brackets—it is the path integral loss over the map Ft starting at x
∗.
This path integral loss is
• equal to 0 if x equals x∗,
• equivalent to f(x) if F = ∇f ,
• however, it may be less than 0 for some x not equal to x∗.
Although this path integral loss does not satisfy all three conditions, it is still promis-
ing for a number of reasons. First, if F = ∇f or x∗t = x∗ ∀t, then the third condition
is met. And second, in Appendix A.5.2, we derive the following lower bound for fˆ(x):
fˆ(x) ≥
T∑
t=1
(
||Ft(x)||p − ||Ft(x∗)||q
)
||Ft(x)||p ηˆ
m
− βt ηˆ
2
m2
L2t . (2.26)
By leveraging this lower bound along with additional information, we are able to
show later that minimizing the path integral, fˆ(x), at a sufficient rate ensures that
the average norm over t of Ft(x) approaches the average norm of Ft(x
∗) as T →∞.
2.4 Online Monotone Equilibration
We are now ready to present a framework for Online Monotone Equilibration
(Algorithm 2: OME) that will enable us to derive upper bounds for regret in online
monotone equilibrium problems.
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Framework 2 Online Monotone Equilibration (OME)
input: A convex set X ⊆ Rn
define: xˆt = xt − ηˆzt where zt ∈ Ft(xt)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a vector, zˆt, from a monotone map, i.e., zˆt ∈ Ft(xˆt)
suffer ft(xt)
end for
Note that the loss at each round, ft(xt), assumes there is an oracle with knowledge
of x∗. We will show later that despite this, knowledge of x∗ is not required for learning
in the OME framework.
We repeat the Online Convex Optimization framework (OCO) here for compari-
son.
Framework Online Convex Optimization (OCO)
input: A convex set X ⊆ Rn
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a vector, zt, from the subdifferential of a convex loss, i.e., zt ∈ ∇ft(xt)
suffer loss ft(xt)
end for
Comparing OME to OCO, we see that the major difference is that we now receive
vectors from a monotone map (at xˆt) whereas in OCO, we receive gradients of a
convex loss (at xt). In some cases, OME reduces to OCO, however, this is not always
the case, so we cannot rely on OCO theory alone to bound ft. In general, OME
represents a strict superset of OCO (see Appendix A.2.1).
Theorem 1. OCO(ft,X ) is equivalent to OME(∂ft,X ) and ∃Ft such that OME(Ft,X ) 6∈
{∀ft OCO(ft,X )} implying OCO ⊂ OME in the strict sense.
Figure 2.1 displays an example of a function resulting from a path integral over a
monotone field F : R2 → R2; the function is non-convex.
However, if F is affine, OME is equivalent to OCO (see Appendix A.3).
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows the contour plot for the function representing the path
integral over a 2-D monotone field, F (x, y)—observe the path integral function dis-
played in title. Notice in the inset that the function value in the interior of the line
segment is greater than the function value at either endpoint. This implies that the
function is not even quasi-convex, a weaker condition than convexity. The definition
of the field and derivation of the path integral can be found in Appendix A.2.2.
Theorem 2. If Ft(xt) = Axt + b and A is positive-definite, then there exists ft such
that OME(Ft,X ) is equivalent to OCO(ft,X ).
2.5 Upper Bound for Cumulative Path Integral Loss
Previously, we established lower bounds for the path integral to show it satisfied
certain properties of a loss function. Now we will establish upper bounds that we can
minimize efficiently with familiar algorithms.
The cumulative path integral loss can be upper bounded as follows:
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fˆ(x) =
T∑
t=1
[ ∫
x:x∗→xˆt
〈Ft(x), dx〉+
∫
x:xˆt→x
〈Ft(x), dx〉
]
(2.27)
≤
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), xˆt − x∗〉+ 〈Ft(x), x− xˆt〉
]
(2.28)
=
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− ηFt(x)− x∗〉+ ηˆ〈Ft(x), Ft(x)〉
]
(2.29)
=
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ ηˆ〈Ft(x), Ft(x)− Ft(xˆt)〉
]
(2.30)
=
T∑
t=1
[
〈zˆt, x− x∗〉+ ηˆ〈zt, zt − zˆt〉
]
(2.31)
where we have replaced the map evaluations with z’s to emphasize that these vectors
are potentially chosen by an adversary. Notice that we have upper bounded fˆ(x) by
a sum of functions that are linear in x. Therefore, the OME problem reduces to the
Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem and we can reuse techniques designed
for OLO. This reduction is mirrored in the OCO framework as well. Formally,
regretTA(X ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt|x∗)− ft(x∗|x∗) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt|x∗) (2.32)
≤
T∑
t=1
〈zˆt, xt − x∗〉+ ηˆ〈zt, zt − zˆt〉 (2.33)
≤
T∑
t=1
〈zˆt, xt − x∗〉+ βtL
2
t
m2
ηˆ2 (2.34)
≤ 1
2η
||x∗||2 + (η + βmax
m2
ηˆ2)
T∑
t=1
L2t (2.35)
≤ 5
4
BL
√
2T . (2.36)
where ||x∗|| ≤ B, ||Ft|| ≤ Lt, L2 ≥ 1T
∑
t L
2
t , βmax = maxt βt, η =
B
L
√
2T
, and ηˆ =√
η
2βmax
(see Appendix A.5 for details).
There is one other subtle problem with our path integral loss as we have defined
it. Observe that as ηˆ → 0, fˆ(x) approaches our original path integral loss, which we
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argued is only applicable for strictly monotone maps. In order for this path integral
loss to be meaningful, we need to show that our algorithms are actually minimizing
this loss at a rate that is faster than ηˆ’s rate of decay. At the very least, any surrogate
loss that we propose must imply some sort of convergence in the offline case to be
admissible in the online setting. In Appendix A.5.5, we leverage the fact that our
lower bound derived in Equation (2.26) must, by definition, be lower than our upper
bound derived in Equation (2.34). We use this to show that an offline algorithm that
minimizes the above regret at the rate displayed in Equation (2.36) implies ||Ft(x)||
approaches ||Ft(x∗)|| on average, i.e.,
||Ft(x)|| ≤ ||Ft(x∗)||+ T−1/8
√
C (2.37)
where C = 8
√
βmaxBL3
21/4
. Note that this bound does not necessarily imply that
||Ft(xt)|| ≤ ||Ft(x∗)|| + T−1/8
√
C on average for some C. In future work, we will
explore if this is a deficiency of our path integral loss or of the analysis. However,
the main takeaway here is that the path integral loss, as defined, is meaningful in the
offline case, which satisfies a natural baseline for admissibility in the online setting.
2.5.1 Derivation of No-Regret Algorithms for OME
Due to the work previously done in OLO, part of the derivation of no-regret al-
gorithms for OME is trivial. We have shown that instantaneous regret for general
monotone maps can be bounded above by considering the constant approximation
of the map (see Equation (2.33)). Note that a constant map, Ft(xt), is always the
subgradient of some linear function, ft(x) = 〈Ft(xt), x〉. This implies that the re-
gret for general monotone maps is bounded above by considering the online linear
optimization problem with ft(x). The implication is that the online gradient descent
and even online mirror descent algorithms can be adapted from OLO with almost
no effort to minimize regret in OME while enjoying similar o(T ) regret bounds (see
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Algorithm 3 Online Extragradient Descent (OED)
input: Scalar learning rates η > 0 and ηˆ > 0
x1 = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
xˆt = xt − ηˆzt where zt ∈ Ft(xt)
xt+1 = xt − ηzˆt where zˆt ∈ Ft(xˆt)
end for
Algorithm 4 Online Mirror Prox (OMP)
input: Link function gη : Rn → X and proximal operator proxηˆ : Rn → X
θ1 = 0
for all t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt = gη(θt)
xˆt = proxηˆ(xt) = arg miny∈X
(
〈zt, y〉+ 1ηˆD(y, xt)
)
where zt ∈ Ft(xt)
θt+1 = θt − zˆt where zˆt ∈ Ft(xˆt)
end for
Equation (2.36)). This is somewhat surprising as Theorem 1 indicates that OME cap-
tures minimizing some non-convex functions. The no-regret algorithms for OME are
given in Algorithms 3 and 4. Please see Appendix A.5 for a more thorough discussion
of proximal operators as well as the book by Shalev-Shwartz [2011] for commonly
used link functions.
These two algorithms may be recognized as online variants of the familiar Ex-
tragradient and Mirror Prox algorithms commonly seen in the VI [62] and (online)
optimization and saddle point [53] literature. Our work generalizes their use beyond
optimization and saddle point (2-D games) problems to more general monotone equi-
librium problems (e.g., N -player games). In addition, our construction of the path
integral loss gives a clear reason as to why Extragradient algorithms (as opposed
to gradient descent) are necessary for solving monotone equilibrium problems. Note
that the original path integral loss we considered leads to online gradient descent, but
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as discussed earlier, this loss is not greater than 0 for all x 6= x∗ even in the offline
setting.
It is also worth highlighting the difference between the Extragradient we present
here and the variants seen in the literature. In particular, our variant uses a stepsize,
ηˆ, for computing xˆt, that grows relative to the stepsize, η, for computing xt. Other
variants in the literature use
• the same constant stepsize for both steps [25],
• average the iterates after training [39, 68] (also seen in socially-convex games [33]),
• average the maps during training [50],
• inertial proximal methods [4],
• square-summable, non-summable stepsizes [55, 56, 85, 120],
• modified EG algorithms [112],
• or complex stepsize schemes [27].
This difference in step size is crucial. Consider revisiting the problem V I(F (x) =
Ax,Rn) where A = −A> is skew-symmetric. If we use constant step sizes given a
time horizon T and η = ηˆ = T−1/2, one can show that limT→∞ ||xT ||2 → 1e ||x0||2, i.e.,
xT does not converge to the equilibrium at x
∗ = 0 (see Appendix A.5.5). On the
other hand, if η = T−1/2 and ηˆ = T−1/4 as we have proposed, xT does converge to x∗.
Most importantly, our online Extragradient method does not require storing or
averaging either the iterates or the maps. This allows processing data streams using
minimal memory and processor time.
2.6 Algorithmic Game Theory and Related Work
Related results in Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) focus on maximizing welfare,
W , which is the sum of player utilities (i.e., minus the sum of player losses). In
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order to compare to results in AGT, we define a monotone game as one in which
the map formed by concatenating the gradients of all players’ losses is monotone, i.e.
F (x) = [∇f (1)(x), . . . ,∇f (N)(x)] is monotone.
OME is a framework that examines (external) regret in monotone games. Mono-
tone games and socially-convex games are both subsets of convex games (see Theo-
rems 6 and 7 in Appendix A.8). Convex games are games in which each agent’s cost
function, f (i)(x), is convex with respect to its own strategy, x(i). Gordon et al. [2008]
studied internal and external regret for individual agents in convex games and related
these to convergence towards correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria respectively.
Note that in general, these results on equilibria do not imply results for welfare. Even-
Dar et al. [2009] examined no-regret algorithms in socially-concave games (equiva-
lently formulated as socially-convex games), and showed that each player’s average
strategy approaches that player’s strategy at the Nash equilibrium; also, each player’s
average utility approaches that player’s utility at the Nash equilibrium. Roughgar-
den [2009] developed the notion of smooth games not to be confused with the β-smooth
maps defined earlier. Smoothness relates the convergence of strategies towards Nash
equilibria to the price of anarchy (PoA), which defines the ratio of the worst-case sum
cost of a Nash equilibrium, maxx∗∈X ∗ −W (x∗), to the best-case sum cost of a player
strategy set, minx∈X −W (x). In short, smoothness relates no-regret dynamics to the
welfare of a game. The results above for convex games and socially-convex games ap-
ply for repeated play (the game is fixed), therefore, we do not consider these settings
online; the smoothness results also apply to games that may change at each step (i.e.,
online). Table 2.1 outlines the intersections between the various game types.
Additional performance gains can be obtained if we can assume each player in
the game is employing an algorithm from a given class. Syrgkanis et al. [2015] have
accelerated convergence to Nash equilibria, to zero-regret, and to optimal welfare (as-
suming the game is smooth and fixed) under this scenario. An extension of this work
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Type / Ex. A.8.1 A.8.2 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.5 A.8.6 A.8.7 A.8.8 A.8.9
Smooth
√ √ √ √ √
Convex
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Monotone
√ √ √ √
Socially-Convex
√ √ √ √
Table 2.1: Games may share multiple properties at once. Definitions of properties and
examples for each case (denoted by the column heading) are given in Appendix A.8.
also considers scenarios where the game is changing at each time step [71]. Specif-
ically, Foster et al. [2016] showed that approximate optimality can be guaranteed if
the game allows players to be replaced with probability p for small p. Moreover, this
is true even when the players observe only bandit feedback (as opposed to expected
costs) when comparing against a dynamic baseline. Critically, bounds on welfare are
still derived from a smoothness constraint on the game.
In contrast, OME does not require Roughgarden’s definition of smoothness and
allows the game to change with probability 1 at each step (i.e., online), however, this
framework bounds a weaker notion of regret, auto-welfare regret (see Appendix A.7),
as opposed to welfare regret.
2.7 Applications
We illustrate applications of Online Monotone Equilibration on modeling several
concave games, solving an online variational inequality problem (OVI), uncovering
insights into a saddle-point based reinforcement learning algorithm, and fitting a
generative model. Note that the majority of these equilibrium problems are actually
strongly monotone, which allows us to use the simpler path integral loss in Equa-
tion (2.11) instead of the integral defined with an intermediate xˆt for more general
monotone fields. We will denote an application as monotone, strictly, or strongly
monotone with the symbols (M), (sM), or (SM).
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2.7.1 Concave Games
Even-Dar et al. [2009] developed the theory of socially-concave games and showed
that minor simplifications of a number of concave games are socially-concave as well.
In Appendix A.9, we show that variants of these games also satisfy monotonicity.
Specifically, we prove F is monotone for the following games:
• Linear Cournot Competition (sM) [21]—Firms compete for consumers by ad-
justing quantities of goods produced. The price of goods is set by a linear
function of the total quantity of goods in the market.
• Linear Resource Allocation (M) [52]—A network controller oversees the sharing
of a communication channel, ensuring total communication does not exceed the
network capacity. Users submit bids to the controller, which the controller uses
when deciding how to allocate capacity. User value functions are linear.
• Congestion Control Protocols (M) [33]—We consider a Tail Drop policy where
a router drops packets that exceed the network capacity.
In Appendix A.9.2, we analyze resource allocation and compare welfare with our
path integral loss. In this case, welfare is maximized when all users submit the
minimum bid amount. This result is independent of the parameters of the users’
utility functions, which from a modeling viewpoint is unsatisfying. In contrast, the
path integral loss is minimized by bids with an intuitive dependence on the utility
function parameters: 1) as the penalty for large bids grows, the optimal bid amount
decreases; 2) as the number of users increases, the optimal bid amount increases (due
to increased competition), approaching an asymptote.
2.7.2 A Machine Learning Economy (SM)
Next, we consider a cloud-based machine learning network (MLN) adopted from
the work of Nagurney and Wolf [2014]. Providers of machine learning data control
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the quantity of data provided while network providers control the delivery price as
well as service quality. Consumers influence the network through demand functions
dictating the prices they are willing to pay for specific quantities and qualities of
services rendered. See Appendix A.10 for a more thorough description.
We define each firm’s utility function to be concave and quadratic in its strategy.
This establishes the equivalence between the equilibrium state we are searching for
and the variational inequality to be solved, VI(F,R+), where Ft returns a vector
consisting of the negative gradients of the utility functions for each firm.
To cast this VI as an online learning problem, we let the parameters of the network
change. This creates a more realistic model as a number of external factors can cause
the network to change such as complex network congestion effects, network outages,
etc. The goal then is to predict the equilibrium point of each new MLN in the face of
these possibly adversarial forces. Specifically, our experiment considers ten different
five-firm networks. At each time step, the adversary receives OED’s prediction for
the equilibrium point and returns the MLN whose equilibrium is farthest from the
predicted one.
Figure 2.2 plots average regret with respect to the time step, demonstrating that
average regret approaches zero in support of our derived sublinear bounds.
2.7.3 GTD Algorithms (SM)
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a class of learning problems in which an agent
attempts to maximize a long-term reward in an unfamiliar environment by reinforcing
rewarding behaviors. Solving this problem typically requires first learning a value
function, V pi(s), which gives the long-term reward the agent is expected to receive if
employing policy pi and starting from state s. Often, we learn an approximate value
function instead, V piθ (s), parameterized by θ ∈ Rd. Approximating V piθ (s) by observing
an exploratory policy, pi′, is called off-policy policy evaluation. The gradient temporal
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Figure 2.2: Demonstration of OMP on the described machine learning network. The
dotted line denotes the upper bound derived for the regret of OMP.
difference (GTD) learning algorithms form a family of algorithms for accomplishing
this task [106, 107].
Liu et al. [2015] showed that although the family of GTD algorithms are technically
not gradient algorithms with respect to their original objectives, they are gradient
algorithms with respect to the following saddle point objective, which is an example
of a two-player game:
min
θ
max
y
y>(b− Aθ)− 1
2
||y||2M (2.38)
where samples of A, b, and M are obtained from observing trajectories according to
the behavioral policy and y is an auxiliary variable used by the GTD algorithm. We
show that this game is strongly monotone (see Appendix A.11). The GTD update
rules are given by
yt+1 = yt + ηt(b− Aθt −Myt) (2.39)
θt+1 = θt + ηt(A
>yt) (2.40)
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where M = 1d or M is a covariance matrix. These updates are equivalent to run-
ning online gradient descent on an appropriate two-player game. Either way, M is
symmetric positive definite and the corresponding map, F , is strongly monotone with
parameter 1 for M = 1d, or more generally, λmin(M). Due to the strong-monotonicity,
we do not need to consider the modified path integral that proceeds through the in-
termediate point xˆt. We can take the simpler path that goes directly to x.
So far, we have considered path integrals that start at x∗. In some cases (and in
this case), it is more illuminating to consider a path integral that starts at a more
general xo and redefine ft(xt) =
∫
z:xo→xt〈Ft(z), dz〉 −
∫
z:xo→x∗〈Ft(z), dz〉. We discuss
the technical details of this change in Appendix A.6. In this more general setting,
the corresponding path integral loss that GTD bounds is
f([yt; θt]) = [y
>
0 (b− Aθt)− y>t (b− Aθ0)] +
1
2
||yt||2M . (2.41)
Now consider θ’s task of minimizing f([y; θ]) relative to θ0 = θ
∗ with y0 fixed at
y. In this case, f([y; θ]) reduces to y>(b− Aθ) + 1
2
||y||2M . From the perspective of θ,
this is equivalent to minimizing
y>(b− Aθ)− 1
2
||y||2M . (2.42)
Similarly, consider y’s task of minimizing f([y; θ]) relative to y0 = y
∗ with θ0 fixed at
θ. In this case, f([y; θ]) reduces to −y>(b − Aθ) + 1
2
||y||2M . From the perspective of
θ, this is equivalent to maximizing
y>(b− Aθ)− 1
2
||y||2M . (2.43)
Therefore, we have recovered the original saddle point problem by simply evaluat-
ing the path integral from each players’ perspective! In this way, the path integral
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has prescribed a constructive procedure for recovering a problem formulation that
previously required a careful eye to conjure.
2.7.4 Constant-Linear GANs (M)
Generative adversarial networks formulate the training of a generative model as a
game [40]. The original formulation is a minimax game between a generator, G(z) :
z → x, and a discriminator, D(x) : x→ [0, 1],
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)
[
log(D(x))
]
+ Ez∼pz(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z)))
]
, (2.44)
where pdata(x) is the true data distribution and pz(z) is a simple (usually fixed)
distribution that is easy to draw samples from, e.g., N (0, 1).
Unfortunately, this game is not monotone in general, however, we can derive a
monotone version of the Wasserstein-type GAN [6] with online guarantees. The new
minimax objective is
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = Ex∼pdata(x) [d
>x]− Ez∼pz(z)[d>Gz] (2.45)
where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, d ∈ Rn, G ∈ Rn×m. We derive the map, F , associated with
this game in Appendix A.12, Equation (A.328). F is monotone for any pz(z) and
pdata(x). If G and d are regularized with
α
2
|| · ||22, then F is strongly monotone with
parameter α.
In Appendix A.13, we show that for any differentiable, strictly convex-concave
minimax game, the corresponding path integral loss that Algorithms 3 and 4 bound
is
f([G; d]) = V (G, d∗)− V (G∗, d). (2.46)
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which is a familiar Lyapunov function for the game. In the case that the minimax
game is only convex-concave, not strictly, the path integral is
f([G; d]) = V (Gˆ, d∗)− V (G∗, dˆ) + V (G, dˆ)− V (Gˆ, d) (2.47)
which, for small ηˆ, is close to the previous path integral.
2.8 Conclusion
We proposed a new framework for online learning, namely Online Monotone Equi-
libration, which enables the study of regret for online monotone equilibrium problems.
This framework generalizes the popular Online Convex Optimization framework in
a way that allows it to model regret for equilibrium problems while still retaining
the simplicity of standard no-regret algorithms from previous work. We support the
broad applicability of our new framework with connections to network congestion pro-
tocols, empirical results from a VI, analysis of an existing RL algorithm, and design
of a generative model.
In terms of technical contributions, we illuminated the boundary between OCO
and OME (e.g., affine maps), showed that OME can successfully frame some on-
line non-convex problems, defined a new, more general notion of regret, and derived
efficient, realtime algorithms with sublinear regret.
2.8.1 Up Next
In this chapter, we showed that the path integral loss can be upper bounded by
the expression below. Assuming our intermediate step to xˆ uses a small step size, ηˆ,
we would expect zt ∈ F (xt) and zˆt ∈ F (xˆt) to be relatively well aligned, i.e., zˆt ≈ ρzt.
This allows the following approximation (let ρˆ = ηˆ(1− ρ)):
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ft(xt) ≤ 〈zˆt, xt − x∗〉+ ηˆ〈zt, zt − zˆt〉 (2.48)
≈ 〈zˆt, xt − x∗〉+ ρˆ||zt||2, (2.49)
which supports the derivation of a new algorithm in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
LINEAR QUADRATIC GANS AND
CROSSING-THE-CURL
3.1 Purpose of Research
Equilibrium problems introduce additional challenges over optimization problems.
Despite these challenges, initial research on GANs began with extremely complex,
neural network models and little accompanying theory. Linear-Quadratic GANs (LQ-
GANs) were recently introduced as a testbed for better understanding GAN training
and equilibria [80]. LQ-GANs can be used to fit a multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion to data, a fundamental task in generative modeling / density estimation. They
replace the standard neural-network generator and discriminator with a linear gener-
ator and a quadratic discriminator. This makes analysis more tractable and insights
gleaned in this setting will hopefully lead to better algorithms in the more powerful
neural-network setting. Here, we aim to better understand the LQ-GAN setting and
propose a new algorithm with provable convergence guarantees in this setting.
Spoiler : We present an intuitive derivation of Crossing-the-Curl (also known as
SGA [11]), a recently proposed algorithm for solving GANs, and prove that it can be
used to fit normal distributions to data with convergence guarantees. This algorithm
does not have a large impact on the training of neural-network based GANs, however,
our analysis reveals an additional property that does transfer to the more complex
setting. Specifically, we solve the LQ-GAN by successively increasing the complexity
of the generator and discriminator throughout training. This curriculum is mirrored
in state-of-the-art GANs [57] as well as our own work in the next chapter.
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3.2 Introduction
When minimizing f(x) over x ∈ X , it is known that f decreases fastest if x moves
in the direction −∇f(x). In addition, any direction orthogonal to −∇f(x) will leave
f(x) unchanged. In this chapter, we show that these orthogonal directions that are
ignored by gradient descent can be critical in equilibrium problems, which are central
to game theory. If each player i in a game updates with x(i) ← x(i)−ρ∇x(i)f (i)(x), x =
[x(1);x(2); . . .]> can follow a cyclical trajectory, similar to a person riding a merry-go-
round (see Figure 3.1). This toy scenario perfectly reflects an aspect of training for a
particular machine learning model mentioned below, and is depicted more technically
later on in Figure 3.2. To arrive at the equilibrium point, a person riding the merry-
go-round should walk perpendicularly to their direction of travel, taking them directly
to the center.
Equilibrium problems have drawn heightened attention in machine learning due to
the emergence of the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [40]. GANs have served
a variety of applications including generating novel images [57], simulating particle
physics [26], and imitating expert policies in reinforcement learning [45]. Despite this
plethora of successes, GAN training remains heuristic.
Deep learning has benefited from an understanding of simpler, more fundamen-
tal techniques. For example, multinomial logistic regression formulates learning a
multiclass classifier as minimizing the cross-entropy of a log-linear model where class
probabilities are recovered via a softmax. The minimization problem is convex and
is solved efficiently with guarantees using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Un-
surprisingly, the majority of deep classifiers incorporate a softmax at the final layer,
minimize a cross-entropy loss, and train with a variant of SGD. This progression from
logistic regression to classification with deep neural nets is not mirrored in GANs. In
contrast, from their inception, GANs were architected with deep nets. Only recently
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has the Linear-Quadratic GAN (LQ-GAN) [36, 80] been proposed as a minimal model
for understanding GANs.
Let                     and                .
Player 1’s loss is:                .
Player 2’s loss is:                     .
Crossing-the-Curl
Simultaneous 
Gradient Descent
Example:
Figure 3.1: The goal is to find the equilibrium point (denoted by the star) of the
merry-go-round. If someone follows simultaneous gradient descent, she will ride along
in circles forever. However, if she travels perpendicularly to this direction, a.k.a.
Crosses-the-Curl, she will arrive at the equilibrium.
In this chapter, we analyze the convergence of several GAN training algorithms
in the LQ-GAN setting. We survey several candidate theories for understanding
convergence in GANs, naturally leading us to select Variational Inequalities, an in-
tuitive generalization of the widely relied-upon theories from Convex Optimization.
According to our analyses, none of the current GAN training algorithms is globally
convergent in this setting. We propose a new technique, Crossing-the-Curl, for train-
ing GANs with guaranteed convergence in the N-dimensional (N-d) LQ-GAN setting.
This work makes the following contributions (proofs can be found in Appendix B):
• The first global convergence analysis of several GAN training methods for the
N-d LQ-GAN,
• Crossing-the-Curl, the first technique with O(N/k) stochastic convergence for
the N-d LQ-GAN,
• An empirical demonstration of Crossing-the-Curl in the multivariate LQ-GAN
setting as well as some common neural network driven settings in Appendix B.16.
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3.3 Generative Adversarial Networks
The Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [40] formulates learning a generative
model of data as finding a Nash equilibrium of a minimax game. The generator (min
player) aims to synthesize realistic data samples by transforming vectors drawn from
a fixed source distribution, e.g., N (0, Id). The discriminator (max player) attempts
to learn a scoring function that assigns low scores to synthetic data and high scores
to samples drawn from the true dataset. The generator’s transformation function, G,
and discriminator’s scoring function, D, are typically chosen to be neural networks
parameterized by weights θ and φ respectively. The minimax objective of the original
GAN [40] is
min
θ
max
φ
{
V (θ, φ) = Ey∼p(y)[g(Dφ(y))] + Ez∼p(z)[g(−Dφ(Gθ(z))]
}
, (3.1)
where p(z) is the source distribution, p(y) is the true data distribution, and g(x) =
− log(1 + e−x).
In practice, finding the solution to Equation (3.1) consists of local updates, e.g.,
SGD, to θ and φ. This continues until 1) V has stabilized, 2) the generated data is
judged qualitatively accurate, or 3) training has de-stabilized and appears irrecover-
able, at which point, training is restarted. The difficulty of training GANs has spurred
research that includes reformulating the minimax objective [6, 73, 78, 79, 87, 114, 123],
devising training heuristics [42, 57, 98, 96], proving the existence of equilibria [8], and
conducting local stability analyses [39, 74, 75, 80].
We acknowledge here that our algorithm, Crossing-the-Curl, was independently
proposed in [11] as Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA). In contrast to that work,
this chapter specifies a non-trivial application of this algorithm to LQ-GAN which
obtains guaranteed global convergence.
Recent work has studied a simplified setting, the Wasserstein LQ-GAN, where G
is a linear function, D is a quadratic function, g(x) = x, and p(z) is Gaussian [36, 80].
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Follow-up research has shown that, in this setting, the optimal generator distribution
is a rank-k Gaussian containing the top-k principal components of the data [36].
Furthermore, it is shown that if the dimensionality of p(z) matches that of p(y),
LQ-GAN is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation of the generator’s resulting
Gaussian distribution. To our knowledge, no GAN training algorithm with guaranteed
convergence is currently known for this setting. We revisit the LQ-GAN in more detail
in Section 3.5.
3.4 Convergence of Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we briefly review Variational Inequalities (VIs) and compare it to
the ODE Method leveraged in recent work [80]. See B.1.2 and B.1.1 for a discussion
of two additional theories.
3.4.1 Variational Inequalities
Variational Inequalities (VIs) are used to study equilibrium problems in a number
of domains including mechanics, traffic networks, economics, and game theory [23,
34, 43, 81]. The Variational Inequality problem, VI(F,X ), is to find an x∗ such
that for all x in the feasible set X , 〈F (x∗), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0. Under mild conditions
(see Appendix B.2), x∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium point. For readers familiar
with convex optimization, note the consistent similarity throughout this subsection
for when F = ∇f . In game theory, F often maps to the set of player gradients.
For example, the map corresponding to the minimax game in Equation (3.1) is F :
R|θ|+|φ| → [∇Vθ;−∇Vφ] ∈ R|θ|+|φ|.
A map, F , is monotone [9] if 〈F (x)−F (x′), x− x′〉 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and x′ ∈ X .
Alternatively, if the (possibly asymmetric) Jacobian matrix of F , J(F ), is positive
semidefinite (PSD), then F is monotone [81, 100] where
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Strongly-Monotone (Smooth/Sharp+)Monotone Pseudomonotone
Deterministic O(e−k) [19] (O(1/k) [18, 84]) O(1/√k) [53] O(1/√k) [25]
Stochastic O(1/k) [55] (O(1/k) [55, 120]) O(1/√k) [53] O(1/√k) [50]
Table 3.1: Existing convergence rates for VI algorithms in different settings.
J(F ) =

∂F1
∂x1
. . . ∂F1
∂xn
...
. . .
...
∂Fn
∂x1
. . . ∂Fn
∂xn
 . (3.2)
A matrix, J , is PSD if for all x ∈ Rn, x>Jx ≥ 0, or equivalently, J is PSD if
(J+J>)  0.
As in convex optimization, a hierarchy of monotonicity exists. F is
monotone iff ∀x ∈ X ,∀x′ ∈ X , 〈F (x)− F (x′), x− x′〉 ≥ 0, (3.3)
pseudomonotone iff ∀x ∈ X ,∀x′ ∈ X , 〈F (x′), x− x′〉 ≥ 0 =⇒ 〈F (x), x− x′〉 ≥ 0,
and quasimonotone iff ∀x ∈ X ,∀x′ ∈ X , 〈F (x′), x− x′〉 > 0 =⇒ 〈F (x), x− x′〉 ≥ 0.
(3.4)
If, in Equation (3.3), “≥” is replaced by “>”, then F is strictly-monotone; if “≥” is
replaced by “s||x − x′||2”, then F is s-strongly-monotone. If F is a gradient, then
replace monotone with convex.
Table 3.1 cites various Extragradient-type algorithms with convergence rates for
several settings. Whereas gradient descent achieves optimal convergence rates for
various convex optimization settings, Extragradient [61] achieves optimal rates for
VIs. If we can prove that a map, F˜ , associated with the game satisfies a known
monotonicity property while maintaining the same fixed point as the original game,
we need only look up the appropriate algorithm in this table to be able to solve for
the equilibrium point of the game.
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3.4.2 The ODE Method and Hurwitz Jacobians
Nagarajan and Kolter [2017] performed a local stability analysis of the gradient
dynamics of Equation (3.1), proving that the Jacobian of F evaluated at x∗ is Hur-
witz1 [15, 16, 58], i.e., the real parts of its eigenvalues are strictly positive. Assuming
the dynamics are Lipschitz continuous, their finding means that if simultaneous gra-
dient descent using a “square-summable, not summable” step sequence enters an
-ball with a low enough step size, it will converge to the equilibrium. This guarantee
applies only in the deterministic setting because stochastic gradients can cause the
iterates to exit this ball and diverge. Note that while the real parts of eigenvalues
reveal exponential growth or decay of trajectories, the imaginary parts reflect any
rotation in the system2.
The Hurwitz and monotonicity properties are complementary (see B.8). To sum-
marize, Hurwitz encompasses dynamics with exponentially stable trajectories and
with arbitrary rotation, while monotonicity includes cycles (Jacobians with purely
imaginary eigenvalues) and is similar to convex optimization. Also note we are inter-
ested in these as global properties. This means that if a subset of X is not Hurwitz
(or monotone), then the map is not Hurwitz (or monotone) globally and we cannot
naturally guarantee convergence globally.
Given the preceding discussion, we believe VIs and monotone operator theory will
serve as a strong foundation for deriving fundamental convergence results for GANs;
this theory is
1. Similar to convexity suggesting its adoption by the GAN community should be
smooth,
1Our definition of Hurwitz is equivalent to the more standard definition: −J is Hurwitz if
maxi[Re(λi(−J))] < 0.
2Linearized Dynamical System: x(t) =
∑
i civie
λit; Euler’s formula: e(a+ib)t = eat(cos(bt) +
i sin(bt)).
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2. Mature with natural mechanisms for handling constraints, subdifferentials, and
online scenarios,
3. Rich with algorithms with finite sample convergence for a hierarchy of monotone
operators.
Finally, we suggest [102] for a lucid comparison of convex optimization, game
theory, and VIs.
3.5 The Linear Quadratic GAN
In the Linear-Quadratic GAN, g(x) = x, and the generator and discriminator
are restricted to be linear and quadratic respectively: G(z) = Az + b and D(y) =
y>W2y + w>1 y. Equation (3.1) becomes
min
A,b
max
W2,w1
{
V (W2, w1, A, b) = Ey∼p(y)[D(y)]− Ez∼p(z)[D(G(z)]
}
. (3.5)
Let E[y] = µ, E[(y−µ)>(y−µ)] = Σ, E[z] = 0, and E[z2] = I. If A is constrained to be
lower triangular with positive diagonal, i.e., of Cholesky form, then (W ∗2 , w
∗
1, A
∗, b∗) =
(0,0,Σ1/2, µ) is the unique minimax solution (see Proposition 9). The majority of this
chapter focuses on the case where p(y) and p(z) are 1-d distributions. Equation (3.5)
simplifies to
min
a>0,b
max
w2,w1
{
V (w2, w1, a, b) = w2(σ
2 + µ2 − a2 − b2) + w1(µ− b)
}
. (3.6)
The map F naturally associated with this zero-sum game is constructed by concate-
nating the gradients of the two players’ losses (fG = V, fD = −V ):
F =
[
∂fD
∂w2
, ∂fD
∂w1
, ∂fG
∂a
, ∂fG
∂b
]>
=
[
a2 + b2 − σ2 − µ2, b− µ, −2w2a, −2w2b− w1
]>
.
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We say naturally because the unique fixed point of this system, F (x∗) = 0, occurs
when both generator and discriminator gradients are zero—occurring at (W ∗2 , w
∗
1, A
∗, b∗).
3.6 Crossing-the-Curl
In this section, we will derive our proposed technique, Crossing-the-Curl, moti-
vated by an examination of the (w1, b)-subsystem of LQ-GAN, i.e., (w2, a) fixed at
(0, a0) for any a0. The results discussed here hold for the N-dimensional case as well.
The map associated with this subsystem is plotted in Figure 3.2 and formally stated
in Equation (3.7).
Fw1,b = [b− µ,−w1]> (3.7)
Jw1,b =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
xk = [w1,k, bk]
>
xk+1 = xk − ρkFw1,b(xk) (3.8)
Figure 3.2: Vector field plot of Fw1,b for µ = 0 with Extragradient, xegk+1 (see up-
dates (3.9) and (3.10)), simultaneous gradient descent, xk+1, and Crossing-the-Curl,
xcck+1, updates overlayed on top.
The Jacobian of Fw1,b is not Hurwitz, and simultaneous gradient descent, defined
in Equation (3.8), will diverge for this problem (see B.5). However, Fw1,b is monotone
(J +J> = 0) and 1−Lipschitz in the sense that ||Fw1,b(x)−Fw1,b(x′)||2 ≤ 1||x−x′||2.
Table 3.1 offers an Extragradient method (see Figure 3.2) with an O(1/k) convergence
rate, which is optimal for worst case monotone maps.
Nevertheless, an algorithm that travels perpendicularly to the vector field will
proceed directly to the equilibrium. In this example, the intuition is to travel in the
direction that is perpendicular to both F and the axis of rotation. For a 2-D system,
the axis of rotation can be obtained by taking the curl of the vector field. To derive
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a direction perpendicular to both F and the axis of rotation, we can take their cross
product:
Fcc = −1
2
(
curl︷ ︸︸ ︷
∇× F )× F = −1
2
{∇F (v · F )− (v · ∇)F}
∣∣∣
v=F
= −
(J − J>
2
)
F =
 w1
b− µ

where∇F is Feynman notation for the gradient with respect to F only and |v=F means
evaluate the expression at v = F . The − 1/2 factor ensures the algorithm moves toward
regions of “tighter cycles” and simplifies notation. It may be sensible to perform some
linear combination of simultaneous gradient descent and Crossing-the-Curl, so we will
refer to (I − η(J − J>))F as Fηcc.
Note that the fixed point of Fcc remains the same as the original field F . Further-
more, the reader may recognize Fcc as the gradient of the function
1
2
(w21 + (b− µ)2),
which is strongly convex, allowing an O(e−k) convergence rate in the deterministic
setting. Fcc is derived from intuition in 2-D, however, we discuss reasons in the next
subsection for why this approach generalizes to higher dimensions.
3.6.1 Discussion and Relation to Other Methods
For the (w1, b)-subsystem, Crossing-the-Curl is equivalent to two other methods:
the consensus algorithm [74] and a Taylor series approximation to Extragradient [61].
Note that if we differentiate the path integral loss highlighted in Section 2.8.1 of the
previous chapter, the first term in the path integral loss recovers Extragradient while
the second term recovers the consensus algorithm.
These equivalences occur because the Jacobian is skew-symmetric (J> = −J) for
the (w1, b)-subsystem. In the more general case, where J is not necessarily skew-
symmetric, Crossing-the-Curl represents a combination of the two techniques. Ex-
tragradient (EG) is key to solving VIs and the consensus algorithm has delivered
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xˆk+1 = xk − ηˆF (xk) (3.9)
xk+1 = xk − ηF (xˆk+1) (3.10)
= xk − η (I − ηˆJ(xk))F (xk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Feg
(3.11)
+O(ηηˆ2)
xk+1 = xk − η(F (xk) + ηˆ∇||F ||2)
= xk − η (I + ηˆJ>(xk))F (xk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fcon
(3.12)
Figure 3.3: A Taylor series expansion of Extragradient (3.11) and the consensus
algorithm (3.12).
impressive results for GANs, so this is promising for Fcc. To our knowledge, Feg is
novel and has not appeared in the Variational Inequality literature.
Crossing-the-Curl stands out in many ways though. Observe that in higher dimen-
sions, the subspace orthogonal to F is (n − 1) dimensional, which means (J>−J)F
is no longer the unique direction orthogonal to F . However, every matrix can be
decomposed into a symmetric part with real eigenvalues, 1/2(J + J>), and a skew-
symmetric part with purely imaginary eigenvalues, 1/2(J − J>). Notice that for an
optimization problem, J−J>=H−H>=0 where H is the Hessian.3 It is the imaginary
eigenvalues, i.e., rotation, that set equilibrium problems apart from optimization and
necessitate the development of new algorithms like Extragradient. It is reassuring
that this matrix appears explicitly in Fcc. In addition, Fcc reduces to gradient de-
scent when applied to an optimization problem making the map agnostic to the type
of problem at hand: optimization or equilibration.
The curl also shares close relation to the gradient. The gradient is ∇ applied to a
scalar function and the curl is ∇ crossed with a vector function. Furthermore, under
mild conditions, every vector field, F : R3 → R3, admits a Helmholdtz decomposition:
F = −∇f +∇×G where f is a scalar function and G is a vector function suggesting
the gradient and curl are both fundamental components.
3Assuming the objective function has continuous second partial derivatives—see Schwarz’s theo-
rem.
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Consider the perspective of Fcc as preconditioning F by a skew-symmetric matrix.
Preconditioning with a positive definite matrix dates back to Newton’s method and
has reappeared in machine learning with natural gradient [5]. Dafermos [1983] con-
sidered asymmetric positive definite preconditioning matrices for VIs. Thomas [2014]
extended the analysis of natural gradient to PSD matrices. We are not aware of any
work using skew-symmetric matrices for preconditioning. The scalar x>Ax ≡ 0 for
any skew-symmetric matrix A, so calling (J> − J) a PSD matrix is not adequately
descriptive.
Note that Crossing-the-Curl does not always improve convergence; this technique
can transform a strongly-monotone field into a saddle and an unstable fixed point
(non-monotone) into a strongly-monotone field (see B.9 for examples), so this tech-
nique should generally be used with caution.
Lastly, Crossing-the-Curl is inexpensive to compute. The Jacobian-vector prod-
uct, JF , can be approximated accurately and efficiently with finite differences. Like-
wise, J>F can be computed efficiently with double backprop [30] by taking the gradi-
ent of 1/2||F ||2. In total, three backprops are required, one for F (xk), one for F (xˆk+1),
and one for 1/2||F (xk)||2.
In our analysis, we also consider the gradient regularization proposed in [80], Freg,
the Unrolled GAN proposed in [76], Funr, alternating gradient descent, Falt, as well
as any linear combination of F , JF , and J>F , deemed Flin, which forms a family of
maps that includes Feg, Fcon, and Fcc:
Freg =
[
FD; FG + η∇G||FD||2
]>
, Flin = (ρI + βJ
> − γJ)F.
Keep in mind that we are proposing Flin as a generalization of Crossing-the-Curl.
We state our main results here for the (w1, b)-subsystem.
Proposition 1. For any α, Fw1,blin with at least one of β and γ positive and both non-
negative is strongly monotone. Also, its Jacobian is Hurwitz. See Proposition 13.
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Corollary 1. Fw1,bcc , F
w1,b
ηcc , F
w1,b
eg , and F
w1,b
con with η > 0 are strongly-monotone with
Hurwitz Jacobians. See Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Fw1,balt , F
w1,b
unr , F
w1,b, and Fw1,breg with any η are monotone, but not
strictly monotone. Of these maps, only Fw1,breg ’s Jacobian is Hurwitz. See Proposi-
tions 12 and 13.
3.7 Analysis of the Full System
Here, we analyze the maps for each of the algorithms discussed above, testing
for quasimonotonicity (the weakest monotone property) and whether the Jacobian is
Hurwitz for the full LQ-GAN system.
Proving quasiconvexity of 4th degree polynomials has been proven strongly NP-
Hard [3]. This implies that proving monotonicity of 3rd degree maps is strongly
NP-Hard. The original F contains quadratic terms suggesting it may welcome a
quasimonotone analysis, however, the remaining maps all contain 3rd degree terms.
Unsurprisingly, analyzing quasimonotonicity for Flin represents the most involved of
our proofs given in Appendix B.11.
The definition stated in (3.4) suggests checking the truth of an expression de-
pending on four separate variables: x, x′, y, y′. While we used this definition for
certain cases, the following alternate requirements proposed in the work of Crouzeix
and Ferland [1996] made the complete analysis of the system tractable. We restate
simplified versions of the requirements we leveraged for convenience.
Consider the following conditions:
(A) For all x ∈ X and v ∈ Rn such that v>F (x) = 0 we have v>J(x)v ≥ 0.
(B) For all x ∈ X and x∗ ∈ X such that F (x∗) = 0, we have that F (x)>(x−x∗) ≥ 0.
Theorem 3 ([22], Theorem 3). Let F : X → Rn be differentiable on the open convex
set X ⊂ Rn.
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1. F is quasimonotone on X only if (A) holds, i.e. (A) is necessary but not
sufficient.
2. F is pseudomonotone on X if (A) and (B) hold, i.e. (A) and (B) are sufficient
but not necessary.
Condition (A) says that for a map to be quasimonotone, the map must be mono-
tone along directions orthogonal to the vector field. In addition to this, condition (B)
says that for a map to be pseudomonotone, the dynamics, −F , must not be leading
away from the equilibrium anywhere.
Equipped with these definitions, we can conclude the following:
Proposition 3. None of the maps, including Flin with any setting of coefficients, is
quasimonotone for the full LQ-GAN. See Corollary 5 and Propositions 15 through 17.
Proposition 4. None of the maps, including Flin with any setting of coefficients, has
a Hurwitz Jacobian for the full LQ-GAN. See Propositions 27 and 15 through 17.
3.7.1 Learning the Variance: The (w2, a)-Subsystem
Results from the previous section suggest that we cannot solve the full LQ-GAN,
but given that we can solve the (w1, b)-subsystem, we shift focus to the (w2, a)-
subsystem assuming the mean has already been learned exactly, i.e., b = µ. We will
revisit this assumption later.
We can conclude the following for the (w2, a)-subsystem:
Proposition 5. Fw2,a, Fw2,areg , F
w2,a
unr , F
w2,a
alt , and F
w2,a
con are not quasimonotone. Also,
their Jacobians are not Hurwitz. See Propositions 14 through 19.
Proposition 6. Fw2,aeg and F
w2,a
cc are pseudomonotone which implies an O(1/
√
k)
stochastic convergence rate. See Propositions 21 and 24. Their Jacobians are not
Hurwitz. See Proposition 27.
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Proposition 7. No monotone Fw2,alin exists. See Proposition 26.
These results are not purely theoretical. Figure 3.4 displays trajectories resulting
from each of the maps.
Fw2,aeg =
[
4w2a
2
2a(a2 − σ2)− 4w22a
]
(3.13)
↓ ∗1/4a2
Fw2,aeg′ =
[
w2
a2−σ2−2w22
2a
]
; (3.14)
Fw2,acc =
[
4w2a
2
2a(a2 − σ2)
]
(3.15)
↓ ∗1/4a2
Fw2,acc′ =
[
w2
a2−σ2
2a
]
(3.16)
Figure 3.4: (Left) Comparison of trajectories on the (w2, a)-subsystem.
4 The vector
field plotted is for the original system, x˙ = −Fw2,a(x). Observe how Fw2,acc takes a
more direct route to the equilibrium. (Right) Maps derived after rescaling Fw2,acc and
Fw2,aeg .
We can further improve upon Fw2,aeg and F
w2,a
cc by rescaling with 1/4a2: (3.13)→(3.14)
and (3.15)→(3.16) respectively. This results in strongly-monotone and strongly-
convex systems respectively, improving the stochastic convergence rate to O(1/k).
In deriving these results, we assumed the mean was given. We can relax this as-
sumption and analyze the (w2, a)-subsystem under the assumption that the mean is
“close enough”. Using a Hoeffding bound, we find that k >
(
yhi−ylow
−|µ|+
√
µ2+dσ2
)2
log[
√
2
δ1/2
]
iterations of Fw1,bcc are required to achieve a 1 − δ probability of the mean being ac-
curate enough to ensure the (w2, a)-subsystem is strongly-monotone. Note that this
approach of first learning the mean, then the variance retains the overall O(1/k)
stochastic rate. We summarize the main points here.
4ODEs were simulated using Heun-Euler with Phase Space Error Control [44].
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Claim 1. A nonlinear scaling of Fw2,aeg and F
w2,a
cc results in strictly monotone and
1/2-strongly monotone subsystems respectively. See Proposition 29.
Claim 2. If the mean is first well approximated, i.e., b2 ≤ µ2+σ2, then Fw2,acc′ remains
1) 1/2-strongly-monotone if the (w1, b)-subsystem is “shut off” or 2) strictly-monotone
if the (w1, b)-subsystem is re-weighted with a high coefficient. See Propositions 30
and 31.
Proposition 8. FW2,Aeg and F
W2,A
cc are not quasimonotone for the 2-D LQ-GAN sys-
tem (with and without (AA>)−1 scaling). See Proposition 32.
Several takeaways emerge. One is that the stability of the system is highly de-
pendent on the mean first being learned. In other words, batch norm is required for
the monotonicity of LQ-GAN, so it is not surprising that GANs typically fail without
these specialized layers.
Second is that stability is achieved by first learning a simple subsystem, (w1, b),
then learning the more complex, (w2, a)-subsystem. This theoretically confirms the
intuition behind progressive training of GANs [57], which have generated the highest
quality images to date. Note that the work by Karras et al. [2017] was inspired by
ideas described in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Thirdly, because J cc
′
w2,a
is symmetric (and  0), we can integrate F cc′w2,a to discover
the convex function it is implicitly descending via gradient descent: f cc
′
w2,a
= 1/2[(a2−
σ2) − σ2 log(a2/σ2)]. Compare this to KL-divergence: KL(σ||a) = 1/2[(σ2/a2) +
log(a2/σ2) − 1]. In contrast to KL, f cc′w2,a is convex in a and may be a desirable
alternative due to less extreme gradients near a = 0.
3.7.2 Learning the Covariance: The (W2, A)-Off-Diagonal Subsystem
After learning both the mean and variance of each dimension, the covariance
of separate dimensions can be learned. Proposition B.14 in the Appendix states
that the subsystem relevant to learning each row of A is strictly monotone when
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Subsystem F Falt Funr Freg Fcon Feg Fcc Feg′ Fcc′
(w1, b) M, H M, H M, H M,H SC,H SC,H SC,H NA NA
(w2, a) QM, H QM, H QM, H QM, H QM, H PM, H PM, H sM,H SC,H
Table 3.2: For convenience, we summarize many of our theoretical results in this
table. Legend: M=Monotone, C=Convex, H=Hurwitz, S=Strongly, s=Strictly,
P=Pseudo, Q=Quasi, /=Not.
all other rows are held fixed. In fact, the maps for these subsystems are affine and
skew-symmetric just like the (w1, b)-subsystem. This implies that Crossing-the-Curl
applied successively to each row of A can solve for A∗; pseudocode is presented in
Algorithm 5. Note that this procedure is reminiscent of the Cholesky-Banachiewicz
algorithm which computes A row by row, beginning with the first row. The resulting
algorithm is O(N/k).
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Algorithm 5 Crossing-the-Curl for LQ-GAN
Input: Sampling distribution p(y), max iterations K, batch size B, lower bound on
variance σmin
(1) Learn Mean
µ0 = [0, . . . , 0]
>
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
µˆ = 1
B
∑B
s=1(ys ∼ p(y))
µk =
k
k+1
µk−1 + 1k+1 µˆ, i.e., µk = µk−1 − ρkF bcc with step size ρk = 1k+1
end for
(2) Learn Variance
σ0 = [1, . . . , 1]
>
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
σˆ2 = 1
B
∑B
s=1[(ys ∼ p(y))− µK ]2
F acc′ = (σ
2
k − σˆ2)/(2σk)
σk = clip(σk−1 − 1k+1F acc′ , σmin,∞)
end for
(3) Learn Covariance
A0 = LT (IN), i.e., lower triangular part of identity matrix
A0,11 = σK,1
for all d = 2, . . . , N do
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
ys ∼ p(y), s = 1, . . . , B
Σˆ = 1
B
∑B
s=1(ys − µK)>(ys − µK)
FWi<d = 2
(∑
j≤iAk−1,ijAk−1,dj − Σˆid
)
FAcc = A
>
k−1,:d−1FWi<d where Ak−1,:d−1 refers to the top left d− 1× d− 1
block of Ak−1
Aˆk,d: = Ak−1,d: − 1k+1FAcc where Ak−1,d: refers to the dth row of Ak
excluding the diagonal
if
∑
j Aˆ
2
k,dj > σ
2
K,d − σ2min then
Aˆk,dj = Aˆk,dj · σK,d/
√∑
j Aˆ
2
k,dj + σ
2
min
end if
FWi<d = 2
(∑
j≤iAk−1,ijAˆk,dj − Σˆid
)
FAcc = A
>
k−1,:d−1FWi<d where Ak−1,:d−1 refers to the top left d− 1× d− 1
block of Ak−1
Ak,d: = Ak−1,d: − 1k+1FAcc where Ak−1,d: refers to the dth row of Ak
excluding the diagonal
if
∑
j A
2
k,dj > σ
2
K,d − σ2min then
Ak,dj = Ak,dj · σK,d/
√∑
j A
2
k,dj + σ
2
min
end if
end for
AK,dd =
√
σ2K,d −
∑
j A
2
K,dj
end for
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3.8 Experiments
Our theoretical analysis proves convergence of the stagewise procedure using
Crossing-the-Curl for the N-d LQGAN. Experiments solving the (w2, a)-subsystem
alone for randomly generated E[(y − µ)2] = σ2 support the analysis of Subsec-
tion 3.7.1—see the first row of Table 3.3. Not listed in the first row of the table
are Fcc′ and Feg′ which converge in 32 and 33 steps on average respectively with a
constant step size of 0.1. Our novel maps, Fcc and Feg, converge in a quarter of the
iterations of the next best method (Freg), and Fcc′ and Feg′ in nearly a quarter of their
parent counterparts. These experiments used analytical results of the expectations,
i.e., the systems are deterministic.
Dim F EG Fcon Freg Feg Fcc
1 (2) 105 (0) 83315 (0.4) 6354 (0.94) 395 (1) 116 (1) 110 (1)
2 (6) 105 (0) 98244 (0.05) 33583 (0.68) 2595 (1) 1321 (1) 1441 (1)
4 (10) 105 (0) 99499 (0.01) 77589 (0.23) 33505 (0.7) 34929 (0.67) 34888 (0.68)
Table 3.3: Each entry in the table reports two quanities. First is the average number
of steps, k, required for each dynamical system, e.g., x˙ = −F (x), to reduce ||xk −
x∗||/||x0−x∗|| to 0.001 for the (W2, A)-subsystem. The second, in parentheses, reports
the fraction of trials that the algorithm met this threshold in under 100,000 iterations.
Dim denotes the dimensionality of x ∼ p(x) for the LQ-GAN being trained (with
|θ| + |φ| in parentheses). For each problem, x0 is randomly initialized 10 times for
each of ten randomly initialized Σ’s, i.e., 100 trials per cell. Extragradient (EG) is
run with a fixed step size. All other ODEs are solved via Heun-Euler with Phase
Space Error Control [44].
The second and third rows of the table reveal that convergence slows considerably
for higher dimensions. However, the stagewise procedure discussed in Subsection 3.7.2
is guaranteed to converge. This procedure solves the 4-d deterministic LQ-GAN in
20549 iterations with a 0.88 success rate. For the 4-d stochastic LQ-GAN using
single-sample minibatch estimates, this procedure achieves ||xk−x∗||/||x0−x∗|| < 0.1
in 100,000 iterations with a 0.75 success rate.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we performed the first global convergence analysis for a variety
of GAN training algorithms. According to Variational Inequality theory, none of
the current GAN training algorithms is globally convergent for the LQ-GAN. We
proposed an intuitive technique, Crossing-the-Curl, with the first global convergence
guarantees for any generative adversarial network. As a by-product of our analysis, we
extract high-level explanations for why the use of batch norm and progressive training
schedules for GANs are critical to training. In experiments with the multivariate LQ-
GAN, Crossing-the-Curl achieves performance superior to any existing GAN training
algorithm.
3.9.1 Up Next
In this chapter, we showed that by applying Crossing-the-Curl first to the problem
of learning the mean of a distribution, then to learning the covariance in successively
higher dimensional equilibrium problems, we were able to ensure global convergence.
This concept of training the GAN using discriminators of varying and increasing levels
of complexity supports our discussion in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERATIVE MULTI-ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
4.1 Purpose of Research
GANs are theoretically formulated as a search for the minimax optimal generator,
the generator that achieves the minimal loss with respect to the best discriminator.
In practice, GAN training typically consists of optimizing a single generator and
a single discriminator simultaneously. This means that the discriminator is nearly
always suboptimal. Furthermore, once training has reached an equilibrium, we can
only trust that the generator achieves the minimal loss with respect to the best
discriminator in a local neighborhood. Unfortunately, the most obvious alternative,
training the discriminator to convergence before each generator update, results in a
discriminator that provides very little training signal to the generator. We would like
a tractable technique for obtaining a generator that is closer to minimax optimal.
In search of this goal, we pit the single generator against several discriminators.
Intuitively, if the generator “fools” a diverse set of discriminators, we can be more
confident that the generator is minimax optimal. We explore various ways of present-
ing the discriminator training signal to the generator and find that simply averaging
the discriminator training signals leads to many performance benefits.
Spoiler : We present a simple extension to GANs that incorporates multiple dis-
criminators. We show that introducing more discriminators into the standard GAN
framework reduces variance of the minimax objective, improves the quality of the
resulting samples that are generated, and accelerates convergence of the GAN to a
steady-state minimax loss.
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4.2 Introduction
In this chapter, we theoretically and empirically justify generalizing the GAN
framework to multiple discriminators. We review GANs and summarize our extension
in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we present our N -discriminator extension to the GAN
framework (Generative Multi-Adversarial Networks). Section 4.4.2 explains how this
extension makes training with the untampered minimax objective tractable. In Sec-
tion 4.5, we define an intuitive metric (GMAM) to quantify GMAN performance and
evaluate our framework on a variety of image generation tasks. Section 4.6 concludes
with a summary of our contributions and directions for future research.
Contributions—To summarize, our main contributions are: i) a multi-discriminator
GAN framework, GMAN, that allows training with the original, untampered minimax
objective; ii) a generative multi-adversarial metric (GMAM) to perform pairwise eval-
uation of separately trained frameworks; iii) a particular instance of GMAN, GMAN∗,
that allows the generator to automatically regulate training and reach higher perfor-
mance (as measured by GMAM) in a fraction of the training time required for the
standard GAN model.
4.3 Generative Adversarial Networks to GMAN
The original formulation of a GAN is a minimax game between a generator, Gθ(z) :
z → x, and a discriminator, Dω(x) : x→ [0, 1],
min
G
max
D∈D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)
[
log(D(x))
]
+ Ez∼pz(z)
[
log(1−D(G(z)))
]
, (4.1)
where pdata(x) is the true data distribution and pz(z) is a simple (usually fixed) dis-
tribution that is easy to draw samples from (e.g., N (0, 1)). We differentiate between
the function space of discriminators, D, and elements of this space, D. Let pG(x) be
the distribution induced by the generator, Gθ(z). We assume D,G to be deep neural
networks as is typically the case.
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In their original work, Goodfellow et al. [2014] proved that given sufficient network
capacities and an oracle providing the optimal discriminator, D∗ = arg maxD V (D,G),
gradient descent on pG(x) will recover the desired globally optimal solution, pG(x) =
pdata(x), so that the generator distribution exactly matches the data distribution. In
practice, they replaced the second term, log(1 − D(G(z))), with − log(D(G(z))) to
enhance gradient signals at the start of the game; note this is no longer a zero-sum
game. Part of their convergence and optimality proof involves using the oracle, D∗,
to reduce the minimax game to a minimization over G only:
min
G
V (D∗, G) = min
G
{
C(G) = − log(4) + 2 · JSD(pdata||pG)
}
(4.2)
where JSD denotes Jensen-Shannon divergence. Minimizing C(G) necessarily mini-
mizes JSD, however, we rarely know D∗ and so we instead minimize V (D,G), which
is only a lower bound.
4.3.1 GMAN: A Multi-adversarial Extension
We propose introducing multiple discriminators, which brings with it a number of
design possibilities. We explore approaches ranging between two extremes: 1) a more
discriminating D (better approximating maxD V (D,G)) and 2) a D better matched
to the generator’s capabilities. Approach 1 failed to produce good results—it has
been relegated to the appendix. We describe approach 2 below. Mathematically,
we reformulate G’s objective as minG maxF (V (D1, G), . . . , V (DN , G)) for different
choices of F (see Figure 4.1). Each Di is still expected to independently maximize
its own V (Di, G), i.e. there is no explicit cooperation. We sometimes abbreviate
V (Di, G) with Vi and F (V1, . . . , VN) with FG(Vi).
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GDND2D1
V(DN,G)V(D2,G)V(D1,G)
F(·)
Figure 4.1: (GMAN) The generator trains using feedback aggregated over multiple
discriminators. If F ≡ max, G trains against the best discriminator. If F ≡ mean, G
trains against an ensemble. We explore other alternatives to F in Subsections 4.4.1
and 4.4.3 that improve on both these options.
4.4 A Forgiving Teacher
This section focuses on the perspective that asks the question, “Is maxD V (D,G)
too harsh a critic?”
4.4.1 Soft-Discriminator
In practice, training against a far superior discriminator can impede the genera-
tor’s learning. This is because the generator is unlikely to generate any samples con-
sidered “realistic” by the discriminator’s standards, and so the generator will receive
uniformly negative feedback. This is problematic because the information contained
in the gradient derived from negative feedback only dictates where to drive down
pG(x), not specifically where to increase pG(x). Furthermore, driving down pG(x)
necessarily increases pG(x) in other regions of X (to maintain
∫
X pG(x) = 1) which
may or may not contain samples from the true dataset (whack-a-mole dilemma). In
contrast, a generator is more likely to see positive feedback against a more lenient
discriminator, which may better guide a generator towards amassing pG(x) in approx-
imately correct regions of X .
For this reason, we explore a variety of functions that allow us to soften the max
operator. We choose to focus on soft versions of the three classical Pythagorean means
parameterized by λ where λ = 0 corresponds to the mean and the max is recovered
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as λ→∞:
AMsoft(V, λ) =
N∑
i
wiVi (4.3)
GMsoft(V, λ) = − exp
( N∑
i
wi log(−Vi)
)
(4.4)
HMsoft(V, λ) =
( N∑
i
wiV
−1
i
)−1
(4.5)
where wi = e
λVi/Σje
λVj with λ ≥ 0, Vi < 0. Using a softmax also has the well known
advantage of being differentiable (as opposed to subdifferentiable for max). Note
that we only require continuity to guarantee that computing the softmax is actually
equivalent to computing V (D˜, G) where D˜ is some convex combination of Di (see
Appendix C.2).
4.4.2 Using the Original Minimax Objective
To illustrate the effect the softmax has on training, observe that the component
of AMsoft(V, 0) relevant to generator training can be rewritten as
1
N
N∑
i
Ex∼pG(x)
[
log(1−Di(x))
]
=
1
N
Ex∼pG(x)
[
log(z)
]
. (4.6)
where z =
∏N
i (1−Di(x)). Note that the generator gradient, |∂ log(z)∂z |, is minimized at
z = 1 over z ∈ (0, 1]1. From this form, it is clear that z = 1 if and only if Di = 0 ∀i,
so G only receives a vanishing gradient if all Di agree that the sample is fake; this
is especially unlikely for large N . In other words, G only needs to fool a single
Di to receive constructive feedback. This result allows the generator to successfully
minimize the original generator objective, log(1−D). This is in contrast to the more
popular − log(D) introduced to artificially enhance gradients at the start of training.
1∇GV = −
∑
i
Di
z
∂Di
∂G
∏
j 6=i(1−Dj) = − 1z ∂Dk∂G for Dk = 1, D6=k = 0. Our argument ignores ∂Dk∂G .
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At the beginning of training, when maxDi V (Di, G) is likely too harsh a critic for
the generator, we can set λ closer to zero to use the mean, increasing the odds of
providing constructive feedback to the generator. In addition, the discriminators have
the added benefit of functioning as an ensemble, reducing the variance of the feedback
presented to the generator, which is especially important when the discriminators are
far from optimal and are still learning a reasonable decision boundary. As training
progresses and the discriminators improve, we can increase λ to become more critical
of the generator for more refined training.
4.4.3 Automating Regulation
The problem of keeping the discriminator and generator in balance has been widely
recognized in previous work with GANs. Issues with unstable dynamics, oscillatory
behavior, and generator collapse are not uncommon. In addition, the discriminator
is often times able to achieve a high degree of classification accuracy (producing a
single scalar) before the generator has made sufficient progress on the arguably more
difficult generative task (producing a high dimensional sample). Salimans et al. [2016]
suggested label smoothing to reduce the vulnerability of the generator to a relatively
superior discriminator. Here, we explore an approach that enables the generator
to automatically temper the performance of the discriminator when necessary, but
still encourages the generator to challenge itself against more accurate adversaries.
Specifically, we augment the generator objective:
min
G,λ∈(0,λmax)
FG(Vi)− f(λ) (4.7)
where f(λ) is monotonically increasing in λ which appears in the softmax equations,
(4.3)—(4.5). In experiments, we simply set f(λ) = cλ with c a constant (e.g., 0.001).
The generator is incentivized to increase λ to reduce its objective at the expense of
competing against the best available adversary D∗ (see Appendix C.3).
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4.5 Evaluation
Evaluating GANs is still an open problem. In their original work, Goodfellow
et al. [2014] report log likelihood estimates from Gaussian Parzen windows, which they
admit, has high variance and is known not to perform well in high dimensions. Theis
et al. [2016] recommend avoiding Parzen windows and argue that generative models
should be evaluated with respect to their intended application. Salimans et al. [2016]
suggest an Inception score, however, it assumes labels exist for the dataset. Recently,
Im et al. [2016] introduced the Generative Adversarial Metric (GAM) for making pair-
wise comparisons between independently trained GAN models. The core idea behind
their approach is given two generator, discriminator pairs (G1, D1) and (G2, D2), we
should be able to learn their relative performance by judging each generator under
the opponent’s discriminator.
4.5.1 Metric
In GMAN, the opponent may have multiple discriminators, which makes it un-
clear how to perform the swaps needed for GAM. We introduce a variant of GAM,
the generative multi-adversarial metric (GMAM), that is amenable to training with
multiple discriminators,
GMAM = log
(F aGb(V ai )
F aGa(V
a
i )
/F bGa(V bi )
F bGb(V
b
i )
)
. (4.8)
where a and b refer to the two GMAN variants (see Section 4.3.1 for notation FG(Vi)).
The idea here is similar. If G2 performs better than G1 with respect to both D1 and
D2, then GMAM>0 (remember V≤0 always). If G1 performs better in both cases,
GMAM<0, otherwise, the result is indeterminate.
67
4.5.2 Experiments
We evaluate the aforementioned variations of GMAN on a variety of image gen-
eration tasks: MNIST [64], CIFAR-10 [63] and CelebA [69]. We focus on rates of
convergence to steady state along with quality of the steady state generator accord-
ing to the GMAM metric. To summarize, loosely in order of increasing discriminator
leniency, we compare
• F-boost: A single AdaBoost.OL-boosted discriminator (see Appendix C.4).
• P-boost: Di is trained according to AdaBoost.OL. A max over the weak learner
losses is presented to the generator instead of the boosted prediction (see Ap-
pendix C.4).
• GMAN-max: max{Vi} is presented to the generator.
• GAN: Standard GAN with a single discriminator (see Appendix C.0.2).
• mod-GAN: GAN with modified objective (generator minimizes − log(D(G(z))).
• GMAN-λ: GMAN with F ≡arithmetic softmax with parameter λ.
• GMAN∗: The arithmetic softmax is controlled by the generator through λ.
All generator and discriminator models are deep (de)convolutional networks [92],
and aside from the boosted variants, all are trained with Adam [59] and batch nor-
malization [48]. Discriminators convert the real-valued outputs of their networks to
probabilities with squashed -sigmoids to prevent saturating logarithms in the minimax
objective (+ 1−2
1+e−z ). See Appendix C.5 for further details. We test GMAN systems
with N = {2, 5} discriminators. We maintain discriminator diversity by varying
dropout probability and network depth.
Figure 4.2 reveals that increasing the number of discriminators reduces the num-
ber of iterations to steady-state by 2x on MNIST; increasing N (the size of the
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discriminator ensemble) also has the added benefit of reducing the variance the mini-
max objective over runs. Figure 4.3 displays the variance of the same objective over a
sliding time window, reaffirming GMAN’s acceleration to steady-state. Figure 4.4 cor-
Figure 4.2: Generator objective, F ,
averaged over 5 training runs on
MNIST. Increasing the number of dis-
criminators accelerates convergence of
F to steady state (solid line) and re-
duces its variance, σ2 (filled shadow
±1σ). Figure 4.3 provides alternative
evidence of GMAN∗’s accelerated con-
vergence.
Figure 4.3: Stdev, σ, of the gener-
ator objective over a sliding window
of 500 iterations. Lower values in-
dicate a more steady-state. GMAN∗
with N = 5 achieves steady-state at
≈2x speed of GAN (N = 1). Note
Figure 4.2’s filled shadows reveal stdev
of F over runs, while this plot shows
stdev over iterations.
roborates this conclusion with recognizable digits appearing approximately an epoch
before the single discriminator run; digits at steady-state appear slightly sharper as
well.
Our GMAM metric (see Table 4.1) agrees with the relative quality of images in
Figure 4.4 with GMAN∗ achieving the best overall performance. Figure 4.5 reveals
GMAN∗’s attempt to regulate the difficulty of the game to accelerate learning. Fig-
ure 4.6 displays the GMAM scores comparing fixed λ’s to the variable λ controlled
by GMAN∗.
We see similar accelerated convergence behavior for the CelebA dataset in Fig-
ure 4.7.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of image quality across epochs forN = {1, 2, 5} using GMAN-
0 on MNIST.
Score Variant GMAN∗ GMAN-0 GMAN-max mod-GAN
B
et
te
r→
0.127 GMAN∗ - −0.020± 0.009 −0.028± 0.019 −0.089± 0.036
0.007 GMAN-0 0.020± 0.009 - −0.013± 0.015 −0.018± 0.027
−0.034 GMAN-max 0.028± 0.019 0.013± 0.015 - −0.011± 0.024
−0.122 mod-GAN 0.089± 0.036 0.018± 0.027 0.011± 0.024 -
Table 4.1: Pairwise GMAM metric means with stdev for select models on MNIST.
For each column, a positive GMAM indicates better performance relative to the row
opponent; negative implies worse. Scores are obtained by summing each variant’s
column.
Figure 4.8 displays images generated by GMAN-0 on CIFAR-10. See Appendix C.0.3
for more results.
We also found that GMAN is robust to mode collapse. We believe this is because
the generator must appease a diverse set of discriminators in each minibatch. Emit-
ting a single sample will score well for one discriminator at the expense of the rest of
the discriminators. Current solutions (e.g., minibatch discrimination) are quadratic
in batch size. GMAN, however, is linear in batch size.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced multiple discriminators into the GAN framework and explored dis-
criminator roles ranging from a formidable adversary to a forgiving teacher. Allowing
the generator to automatically tune its learning schedule (GMAN∗) outperformed
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Figure 4.5: GMAN∗ regulates diffi-
culty of the game by adjusting λ. Ini-
tially, G reduces λ to ease learning and
then gradually increases λ for a more
challenging learning environment.
Score λ λ∗ λ = 1 λ = 0
(N = 5)
B
et
te
r→ 0.028 λ
∗ - −0.008
±0.009
−0.019
±0.010
0.001 λ = 1 0.008±0.009
- −0.008
±0.010
−0.025 λ = 0 0.019±0.010 0.008±0.010 -
Figure 4.6: Pairwise GMAM
stdev(GMAM)
for
GMAN-λ and GMAN∗ (λ∗) over 5 runs on
MNIST.
GANs with a single discriminator on MNIST. In general, GMAN variants achieved
faster convergence to a higher quality steady state on a variety of tasks as measured
by a GAM-type metric (GMAM). In addition, GMAN makes using the original GAN
objective possible by increasing the odds of the generator receiving constructive feed-
back. Follow up research motivated by the curriculum training schedule just presented
achieved some of the highest quality images generated by a GAN to date [57].
4.6.1 Up Next
One of the benefits observed of GMAN is accelerated convergence of the minimax
loss to steady-state. Often, convergence of the loss along with visually satisfactory
samples indicates to practitioners that training is complete. However, do a steady
loss and steady sample quality imply that the weights of the game have converged?
The next chapter borrows techniques from dynamical system theory to answer this
question.
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Figure 4.7: Image quality improvement across number of generators at same number
of iterations for GMAN-0 on CelebA.
Figure 4.8: Images generated by GMAN-0 on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYZING NON-MONOTONE GAMES
5.1 Purpose of Research
Many of the equilibrium problems of interest in ML, for example GANs, are not
monotone. That being said, researchers have been able to employ heuristics to achieve
promising empirical results which demonstrates that training these models is tractable
to some degree. Similar challenges were encountered in deep learning. It was thought
that deep networks would be intractable to train due to their inherent non-convexity,
yet the repeated successes of researchers suggested otherwise. It was only recently
discovered through random matrix (Hessian) theory and other approaches that the
primary obstacles to successful optimization of deep networks are saddle points and
also that most local minima are only marginally suboptimal. This finding has been
followed by a surge of research into methods for “escaping saddle points”.
Given that monotone operator theory can not explain the success of GANs trained
with deep networks, we would like some set of tools for analyzing these more complex
models. In contrast to optimization theory where one can analyze a local neighbor-
hood by examining the spectrum of the Hessian, there exist structures in dynamical
systems that can only be recognized at a macro-scale. For example, we cannot neces-
sarily recognize a limit-cycle of large radius by examining the cycle’s center. Here, we
extend tools from dynamical systems theory, namely Lyapunov Exponent calculation,
for characterizing the dynamics of complex systems. These tools reveal qualitative
characteristics of the equilibrium dynamics including stable fixed points, limit cycles,
and strange attractors. By gaining a better understanding of complex equilibrium
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problems we may develop better algorithms and better understand behavior away
from the equilibrium.
Spoiler : By computing the Lypapunov exponents, we are able to show that success-
fully trained GANs are not always converging to equilibria or even local neighbor-
hoods of equilibria. Instead they are sometimes converging to limit-cycles or strange
attractors. Our contribution focuses on identifying these challenges, and we leave
overcoming these challenges to future work.
5.2 Introduction
While the necessary progress in (non)-monotone operator theory / VIs may not
emerge for some time, Lyapunov exponent and machine learning techniques can pro-
vide useful empirical tools for analyzing game dynamics. In Section 5.3 we explain
how VI’s connection to projected dynamical systems allows us to apply a Monte-
Carlo sampling tool for analyzing complex VI problems; we then enhance this tool
in Section 5.4 so it scales to large games (i.e., many player variables). In Section 5.5
we discuss an interesting application in modeling the cloud services market economy.
We then we explore our proposed model with a hypothetical case study and demon-
strate the proposed machine learning pipeline on our new cloud services model. In
Section 5.7, we compute the Lyapunov exponents of GANs applied to a variety of
datasets and show that “successful” GAN training sometimes converges to strange
attractors.
5.3 Identifying Boundaries of Attraction
VI theory provides no general guarantees on the uniqueness of Nash equilibria
when losses are non-convex. This motivates an algorithmic approach to identifying the
number of equilibria, their locations, and possibly other phenomena. In particular, we
74
will leverage theory and algorithms from dynamical systems - we refer the interested
reader to the book by Strogatz [2014] for a gentle introduction.
Nagurney and Zhang [1996] established an equivalence between VIs and projected
dynamical systems that makes available new theory and algorithms, providing a foun-
dation for the necessary analysis.
Definition 1. Assuming that the feasible set X is a convex polytope, the projected
dynamical system, PDS(F,X ), corresponding to VI(F,X ) is x˙ = ΠX (x,−F (x)) with
x(0) = x0 and ΠX (x,−F (x)) = limδ→0 PX (x−δF (x))−xδ .
In terms of attractors, strongly monotone VIs admit only stable fixed points ac-
companied by a relatively small range of attractor dynamics including stable spirals
and nodes. As expected, less can be said of VIs arising from non-convex loss func-
tions. Other, qualitatively distinct attractors include limit cycles, tori, and strange
attractors (see Figure 5.1). It’s important to be aware of these other possible attrac-
Figure 5.1: Stable spiral (left) and limit cycle (right, dashed).
tors when analyzing a more complex system. For example, consider a stock exchange
and assume the market closed with prices at a stable equilibrium. A stock opening
the next morning in one range of prices may cause the group of stocks as a whole to
simply readjust to a new stable NE. On the other hand, opening the stock in another
range of prices may result in the group tending towards a limit cycle where prices
continuously oscillate. It’s then obvious that the ability to predict which ranges re-
sult in which behaviors helps determine where it’s best to open the stock. Thus, we
75
would like to identify the endpoints of these ranges, or more generally, the boundaries
of attraction (BoAs).
There are several existing techniques for identifying BoAs. The theory of Lya-
punov functions has long motivated a large group of these, however, they can only be
applied to restricted types of nonlinear systems and are not capable of identifying the
entire BoA [66]. Others attempt to approximate Lypapunov functions using a set of
scalar functions [88]. Still other, non-Lypunov based approaches have been proposed
that work backwards from the attractor. These methods tend to be lightweight, but
less reliable. Recently, Armiyoon and Wu [2014] developed a method for identifying
BoAs that relies on Lyapunov exponent (LE) theory. Convergence of LEs can be slow,
but they enjoy the advantage of being independent of initial conditions and can be
applied to general nonlinear systems. The authors proposed the use of Monte-Carlo
sampling to alleviate the computational load of calculating LEs. Their approach can
give us an idea of the number and types of attractors we can encounter in a bounded
space, but first, to understand their algorithm, we need an understanding of LEs.
LEs measure the long-term deformation of a sphere along a trajectory in the
dynamical system and are invariant within a single BoA. It’s this invariance property
that allows us to use the LE as a signature for the basin of attraction in spite of varying
initial conditions.1 Furthermore, LEs reveal the type of attractor. For instance, if all
values in the LE are negative, the attractor is a stable fixed point; if instead, one of
the values is zero, the attractor is a limit cycle (see Table 5.1).
Consider the following linear approximation to an n-dimensional dynamical sys-
tem, x˙ = F (x): ψ˙ = Jψ where we have replaced x with a matrix ψ whose columns
are meant to approximate the eigenvectors of the system. Assume the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian are distinct (implies its eigenvectors are linearly independent). In the
1Two basins may have the same LE though.
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Type Sorted LE Spectrum
Stable Fixed Point (−, . . . ,−)
Limit Cycle (1-torus) (0,−, . . . ,−)
n-Torus ( 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n leading 0′s
,−, . . . ,−)
Chaos (repeller) (+, . . .)
Table 5.1: LE spectrum for continuous-time attractors.
following example, we will focus on the first column of ψ and assume ψ1(0) = u1,
the first unit-norm eigenvector. The following process provides intuition for the LE
computation process:
ψ˙1 = Jψ (5.1)
ψ1(t) = c1e
λ1tu1 + . . .+ cne
λntun (5.2)
ψ1(0) = u1 = c1u1 + . . .+ cnun =⇒ c1 = 1, c2 = . . . = cn = 0 (5.3)
ψ1(∆t) = u1e
λ1∆t (5.4)
log ||ψ1(∆t)|| = log ||u1eλ1∆t|| = log(eλ1∆t) + log ||u1|| (5.5)
= λ1∆t. (5.6)
Therefore, by evolving the system ψ˙ = Jψ and tracking the change in norm of the
columns of ψ, we can attempt to recover the “eigenvalues” of the system.
The general idea of Armiyoon and Wu’s algorithm is to sample grid points with
high probability of being near a BoA, compute the LEs of the sampled grid point
as well as a few of its neighbors, and then compare LEs between all pairs of tested
points. If a pair of LEs do not match, then they are located on either side of a BoA
and the pair can be added to a training set for a classifier (e.g. SVM). In addition,
the probabilities of the neighbors can be increased since they are most likely near the
boundary as well. In the case where the LEs are the same (within some tolerance),
the probabilities can be reduced.
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In their paper, they consider domains in R2 to R4. Low dimensionality allows them
to apply standard LE calculation techniques coupled with more basic ODE solvers
(e.g. constant step size) without compromising runtime. We are more interested in
the high dimensional domains that often occur in VIs with many players, each of which
controls multiple variables. Given a constant number of grid points per dimension,
the total number of grid points scales exponentially with the number of dimensions
and quickly makes this Monte-Carlo sampling approach impractical. Moreover, basic
ODE solvers may incorrectly track the trajectories of systems that contain multiple
time scales.
5.4 Improving the BoA Identification Algorithm
As stated, we would like to alter the BoA algorithm so it scales more gracefully
with dimensionality. The first step is to adjust the LE computation to be able to
accompany an ODE solver (S) with an adaptive step size scheme (T). While the
fix is somewhat trivial, it was very difficult to come across explicit LE computation
instructions for constant step sizes [117, 99] and we never found any such instructions
for adaptive step sizes. We include the necessary pseudocode in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 LE for use with Adaptive Step Sizes
INPUT: F, x0,∆t0,S,T
1: Λ = (0, . . . , 0), ψ0 = I, k = 0, T = 0
2: J ← Jacobian(F(x)) · ψ
3: GS ← GramSchmidt without normalization
4: | · |c ← column-wise norm
5: repeat
6: xk+1 = S(xk,∆tk, F ) *evolve trajectory
7: ψˆk+1 = S(ψk,∆tk, J) *evolve ellipsoid
8: ψˆk+1 = GS(ψˆk+1) *orthogonalize ellipsoid
9: λ∆t = log(|ψˆk+1|c) *measure growth
10: Λ = (Λ · T + λ∆t)/(T + ∆tk) *update mean
11: T = T + ∆tk
12: ψk+1 = ψˆk+1/|ψˆk+1|c *reset to sphere
13: ∆tk+1 = T(xk, xk+1, ψk, ψk+1,∆tk)
14: until Convergence of Λ
Next, we point out that computing an LE involves following the trajectory from
an initial point x0 until convergence. The runtime for this computation alone can
be extensive for high dimensional systems. Since the LE is a global property and
hence, in theory, a property shared by all points along the trajectory, ignoring the
computed LE’s association with all points along the trajectory seems particularly
wasteful. Instead of throwing out this information, we can include it by recognizing
that all subsequent points after the initial point along the trajectory are ideally pro-
gressing away from the boundary (assuming integer dimensional BoA’s). Moreover,
the LE gives us an idea of the exponential rate of divergence away from the boundary,
and so we can use the LE to decay the probability of grid points along the trajectory.
Algorithm 7 describes the steps used to adjust probabilities using this heuristic and
an example is displayed in Figure 5.2. This approach allows us to update the proba-
bilities of many more grid points per LE computation, helping to combat the issues
of dimensionality.
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Figure 5.2: The probabilities of points farther along the trajectory (white to black)
should be reduced as they are most likely far away from any boundary. These adjust-
ments can be shared with the surrounding grid points.
5.5 A New Market Model
We demonstrate the potential of the proposed algorithm on a model of the promi-
nent, commercial cloud market that has arisen over the past decade. Several compa-
nies, or clouds, offer compute services to the public at different prices and qualities
of service. In general, the quality of a service degrades as the price is lowered. Each
cloud i advertises the same price-degradation pair, (pi, di), to every client j. As sug-
gested by Wang et al. [2015], client j’s demand for cloud i, Qij, is monotonically
decreasing in pi and di with a nonzero zero-utility cutoff. Note that while we will
continue to discuss this model in the context of cloud services, our model can likely
be applied to any industry where firms set prices for quality of service at a cost to
themselves.
Our demand function, Qij, consists of a squared-exponential spliced with a 5th
degree polynomial (coefficients β are in Appendix D.2). The function is twice dif-
ferentiable, contains both elastic and inelastic regions, and drops to zero-demand at
finite tij (see Figure 5.3). We’ve also included factors pr =
pi
p¯
, dr =
di
d¯
where p¯ and
d¯ are cloud price and degradation averages so that clients are also attracted to low
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Algorithm 7 Update Grid Probability Along
Trajectory x
INPUT: LE, x,∆tk, dmax
1: Initialize hashes N,D
2: t = 0, T =
∑
∆tk, λ = max(|LE|)
3: for xk in x do
4: g,d = gridNeighborsDistances(xk)
5: for each (g, d) in (g,d) do
6: N [g]
+
= e−λ·t/T ·∆tk
7: D[g]
+
= ∆tk
8: end for
9: t
+
= ∆tk
10: end for
11: for each g in N,D do
12: P (g)
∗
= N [g]/D[g]
13: end for
prices/degradation in a relative sense. Client-cloud loyalty is simulated through client
j’s elasticity coefficient, αij, while purchasing power is given by Hij (see equations
5.7 and 5.8).
tij = αijpidiprdr (5.7)
Qij =

Hije
−t2ij , tij ∈ [0, tc]
5∑
k=0
βkt
i
ij , tij ∈ (tc, tc + 1)
0 , tij ∈ [tc + 1,∞)
(5.8)
pii =
∑
j
piQij(pi, di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
− ci
d2i
Qij(pi, di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost
(5.9)
Figure 5.3: Proposed demand function Qij(tij) with t
c = 1.
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Cloud profit2, pii, is defined as revenue minus cost where cost scales as the square
of quality (1/di) with coefficient ci.
Let xi = (pi, di) ∈ [,∞)2, i ∈ 1, . . . , n, and Li(xi, x−i) = −pii, then we would
like to analyze the model given by VI(F,X ) where F = (∇x1L1, . . . ,∇xnLn) and
X = [,∞)2n. Note that X is unbounded (not compact), so we are not guaranteed a
solution to the VI exists.
We stated in the introduction, an equivalence between the VI with pseudo-convex
losses and the NE problem. The cloud profit functions, as defined, are, in gen-
eral, non-concave. Although we no longer have a guarantee that solutions to the VI
are necessarily Nash equilibria, we still have an equivalence between VI(F,X ) and
PDS(F,X ). This means we can perform the same BoA analysis, but we’ll need to
check stable fixed points to see if they satisfy the Nash definition, which amounts to
solving n non-convex, 2-D, constrained optimization problems. In our solution, we
use Scikit-learn’s L-BFGS-B for this task [90]; runtime is negligible relative to the
BoA algorithm.
5.6 Cloud Services Experiment
To demonstrate the promise of the described pipeline, we focus on identifying the
BoA’s (as well as Nash equilibria) of our proposed cloud services market economy
model. Here we investigate a hypothetical scenario in which four cloud companies
compete for the opportunity to provide service to five clients looking to transfer
their in-house computation to the cloud. The first three cloud companies are large
providers with highly optimized servicing capabilities (lower ci), while the last two
are newcomers to the market, trying to fill a niche with higher cost green-tech (higher
ci). Client 1 is a big buyer loyal to clouds with the 3 lowest cost functions (e.g. big
2pii is nondifferentiable at di = 0, however, zero price and infinite quality are nonsensical, so our
market is constrained to [,∞)
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name providers). Client 2 is a medium buyer with slight preference towards green-
tech. Client 3 is a small buyer who prefers green-tech, but is not opposed to a large
corporation. Client 4 is a big buyer loyal to cloud 1, but otherwise prefers green-tech.
To compute LEs, we’re using a projected version of Heun-Euler, a 2nd order, explicit
ODE solver with an adaptive step size.
Running the BoA algorithm3 over a 10 dimensional grid (6 points/dimension) with
the enhancements described in section 5.4 returns a set of of positive-negative samples
for each reference LE. After running an SVM on each LE sample set, we define the
boundaries as the critical points at which the SVM with the highest margin prediction
is dethroned by an SVM with a higher margin prediction.
Figure 5.4: Basins of attraction are marked stable or unstable and differentiated by
pattern, each with a gradient that runs from most likely belonging to the region
(dark) to least likely (light). Boundaries are marked by black lines.
In Figure 5.4, we consider a scenario where green-tech newcomer, cloud 5, enters
the pre-established cloud services market described above. Opening with (p5, d5)
in either of the stable regions sets the market on a path toward the same NE; the
two regions are mislabeled as distinct due to noise in their LE calculations. On
the other hand, launching their business in the unstable region results in chaos and
3All code at https://github.com/all-umass/VI-Solver
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should be avoided. Although we can’t visualize both green-tech newcomers entering
the market (>3-D), we can quickly evaluate our SVM classifiers to determine the
corresponding basin of attraction and associated characteristic LE for any given set
of price-degradation pairs. Obviously, there are factors that our model does not take
into account. In spite of this, knowledge of BoAs combined with market monitoring
can also be used to suggest when a discussion of external intervention might be
prudent (e.g. government regulation) or when external intervention might transition
the market into a more desirable basin of attraction.
5.7 Lyapunov GANs
Several papers have conducted a local stability analysis of common GAN training
algorithms about the global equilibrium. In the remainder of this chapter, we explore
whether or not these analyses are relevant to current GAN training protocols. More
concretely, does successful GAN training imply convergence to a locally stable fixed
point or are weights possibly converging to other dynamics such as limit cycles and
strange attractors?
GANs produce the sharpest and most perceptually pleasing image samples to date.
They are also useful for other domains. Improving their performance and being able to
trust their training can make their widespread adoption into commercial applications
a reality. Understanding the dynamics at the end of GAN training will provide useful
information for developing better algorithms that converge to local equilibria. For
example, if GANs are converging to the local equilibrium, then we can use algorithms
and analysis that focuses on that. However, if GANs are converging to a limit cycle,
we can use algorithms designed to break through the cycle and converge towards
the center. And if GANs are converging to a strange attractor, we need to research
ways of finding the fixed point of these systems. Also, are their other implications
of converging to a strange attractor. Is that a desirable property? Here, we focus
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on identifying the dynamics near the end of GAN training and leave overcoming the
identified challenges to future research.
Adam [59] is an algorithm commonly used to successfully train GANs, however,
the Adam update scheme is iteration dependent. This is to say that the dynamics
for Adam cannot be written down simply as an autonomous ODE, x˙ = F (x). To
compute the Lyapunov exponents for the GAN, we require this property. Therefore,
we shift focus to RMSProp [111], another popular algorithm used to successfully train
GANs. RMSProp can be written down as an autonomous ODE:
at = γat−1 + (1− γ)g2t (5.10)
xt = xt−1 − ηgt√
at + 
(5.11)
where gt = ∇xf(xt). We can rewrite the RMSProp update as follows:
at = at−1 − (1− γ)(at−1 − g2t ) (5.12)
xt = xt−1 − ηgt√
γat−1 + (1− γ)g2t + 
. (5.13)
After rewriting in this form, its ODE formulation is apparent:
a˙ = −(1− γ)(a− g2) (5.14)
x˙ = − ηg√
γa+ (1− γ)g2 + . (5.15)
It was shown that RMSProp as well as other related algorithms like Adam are not
always locally convergent [94]. For this reason, after training the GANs with RM-
SProp, we switch to SGD in order to determine local convergence near the end of
training.
If the dimensionality of the dynamical system is very large (n  10), then it is
more efficient to compute only the top-k LEs. In this case ψ0 is constructed as the
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first k columns of I. Recall that the top LEs reveal the qualitative dynamics of the
system. Moreover, representing the Jacobian of a large system in memory can be
prohibitively expensive. Line 2 of Algorithm 6 only requires the action of J(F (x)) on
the ellipsoid ψ whose result is an n× k matrix; it does not require the n× n matrix
J(F (x)) on its own. This action can be approximated with finite differences:
[J(F (x)) · ψ]i ≈ F (x+ ψi)− F (x)

(5.16)
where  1 and the subscript i denotes the ith column of the matrix.
5.8 GAN Experiments
We compute LEs for GANs in several domains:
• Constant-Linear (CL-GAN) and Linear-Quadratic GAN (LQ-GAN): We ex-
amine simultaneous gradient descent and the consensus algorithm applied to
learning the mean and variance of a 1-d distribution. We use this setting to
illustrate how Lyapunov exponents recover known properties of these systems.
• Mixture of 8 (MO8G) and 25 Gaussians (MO25G): Fitting mixtures of Gaus-
sians is a common benchmark for GAN models. We show that successfully
trained neural-network based GANs can exhibit positive LEs in this setting.
By examining the change in the norm and angle of the weights throughout
training with RMSProp, we establish that the weights naturally stay within
a compact set. This fact combined with positive LEs suggest the weights are
caught in a strange attractor.
• MNIST and CIFAR-10: We discover similar results when performing the same
calculations for these popular image dataset benchmarks. GAN training with
RMSProp gets caught in a strange attractor.
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Note that assuming simultaneous gradient descent, the Wasserstein GAN was shown
to be cyclic locally while the original objective is locally stable [80]. However, the
consensus algorithm [74] is proven to converge to a local equilibrium if the step size is
small enough and the iterates are near enough to the equilibrium, ||xk − x∗|| < . In
the following experiments, we train GANs using neural network distance [8] (similar
to Wasserstein distance) and have found the consensus algorithm to perform quite
well in practice.
Standard GAN training uses stochastic optimization methods which estimate ex-
pectations using minibatches of samples. To remove the possibility of stochasticity
introducing chaotic behavior and conflating our understanding of training dynamics,
we sometimes use one large, single minibatch to compute expectations over both p(z)
and p(x) throughout the entire training process. We will distinguish between this set-
ting and the traditional stochastic setting by writing [Det] or [Sto] at the beginning
of the Figure caption.
5.8.1 CL and LQ-GAN
The analytically computed Lyapunov exponents for simultaneous gradient descent
applied to the constant-linear GAN (CL-GAN) are Λ1,2 = log(
√
1 + α2)/α = 0.005
where α = 0.01 is the step size.
Proof. For the CL-GAN, xk+1 = xk − αAxk = (I − αA)xk where A =
 0 1
−1 0
 =
−A>. Let ||xk|| = 1.
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||xk+1||2 = ||(I − αA)xk||2 (5.17)
= x>k (I − αA)(I − αA)xk (5.18)
= x>k (I + α
2A>A)xk (5.19)
= (1 + α2)||xk||2 = 1 + α2 (5.20)
=⇒ Λ1,2 = log ||xk+1||
α
=
log
√
1 + α2
α
. (5.21)
The consensus algorithm applied to the same problem gives Λ1,2 = −1.005.
Proof. For the CL-GAN, xk+1 = xk − αA>−A2 Axk = (1− α)xk.
||xk+1||2 = ||(1− α)xk||2 (5.22)
=⇒ Λ1,2 = log ||xk+1||
α
=
log(1− α)
α
= −1.005. (5.23)
Note these agree with the values empirically computed using finite differences (see
values reported in the titles of Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: [Det] Top two Lyapunov exponents vs iterations for CL-GAN trained
with simultaneous gradient descent (left) and the consensus algorithm (right).
88
We plot the exponents computed using stochastic optimization in Figure 5.6. Note
the exponent calculation remains accurate although convergence to the analytical
values is mildly delayed.
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Figure 5.6: [Sto] Top two Lyapunov exponents vs iterations for CL-GAN trained with
simultaneous gradient descent (left) and the consensus algorithm (right).
The consensus algorithm applied to the LQ-GAN results in Λ1,2 ≈ 0.03,−0.15
which supports the earlier analysis (see Sections 3.7.1 and 3.8) that the consensus
algorithm is not convergent on this domain.
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Figure 5.7: [Det] Top two Lyapunov exponents vs iterations for LQ-GAN trained
with the consensus algorithm (left) and weights projected onto the first two columns
of ψ (right). The trajectory of Λ1,2 over iterations reveals that the system is initially
chaotic (positive leading exponent) and then converges toward a limit cycle (near
zero leading exponent). The trajectory of the weights projected onto ψ supports this
conclusion: initial portions of the trajectory (light gray) exhibit chaos while later
portions (black) reveal cyclic behavior.
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5.8.2 Mixture of Gaussians
The Lyapunov exponents for MO8G with RMSProp+consensus are 942 and 895
(see Figure 5.8). For MO25G, they are 7296 and 7089 (see Figure 5.9). Losses
for both systems have converged to steady-state and sample distributions for both
systems accurately reflect ground truth, yet the LEs computed after switching to SGD
are near zero for MO8G indicating a limit cycle and positive for MO25G indicating
chaos.
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Figure 5.8: [Det] Top two Lyapunov exponents (left), minimax loss (2nd column),
Euclidean norm of the weights (3rd column), and final samples (right) vs iterations
for a GAN trained with RMSProp+consensus on a mixture of 8 Gaussians (top row).
Training is continued without RMSProp in the bottom row. We also tried rescaling
the gradients by the final exponentially averaged norms obtained by RMSProp, but
have not presented them here because this approach immediately diverged (NaNs).
5.8.3 MNIST
The Lyapunov exponents for RMSProp+consensus (stochastic) are 5041 and 3789
(see Figure 5.10). Notice in Figure 5.10 (see insets) that we observe highest sample
quality when the loss is stable. This coincides with a steady norm for the weights.
However, the LEs over this period are increasing, which suggests the system is be-
coming more chaotic. The constant norm suggests the weights are remaining within
some compact ball, yet the positive exponents suggest the system is divergent. These
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Figure 5.9: [Det] Top two Lyapunov exponents (left), minimax loss (2nd column),
Euclidean norm of the weights (3rd column), and final samples (right) vs iterations
for a GAN trained with RMSProp+consensus on a mixture of 25 Gaussians (top row).
Training is continued without RMSProp in the middle row. We also tried rescaling the
gradients by the final exponentially averaged norms obtained by RMSProp (bottom
row).
two together suggest a strange attractor that is becoming increasingly chaotic. The
system finally “breaks” around 300 thousand iterations at which point the norm of
the weights increases until the loss stabilizes again and sample quality returns to its
previously high level.
5.8.4 CIFAR-10
The Lyapunov exponents for RMSProp+consensus (stochastic) are 19884 and
15931 (see Figure 5.11). The loss in Figure 5.11 remains relatively stable and the
norms of the weights appear to be approaching an asymptote. We would need to
train for many more iterations to confirm that the system is caught in a strange
attractor, but based on results from the domains examined above, it is likely.
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Figure 5.10: [Sto] Top two Lyapunov exponents (left), minimax loss (2nd column),
Euclidean norm of the weights (3rd column), and final samples (right) vs iterations for
a GAN trained on MNIST with RMSProp+consensus (top) and then just consensus
(bottom).
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Figure 5.11: [Sto] Top two Lyapunov exponents (left), minimax loss (2nd column),
Euclidean norm of the weights (3rd column), and final samples (right) vs iterations for
a GAN trained on CIFAR-10 with RMSProp+consensus (top) and then just consensus
(bottom).
Note that the GAN trained on CIFAR-10 consistently generated high quality
samples (see inset of loss in Figure 5.11) while the one trained on MNIST exhibited
intermittent periods of divergence that prevented successful training. Below in Fig-
ure 5.12, we plot the PCA-projected trajectories for both domains—the trajectory
for the GAN successfully trained on CIFAR-10 matches the trajectories of successful
trained models reported in [70].
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Figure 5.12: Projection of the generator and discriminator weights onto the top two
principal components vs iterations for a GAN trained on MINST (left) and CIFAR-10
(right) using RMSProp.
5.9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented an improved Lyapunov Exponent calculation and
Boundary of Attraction Identification algorithm. We demonstrated this algorithm on
an economic game model of the cloud services economy. We also computed the top-k
Lyapunov exponents of GANs using finite differences to approximate the Jacobian-
vector products that are required.
By computing the Lypapunov exponents, we were able to show that successfully
trained GANs are not always converging to equilibria or even local neighborhoods of
equilibria. Given that adaptive stochastic gradient methods like RMSProp and Adam
are the training methods of choice for GANs, it appears that successful training often
means trapping the GAN in a limit cycle or strange attractor. Figuring out how
RMSProp remains “trapped” in these attractors will require more research.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation we have made several contributions.
We began by introducing a framework for solving monotone equilibrium problems
in an online or streaming setting, namely Online Monotone Equilibration (OME).
This framework was constructed using a notion of regret that is defined as the path
integral over the vector field associated with the equilibrium problem. By leveraging
the properties of monotonicity, we can ensure that an Extragradient type algorithm
achieves vanishing average regret as the number of samples in the stream approaches
infinity. The no-regret algorithm derived from this framework is novel in the sense
that the first step of the Extragradient update uses a stepsize that is growing at a rate
O(T 1/4) with respect to the stepsize of the second step. Unlike some other algorithms
in the literature, ours does not require storing and averaging the iterates or the maps.
We presented applications of OME which included equilibrating models of market
economies, providing guarantees for network packet protocols, learning agent policies
from non-stationary behavioral policies, and training a GAN online. With regards to
variational inequality problems and their applications (market economies, traffic net-
works, supply chains, etc.) specifically, OME supports monotonicity as an important
property to a dynamic, healthy ecosystem in which the goal is to have all interested
parties safely track the equilibrium. It also suggests foresight (as Extragradient uses
gradients from the “future”) is critical to reaching an equilibrium.
The path integral loss used to construct OME supports a more sophisticated
algorithm suited for the offline setting. We called this new algorithm Crossing-the-
94
Curl and proved that it is guaranteed to solve a certain GAN variant: the Linear-
Quadratic GAN (LQ-GAN). Solving the LQ-GAN is equivalent to fitting a normal
distribution to data, and so it represents a fundamental problem in density estimation
or generative modeling. In addition to proving that Crossing-the-Curl solves the LQ-
GAN with finite sample convergence rate guarantees, we showed the negative result
that at the time of this thesis, none of the current GAN training algorithms provably
solve the LQ-GAN according to both Variational Inequality (VI) and Dynamical
Systems (Hurwitz) convergence theory.
Our approach to solving the LQ-GAN required applying Crossing-the-Curl in
stages, increasing the complexity of the discriminator and generator at each stage.
This insight motivates a more tailored training regimen for GANs in which discrimi-
nators of varying complexity are pitted against the generator. We called this setting
Generative Multi-Adversarial Networks (GMAN). In this setting, the generator can
be given control over which discriminators to focus on, deemed GMAN*, and experi-
ments revealed an intuitive pattern. The generator chooses to compete against a weak
discriminator initially, but competes against successively more complex discrimina-
tors later in training. In general, we found that introducing a variety of discriminators
in to the training regimen resulted in 1) reduced variance of the minimax objective, 2)
improved quality of generated samples, and 3) accelerated convergence of the minimax
objective to steady-state.
The third property of GMAN prompted a closer inspection of the dynamics at
the end of training. Does convergence of the minimax objective imply convergence
of the generator and discriminator weights? More generally, what dynamics do the
weights exhibit during training? To answer these questions, we computed the top-2
Lyapunov exponents of the system throughout training. The exponents we computed
revealed that convergence of the objective does not necessarily imply convergence of
the weights. The exponents also confirmed that a popular GAN training algorithm,
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RMSProp, is not convergent [94]. Despite this fact, RMSProp (as opposed to non-
adaptive gradient methods) is critical to successful GAN training. In some cases,
switching to the consensus algorithm, a better understood yet more primitive training
algorithm, revealed that the weights were in fact near a local equilibrium. In other
cases, the Lyapunov exponents remained near zero suggesting the weights were caught
in a limit-cycle or strange attractor.
The work in this thesis aims at making fundamental steps toward better un-
derstanding equilibrium problems as they pertain to machine learning and learning
theory more generally. We hope that this work will provide a useful foundation for
artificial intelligence and machine learning researchers to extend and study relevant
equilibrium problems.
6.1 Future Work
With regards to our theoretical contributions, we focused on controlled settings
where we could make progress. We intend to build on this progress by relaxing our
assumptions and tackling other types of equilibrium problems. We also intend to
explore more tangential applications of the ideas presented here. For example,
1. Is the β-smoothness constraint crucial to obtaining regret bounds? Can we
relax this constraint? What is a simple example of a non-smooth vector field?
What about an example that is not the gradient of any function?
2. In the OME framework, we assumed the addition of a strongly-convex regular-
izer to the path integral loss to make the adversarial setting learnable. In an
equilibrium problem, it may make more sense to bias learning with a strongly-
monotone field. In future work, we can look into replacing R(x) with the path
integral over a strongly-monotone field.
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3. The modified path integral loss used to formulate OME suggested including an
extra term beyond what we explored for Crossing-the-Curl : −〈zt, zˆt〉. Does an
analysis including this modification improve convergence for the LQ-GAN?
4. We studied the LQ-GAN with only one possible parameterization. Does a
different parameterization, for example, one where D(y) = w2(y−w1)2, lead to
better training dynamics? If the dynamics exhibit a symmetric Jacobian, what
is the derived convex divergence between distributions?
5. We were able to use the fundamental theorem of calculus for path integrals to
construct a general loss function for equilibrium problems. Machine learning
models often consist of loss functions paired with function approximators. Can
we use the path integral to define new function approximators as well? What
advantages does this parameterization allow?
6. In this thesis we encountered several obstacles to equilibration that do not
appear in optimization. In some cases, for example when deriving an algorithm
to solve the LQ-GAN, we were able to turn the equilibrium problem into an
optimization problem. Should this always be the goal—to somehow remove the
rotation and transform the problem into a simpler one? When is it possible1?
Or is there a reason to desire the more general dynamics possible in equilibrium
problems?
7. In Chapter 4, we introduced the GMAM metric for comparing the performance
of different GAN models. Recently, Balduzzi et al. [2018] introduced a theoret-
ically sound framework for evaluating agent-vs-agent play. We may be able to
apply this framework to improve the evaluation of GANs.
1We might start with the Hairy Ball theorem [51].
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8. Stochastic gradient descent was recently proven to converge to limit cycles [20]
suggesting that equilibrium algorithms that converge in the presence of cycles,
e.g., Crossing-the-Curl, may be helpful here. In future work, we will explore
this possibility experimentally.
9. A complete convergence analysis of the solution to an equilibrium problem re-
quires analyzing the selected algorithm paired with the problem. For example,
a complete convergence analysis of a GAN requires analyzing the selected algo-
rithm, e.g., Crossing-the-Curl, paired with the chosen divergence, e.g., Jensen-
Shannon, and function approximators, e.g., deep networks. In future work, we
will examine more of these combinations to better understand the best mar-
riages for each problem.
As suggested by prior work in computational neuroscience, interesting behavior
reminiscent of transient cognitive dynamics emerges just outside the boundary of
monotone systems (i.e., just one eigenvalue of the Jacobian is negative) [91]. Can a
strong understanding of monotone equilibrium problems better equip us to explore
the space beyond their boundary? Other work argues that integrated information
possibly achieved via sensitivity to initial inputs is crucial (i.e., diverging dynamics are
required) to an emerging consciousness [113]. More generally, the brain’s intelligence
is highly parallel and distributed which motivates research to move away from the
monolithic learning formulations given by optimization and toward the multi-agent
systems present in game theory and equilibration. We hope the tools presented here
can help with the transition.
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APPENDIX A
ONLINE MONOTONE EQUILIBRATION
This appendix serves as a supplement primarily to Chapter 2, however, we include
additional proofs (e.g., the following section) and materials that may be of interest to
the reader looking for more insight. In some cases, we consider a more general path
integral loss starting at a vector o deemed a reference vector rather than the standard
x∗:
fo(x) = fo(o) +
∫
o→x
〈F (z), dz〉. (A.1)
A.1 Pseudo-monotonicity in Integral Form
Definition 2 (Pseudo-monotone). F is pseudo-monotone if the following one-way
implication holds for all x, y ∈ X : 〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 =⇒ 〈F (y), y − x〉 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. If F is pseudo-monotone, F also obeys the following one-way implication
〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 =⇒
∫
z:x→y
〈F (z), dz〉 ≥ 0. (A.2)
Proof. Assume 〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 and let ∆z = y−x
n
for n ∈ Z+. Then
〈F (x), y − x〉 = 〈F (x), y − x
n
〉 · n (A.3)
= 〈F (x),∆z〉 · n (A.4)
≥ 0 (A.5)
=⇒ 〈F (x), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.6)
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Let i∆z = (x+ i∆z)− x = yˆi − x. Then
〈F (x), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.7)
=⇒ 〈F (x), yˆi − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.8)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi), yˆi − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.9)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi), i∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.10)
=⇒ 〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 ∀ i ≥ 0 (A.11)
=⇒
n∑
i=0
〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 (A.12)
where ∆z = ∆z(n) (A.13)
=⇒ lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
〈F (yˆi),∆z〉 ≥ 0 (A.14)
=
∫
z:x→y
〈F (z), dz〉 ≥ 0. (A.15)
A.2 Theorem 1: OCO ⊂ OMO
Let the feasible set, X , and field, F (x), be defined as follows:
x = [r, c] ∈ X ≡ [0, 1]2, (A.16)
F (x) =
(
r2+2rc+c2
−2r2+2rc+c2
)
(A.17)
with equilibrium point x∗ = [0, 0].
A.2.1 F is monotone over X = [0, 1]2
The symmetric part of the Jacobian of F is positive semi-definite:
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J(F ) =
(
2r+2c 2r+2c
−4r+2c 2r+2c
)
, (A.18)
Js(F ) =
1
2
(J + J>) =
(
2r+2c 2c−r
2c−r 2r+2c
)
(A.19)
with
det(Js) = 3r
2 + 12rc ≥ 0 ∀ [r, c] ∈ X , (A.20)
τ(Js) = 4r + 4c ≥ 0 ∀ [r, c] ∈ X , (A.21)
=⇒ Js(F )  0. (A.22)
The trace and determinant of the (2×2 matrix) symmetrized Js are both non-negative,
which imply the eigenvalues of Js are non-negative. Therefore, F is monotone.
A.2.2 f is non-convex over X = [0, 1]2
The path integral over the field F starting at x∗ is
f(x) = fo +
∫
z:o→x
〈F, dz〉 (A.23)
=
∫ 1
0
〈F (o+ τ(x− o)), (x− o)dτ〉 (A.24)
=
∫ 1
0
〈F (τx), x〉dτ (A.25)
=
1
3
(r3 + 3rc2 + c3) (A.26)
with Hessian
H(f) =
(
2r 2c
2c 2r+2c
)
, (A.27)
det(H) = 4(r2 + rc− c2) < 0∀ {[r, c] | [r, c] ∈ X , c >
√
5 + 1
2
r} (A.28)
=⇒ H 0. (A.29)
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This means f forms a saddle surface over a compact subset of X , therefore, it is
non-convex. In fact, f is not even quasi-convex. For example, let x0 = [0, 0.8], xf =
[0.5, 0.45] and consider their midpoint, then
f(
x0 + xf
2
)  max{f(x0), f(xf )}. (A.30)
The following example provides a field whose path integral is non-convex over an
unconstrained domain. The field F and its Jacobian are shown below:
F = [2x+
2
pi
sin(
pi
2
y), 2y +
2
pi
sin(
pi
2
x)], (A.31)
J =
 2 cos(pi2y)
cos(pi
2
x) 2
 , (A.32)
Jsym =
 2 12(cos(pi2x) + cos(pi2y))
1
2
(cos(pi
2
x) + cos(pi
2
y)) 2
  1 (A.33)
with x∗ = [0, 0]. The path integral over this field and its indefinite Hessian are
f = x2 + y2 − 4
pi2
(
y
x
(cos(
pi
2
x)− 1) + x
y
(cos(
pi
2
y)− 1)), (A.34)
H =
 2− yx
(
8(cos(pix
2
)−1)
(pix)2
+
4 sin(pix
2
)
pix
− cos(pix
2
)
)
4
(
cos(pix
2
)−1
(pix)2
+
sin(pix
2
)
2pix
+
cos(piy
2
)−1
(piy)2
+
sin(piy
2
)
2piy
)
4
(
cos(pix
2
)−1
(pix)2
+
sin(pix
2
)
2pix
+
cos(piy
2
)−1
(piy)2
+
sin(piy
2
)
2piy
)
2− x
y
(
8(cos(piy
2
)−1)
(piy)2
+
4 sin(piy
2
)
piy
− cos(piy
2
)
)
 ,
(A.35)
H|x=1,y=10 =
2− 40pi (1− 2pi ) 2(25pi−51)25pi2
2(25pi−51)
25pi2
2− 1
10
+ 2
125pi2
 =
−2.626 0.223
0.223 1.902
 0. (A.36)
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A.3 Theorem 2: OME ≡ OCO for Positive definite Affine
Maps
This concerns such problems as linear complementarity problems (LCPs):
Ft(xt) = Axt + b (A.37)
where xt, b, ot ∈ Rn, A  0 ∈ Rn×n. The path integral over the field Ft starting at ot
(e.g., ot = x
∗
t ) is a quadratic function,
ft(xt)− fot = (A.38)
=
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (A.39)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Ft(ot + τ(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (A.40)
=
∫ 1
0
〈A(ot + τ(xt − ot)) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (A.41)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + τA(xt − ot) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (A.42)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉
+ τ〈A(xt − ot), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (A.43)
= 〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)〉
+
1
2
〈A(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)〉 (A.44)
= o>t A
>xt − o>t A>ot + b>(xt − ot)
+
1
2
(xt − ot)>A>(xt − ot) (A.45)
= o>t A
>xt − o>t A>ot + b>(xt − ot)
1
2
[x>t A
>xt − o>t A>xt − x>t A>ot + o>t A>ot] (A.46)
=
1
2
[x>t A
>xt + x>t (A− A>)ot − o>t A>ot] + b>(xt − ot) (A.47)
=
1
2
[x>t
(A+ A>
2
)
xt + x
>
t (A− A>)ot − o>t A>ot] + b>(xt − ot), (A.48)
103
with positive definite Hessian
Hessian(ft) =
1
2
[A+ A>]  0 =⇒ ft is convex. (A.49)
This also implies that every multivariate function with nonzero Hessian can be repre-
sented by an infinite number of fields (other than the gradient), specifically any field
whose symmetric component equals A+A
>
2
.
A.4 Monotone Equilibration with o = x∗
Here, we consider the case where the reference point is the solution to the corre-
sponding variational inequality problem, o = x∗ = V I(F,X ). Remember, this means
x∗ is an equilibrium point of the field, F , and has the property
〈F (x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ X . (A.50)
Theorem 4. If o is a solution to V I(F,X ) where F : X → Rn is a monotone (or at
least pseudo-monotone) map and X is a convex set, then o is a global minimizer of
the monotone optimization problem with map F , reference vector o, and any reference
scalar fot.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let f(o) = 0. Then
∇x
{∫
z:o→x
〈F (z), dz〉
}∣∣∣
x=o
= (A.51)
= ∇x
{∫
t:0→1
〈F (o+ t(x− o)), x− o〉dt
}∣∣∣
x=o
(A.52)
=
∫
t:0→1
{
F (o+ t(x− o))+ (A.53)
J(o+ t(x− o))>(x− o)tdt
}∣∣∣
x=o
(A.54)
=
∫
t:0→1
{
F (o)
}
(A.55)
= F (o). (A.56)
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A necessary first order condition for optimality is
〈F (o), z − o〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ X , (A.57)
which by the definition of the variational inequality problem is solved by o = x∗.
Reversing this result
f(o) = 0 ≤ 〈F (o), z − o〉 ≤
∫
x:o→z
〈F (x), dx〉 = f(x) (A.58)
reveals that o = x∗ is also a global minimum.
This directly implies that the Projection Method (online gradient descent with
R = 1
2η
||x2||) converges exponentially fast to a minimum of the path integral loss for
strongly monotone fields.
Note that the optimality proof also carries through for pseudo-monotone fields
(see A.1):
f(o) = 0 ≤ 〈F (o), z − o〉 (A.59)
=⇒ 0 ≤
∫
x:o→z
〈F (x), dx〉 = f(x) (A.60)
which reveals that o = x∗ is also a global minimum of the pseudo-monotone loss.
A.5 Upper and Lower Bounds for Path Integral Loss
In this section, we derive linear lower and upper bounds for the path integral
loss assuming xˆ = prox(x). First, we review proximal maps. We assume Ft has
bounded norm, i.e., ||Ft(y)||q ≤ Lt ∀y, and is βt-smooth, i.e., ||Ft(x) − Ft(y)||q ≤
βt||x− y||p ∀x, y for some p ∈ [1, 2] and some q such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
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A.5.1 Proximal Maps
We assume the following form for the proximal map:
prox(x) = arg min
z∈Rn
(
〈F (x), z〉+ 1
ηˆ
D(z, x) + ιX (z)
)
(A.61)
= arg min
z∈X
(
〈F (x), z〉+ 1
ηˆ
D(z, x)
)
(A.62)
= arg min
z∈X
g(z, x), (A.63)
D(z, x) = ψ(z)− ψ(x)− 〈ψ′(x), z − x〉, (A.64)
where ιX is the indicator function,
ιX (x) =

0, if x ∈ X
∞, otherwise,
(A.65)
D(z, x) is a Bregman divergence, and ψ : Rn → R is m-strongly-convex w.r.t. the
p-norm which implies
D(z, x) ≥ D(x, x) + 〈D′(x, x), z − x〉+ m
2
||z − x||2p (A.66)
≥ m
2
||z − x||2p (A.67)
=
m
2
||z − x||22 = D˜(z, x), (A.68)
where the last step follows from the fact that ||y||d+a ≤ ||y||d for all a ≥ 0 and d > 0
along with our constraint that p ∈ [1, 2].
Let prox defined with D˜ be proxw, i.e., a prox operator with weakened divergence.
The proximal operator can be viewed as minimizing 〈∇F (x), z〉 with a penalty given
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by 1
ηˆ
D(z, x) for deviating too far from x. Therefore, proxw(x) will be no closer to x
than prox(x). This implies
||xt − prox(xt)||q ≤ ||xt − proxw(xt)||q (A.69)
= ||xt − xt + ηˆ
m
Ft(xt)||q (A.70)
≤ ηˆ
m
Lt. (A.71)
A.5.2 Lower Bounds
We use the following Lemma in building a lower bound for the path integral loss.
Lemma 3 (Prox Segment Lower Bound). The lower bound for the path integral∫
xˆt→xt〈F (z), dz〉 is further lower bounded as follows:
〈Ft(xˆt), xt − xˆt〉 ≥
(m
ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − xt||2p, (A.72)
where m is the strong-convexity parameter of the Bregman divergence used to form
the proximal operator and βt is the smoothness coefficient for the map Ft.
Proof. Let G = g(xt, xt) − g(xˆt, xt) = 〈F (xt), xt〉 − 〈F (xt), xˆt〉 − 1ηˆD(xˆt, xt) ≥ 0
where xˆt = prox(xt). Note that the minimization problem associated with prox(x),
minz∈X g(z, x), is a strongly-convex optimization problem over a convex set. Solu-
tions, xˆt, to this problem enjoy the property that the derivative of g at xˆt is in the
normal cone, C, at xˆt:
−∂g(z, xt)
∂z
∣∣∣
xˆt
∈ C(xˆt), (A.73)
C(xˆt) = {y ∈ Rn|〈y, x− xˆt〉 ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ X}, (A.74)
107
which, by definition of the normal cone, directly implies
〈−∂g(z, xt)
∂z
∣∣∣
xˆt
, x− xˆt〉 ≤ 0 (A.75)
〈F (xt) + 1
ηˆ
∂D(z, xt)
∂z
∣∣∣
xˆt
, x− xˆt〉 ≥ 0 (A.76)
=⇒ 〈F (xt), x− xˆt〉 ≥ −1
ηˆ
〈D′(xˆt, xt), x− xˆt〉 (A.77)
where we have switched to a shorthand representation of the derivative in the last
step for the sake of exposition. This allows us to lower bound the gap G by
G = 〈F (xt), xt − xˆt〉 − 1
ηˆ
D(xˆt, xt) (A.78)
= −1
ηˆ
[
〈D′(xˆt, xt), x− xˆt〉+D(xˆt, xt)
]
. (A.79)
Revisiting the strong-convexity of D and swapping z and x gives
D(x, x) ≥ D(z, x) + 〈D′(z, x), x− z〉+ m
2
||z − x||2p (A.80)
0 ≥ D(z, x) + 〈D′(z, x), x− z〉+ m
2
||z − x||2p (A.81)
=⇒ D(xˆt, x) + 〈D′(xˆt, x), x− xˆt〉 ≤ −m
2
||xˆt − x||2p. (A.82)
Plugging this back into the lower bound for G gives
G ≥ m
2ηˆ
||xˆt − x||2p. (A.83)
Rearranging gives 〈F (xt), xt − xˆt〉 = G+ 1ηˆD(xˆt, xt). Therefore, we have
βt||xˆt − xt||2p ≥ ||Ft(xˆt)− Ft(xt)||q||xˆt − xt||p (A.84)
≥ 〈Ft(xˆt)− Ft(xt), xˆt − xt〉 (A.85)
=⇒ 〈Ft(xˆt), xt − xˆt〉 ≥ 〈Ft(xt), xt − xˆt〉 − βt||xˆt − xt||2 (A.86)
≥ G+ 1
ηˆ
D(xˆt, xt)− βt||xˆt − xt||2 (A.87)
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where the first lines follow from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the dual norm
and the βt-smoothness property of Ft. Using the strong-convexity of D and then the
lower bound for G we have,
〈Ft(xˆt), xt − xˆt〉 ≥ G+
(m
2ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − xt||2p (A.88)
≥
(m
ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − xt||2p. (A.89)
Now let F efft (x) = (x− xˆt)mηˆ . Notice that in the unconstrained setting, F efft = Ft
while in the constrained setting F efft represents the component of Ft projected onto
the feasible set. We define this map because F eff (x) = 0 implies x is a fixed point of
the map Ft. In other work, F
eff
t is referred to as the residue vector [25, 85, 86]. We
are now ready to derive a lower bound for the path integral loss:
fˆx∗(x) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[ ∫
z:x∗→xˆt
〈Ft(z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆt→x
〈Ft(z), dz〉
]
(A.90)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(x∗), xˆt − x∗〉+ 〈Ft(xˆt), x− xˆt〉
]
(A.91)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(x∗), x− x∗〉+ 〈Ft(x∗), xˆt − x〉+ 〈Ft(xˆt), x− xˆt〉
]
(A.92)
≥ 〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(x∗), xˆt − x〉+
(m
ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − x||2p
]
(A.93)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
− ||Ft(x∗)||q||xˆt − x||p +
(m
ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − x||2p
]
(A.94)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
− ||Ft(x
∗)||q||F efft (x)||p
m
ηˆ +
(m
ηˆ
− βt
)
||xˆt − x||22
]
(A.95)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[(
||F efft (x)||p − ||Ft(x∗)||q
)
||F efft (x)||p
ηˆ
m
− βt ηˆ
2
m2
L2t
]
(A.96)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[(
||F efft (x)||p − ||Ft(x∗)||q
)
||F efft (x)||p
ηˆ
m
− βt ηˆ
2
m2
L2t
]
. (A.97)
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A.5.3 Upper Bounds
We are also able to obtain the following upper bound for the path integral loss:
fˆx∗(x) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[ ∫
z:x∗→xˆt
〈Ft(z), dz〉+
∫
z:xˆt→x
〈Ft(z), dz〉
]
(A.98)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), xˆt − x∗〉+ 〈Ft(x), x− xˆt〉
]
(A.99)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ 〈Ft(xˆt), xˆt − x〉+ 〈Ft(x), x− xˆt〉
]
(A.100)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ 〈Ft(x)− Ft(xˆt), x− xˆt〉
]
(A.101)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ ||Ft(x)− Ft(xˆt)||q||x− xˆt||p
]
(A.102)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ βt||x− xˆt||2p
]
(A.103)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ βtL
2
t
m2
ηˆ2
]
, (A.104)
where we leveraged the monotone path integral bounds in the first step, rearranged
terms, and then used Cauchy-Schwarz and the βt-smoothness of Ft.
A.5.4 OED and OMP Regret Bounds
We repeat the bounds adopted from the work of Shalev-Shwartz [2011] for conve-
nience.
Theorem 5. Let R be a (1/η)-strongly-convex function over X with respect to a norm
|| · ||. Assume that A :=OMP is run on the sequence of monotone maps, Ft, with the
link function
g(θ) = arg max
x∈X
(〈x, θ〉 −R(x)). (A.105)
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Then, for all x∗ ∈ X ,
regretA(X ) ≤ R(x∗)−min
v∈X
R(v) + (η +
βmax
m2
ηˆ2)
T∑
t=1
L2t (A.106)
≤ 3
2
BL
√
2T for R(x) =
1
2η
||x||22, (A.107)
where ||x∗||2 ≤ B, ||Ft||q ≤ Lt, L2 ≥ 1T
∑
t L
2
t , βmax = maxt βt, η =
B
L
√
2T
, and ηˆ =
m
√
η
βmax
.
Proof. As we have shown previously,
regretA(t,T )(X ) ≤ 〈Ft(xˆt), xt − x∗〉+
βtL
2
t
m2
ηˆ2 (A.108)
(A.109)
The OMP algorithm is equivalent to running Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL)
on the sequence of linear functions 〈F (xˆt), xt〉 with the regularization R(x). The
theorem now follows directly from Theorem 2.11 and Lemma 2.6 in the work of Shalev-
Shwartz [2011].
A.5.5 Combining Upper and Lower Bounds
Unfortunately, obtaining meaningful regret bounds is not as clean as in the sim-
pler setting of online convex optimization. This is because our path integral loss is
a function of our step size ηˆ. If we set ηˆ to zero, then we can arbitrarily decrease
our loss without obtaining any real performance gains. We will demonstrate this
with an example later. To reiterate, our regret bound is only meaningful if minimiz-
ing regret implies improved performance with respect to some other, ηˆ-independent,
performance measure.
111
Lemma 4. Minimizing the path integral loss for monotone maps at a rate ∝ T−1/2
implies
||F efft (x)||p ≤ ||Ft(x∗)||q + CT−1/8 (A.110)
on average where C = (211/8)(βmaxBL
3)1/4 < 2.6(βmaxBL
3)1/4.
Proof. Rewriting the lower and upper bounds together, we see
1
T
T∑
t=1
[(
||F efft (x)||p − ||Ft(x∗)||q
)
||F efft (x)||p
ηˆ
m
− βt ηˆ
2
m2
L2t
)]
(A.111)
≤fˆx∗(x) (A.112)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ βtL
2
t
m2
ηˆ2
]
. (A.113)
Let P be defined as follows:
P =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[(
||F efft (x)||p − ||Ft(x∗)||q
) ||F efft (x)||p
m
. (A.114)
Let R(x) = 1
2η
||x||22. Rearranging the bounds and assuming the same FTRL regret
rate above imply that
P ≤ 1
T ηˆ
T∑
t=1
[
〈Ft(xˆt), x− x∗〉+ 2βtL
2
t
m2
ηˆ2
]
(A.115)
≤ 1
T ηˆ
[B2
2η
+ (η +
2βmax
m2
ηˆ2)TL2
]
= P u. (A.116)
Taking derivatives with respect to η and ηˆ and setting equal to zero gives:
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∂P u
∂η
=
1
ηˆ
(
− B
2
2η2
+ TL2
)
= 0 (A.117)
=⇒ η = B
L
√
2T
(A.118)
∂P u
∂ηˆ
= − 1
ηˆ2
(B2
2η
+ ηTL2
)
+
2βmax
m2
TL2 = 0 (A.119)
= − 1
ηˆ2
(√2
2
BL
√
T +
√
2
2
BL
√
T
)
+
2βmax
m2
TL2 (A.120)
= − 1
ηˆ2
√
2BL
√
T +
2βmax
m2
TL2 = 0 (A.121)
=⇒ − 1
ηˆ2
B
L
√
2T
+
βmax
m2
= 0 = − η
ηˆ2
+
βmax
m2
(A.122)
=⇒ ηˆ = m
√
η
βmax
(A.123)
=⇒ P ≤ 4
√
βmaxBL3
m(2T )1/4
= DT−1/4. (A.124)
Let ||F efft (x)||p = Ct||Ft(x∗)||q. Then,
=⇒ 1
m
(Ct − 1)Ct||Ft(x∗)||2q ≤ P (A.125)
=⇒ Ct ≤ 1 + T
−1/8
||Ft(x∗)||q
√
2mD → 1 at a rate ∝ T−1/8 (A.126)
=⇒ ||F efft (x)||p ≤ ||Ft(x∗)||q + T−1/8
√
2mD on average. (A.127)
To summarize, our algorithm minimizes regret at rate that implies that the average
norm of the effective vector field at each step is approaching the norm of the vector
field at optimality.
To demonstrate the importance of our choices for η and ηˆ, consider solving
V I(F (x) = Ax,Rn) where A = −A> with η = ηˆ = T−1/2. Note that x∗ = 0 is
the unique solution to this problem. Then
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xk+1 =
[
(1− ηηˆ)I − ηA
]
xk = Jxk (A.128)
and the norm of the iterates change as
||xk+1||2 = x>k J>Jxk =
[
(1− ηηˆ)2 + η2
]
||xk||2 (A.129)
||xT ||2 =
[
(1− ηηˆ)2 + η2
]T
||x0||2 = γT ||x0||2. (A.130)
In the limit as T → ∞, γT converges to 1
e
! Therefore, the naive algorithm does
not converge for this problem. On the other hand, if η = T−1/2 and ηˆ = T−1/4,
then γT → 0 in the limit meaning, as expected, our proposed step size choice does
converge.
A.6 A Curl Bound for a Different Path Integral
The path integral loss presented in the main body of the thesis requires knowledge
of x∗. Ideally, we would like to observe some version of a loss in order to track progress
during training and gain more insights into the performance of our algorithm. Instead
of computing the path integral starting at x∗, we can consider starting at some other
reference point, ot, for which we have a good value estimate, i.e., f(ot) is known. Then
we can later measure our performance relative to x∗ by comparing two path integrals:
one that integrates from ot to x and one that integrates from ot to x
∗. Using this new
definition, we can immediately derive a linear upper bound for the alternative loss as
follows:
falt(xt) =
∫ xt
ot
−
∫ x∗
ot
≤ 〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (ot), x∗ − ot〉. (A.131)
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ot
x*
xt
Figure A.1: Illustrative comparison of two-step,
∫ xt
ot
− ∫ x∗
ot
, to one-step loss,
∫ xt
x∗ .
In comparison, our original loss is,
f(xt) =
∫ xt
x∗
≤ 〈F (xt), xt − x∗〉 = 〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (xt), x∗ − ot〉. (A.132)
Unfortunately, we cannot simplify the difference between the latter terms, 〈F (xt)−
F (ot), x
∗ − ot〉, and so it is not clear if one of these losses upper bounds the other.
However, we can bound the difference between the two losses using Stokes’ theorem
and bounds on F and its derivatives. The difference between the two losses is equal to
the magnitude of the path integral around the triangle in Figure A.1. By Whitney’s
extension of Stokes’ theorem to perimeters with corners [116],
|
∮
∂Σ
〈F, dx〉| = |
∫
Σ
∇× F ′ · dΣ| ≤ max
Σ
||∇ × F ′|| ·
∫
Σ
dA
≤ σmax(J − J>) · (Area of 4) (A.133)
where σmax(A) denotes the maximum singular value of matrix A, F
′ is the projection
of F onto the triangle 4, and Σ (∂Σ) is the two dimensional area (perimeter) formed
by the path around the triangle. The bound on the norm of the curl is proven in
Lemma 5 below. Note that if we set ot = x
∗, the triangle collapses and the losses are
the same. Also, if we set ot = xt−1, the triangle collapses in the limit as T → ∞.
This is because ||xt − xt−1|| ≤ ηmLt and η ∝ T−1/2. Using ot = xt−1 is particularly
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appealing because in many online settings, we have access to all historical play and
can compute an accurate estimate of the value of xt−1.
The bound outlined above applies to the path integral loss that we used for
strongly and strictly monotone maps. To bound the difference between path inte-
grals constructed for monotone fields, we need to consider the following difference:
fˆalt(xt)︷ ︸︸ ︷( ∫
ot→xˆt
+
∫
xˆt→xt
)
−
(∫
ot→xˆ∗t
+
∫
xˆ∗t→x∗
)
−
fˆ(xt)︷ ︸︸ ︷( ∫
x∗→xˆt
+
∫
xˆt→x
)
(A.134)
=
∫
ot→xˆt
−
∫
x∗→xˆt
−
∫
xˆ∗t→x∗
−
∫
ot→xˆ∗
(A.135)
where we have omitted the integrands, 〈F (z), dz〉, to avoid clutter. Notice that these
four integrals trace out the path ot → xˆt → x∗ → xˆ∗ → ot. In order to use Stokes’
theorem, we need to form a 2-manifold over the perimeter formed by the path. We
can construct a surface manifold using two triangles: (ot, xˆt, x
∗) and (ot, xˆ∗t , x
∗). The
area of the second triangle is O(ηˆ) because ||xˆ∗t −x∗|| ≤ ηˆmLt. In addition, the vertices
of the first triangle approach (ot, x, x
∗) as ηˆ goes to zero.
Lemma 5 (Curl Bound). The curl of the vector field over any 2-manifold is bounded
by the maximum singular value of two times the skew-symmetric part of the Jacobian:
||∇ × F ′||2 ≤ σmax(J − J>).
Proof. The proof outline is as follows. The triangle in Figure A.1 defines a 2-D plane
in an n-dimensional ambient space. We are interested in the path integral around the
triangle. Each element of the path integral consists of an inner product of the field F
with a differential vector along the curve. Any components of F that are orthogonal to
this differential vector evaluate to zero. The triangle is 2-D hence, its perimeter is 2-
D, which means we may consider a projection of F , F:2, onto the 2-D plane defined by
the triangle. We can think of this projection as a rotation of F , FR = R ·F , followed
by a projection in which we extract the first two dimensions of F:2 = Π∆(F
R). The
116
curl is defined for 3-D so we will actually append a third dimension whose component
is identically zero. Define F ′ to be this augmented projection of the field.
Using the fact that ∇×F ′ = (J − J>)F ′ results in a vector that is perpendicular
to F ′, we find that
(∇× F ′)× F ′ = (J(F ′)− J(F ′)>)F ′ (A.136)
= ||∇ × F ′||2||F ′||2 sin θn = ||∇ × F ′||2||F ′||2n. (A.137)
We can then bound the norm of the curl by recognizing the following as the
induced 2-norm of a matrix:
||∇ × F ′||2 = ||(J(F ′)− J(F ′)>)F ′||2/||F ′||2 (A.138)
≤ σmax(J(F ′)− J(F ′)>) (A.139)
= ||J(F ′)− J(F ′)>||2 (A.140)
= ||J(F:2)− J(F:2)>||2 because J(F ′) is simply (A.141)
J(F:2) augmented with zeros along
the third row and third column.
≤ ||J(FR)− J(FR)>||2 because the principal (A.142)
submatrix just removes entries.
= ||R(J(F )− J(F )>)||2 by linearity of the Jacobian. (A.143)
≤ ||R||2||J(F )− J(F )>||2 Lp induced norms (p =∞) (A.144)
are submultiplicative.
≤ ||J(F )− J(F )>||2 rotation matrix has unit (A.145)
spectral bound.
= σmax(J − J>) =
√
λmax(A>A) where A = J − J>. (A.146)
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Figure A.2: Illustrative comparison of auto-welfare to a game-agnostic loss. Online
optimization provides theory for regret measured only along the edges of the square
(axis aligned), while online monotone equilibration additionally measures regret along
diagonals (any line).
A.7 Online Monotone Games and Auto-Welfare
In this section, we define monotone games and auto-welfare.
Definition 3 (Monotone Game). A game is monotone if the map, F : X → Rn,
formed by concatenating the subgradients of all N player cost functions, f (i)(x), is
monotone. More concretely, let F = [z(1), . . . , z(N)] where z(i) ∈ ∂x(i)f (i) is any sub-
gradient of f (i) w.r.t. x(i). A game is monotone if F satisfies Equation (1.26).
Essentially, a game is monotone if gradient descent with an infinitesimally small
step size, e.g., GIGA [125], does not cause the player strategies to diverge away from
the equilibrium point. In online monotone games, an adversary may choose a new
monotone game for the players to play at every time step, i.e., f (i)(x) becomes f
(i)
t (x).
We begin our discussion of regret with a trivial application of online optimization
to games. Online optimization provides theory for bounding the regret of an algo-
rithm’s prediction, xt, when comparing to a baseline, x
∗, chosen in retrospect. In
other words, if we were to go back in time and play this baseline against the same
exact sequence of environments, how much better would we do? To measure this, we
can sum up the differences between the algorithm’s loss and the baseline loss at each
time step, t, as in OCO (see Algorithm 1).
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In order to use this theory in a game, we simply focus our attention on one player
and treat the rest of the players as part of the adversarial environment. In this way,
online optimization can provide regret bounds for each player if we imagine replaying
the game but with all other players forced to replay the same actions as before. This
is largely unsatisfying given that it seems to have taken the game aspect out of the
game. Ideally, our regret measure would leave the game environment intact and allow
all players to change their actions. In this regard, welfare regret is far more satisfying
because it measures the sum of all player payoffs with respect to a baseline that
allows all players to change their actions. Unfortunately, bounding welfare regret
often requires properties like smoothness.
As a compromise, we propose auto-welfare. Consider player 1 in an N -player
game. Player 1 receives a payoff or reward for changing her strategy, however, her
reward depends on all other player adjustments as well. Player 1 never knows how
the other N−1 players are going to change their strategies, so it is reasonable for her
to measure the portion of her reward that is due to her strategy change alone. Such a
measurement provides valuable feedback on her decision to update her strategy, and
this measurement is exactly what auto-welfare sums for all players. Therefore, auto-
welfare can be thought of as measuring how “satisfied” the players as a whole are with
their decision making given that they only have control over themselves. In contrast,
welfare measures how “satisfied” the players as a whole are with the outcome of the
game.
We can compute auto-welfare, W a, with a path integral,
W at (xt) = W
a
ot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−Ft(x), dx〉, (A.147)
where Ft(x) is an output of the game map (see Definition 3), ot is any reference
vector with known auto-welfare, W aot , and x : ot → xt is the straight line path from ot
to xt through X . Figure A.2 illustrates the flexibility auto-welfare provides over the
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game-agnostic loss provided by online optimization theory. This formulation has been
considered for converting symmetric VIs into equivalent optimization problems [2, 46],
however, to our knowledge has not been leveraged for asymmetric VIs, which represent
a wider class of games.
We can rewrite auto-welfare as follows to reveal its relationship to standard wel-
fare, W :
W at (xt) = W
a
ot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−Ft(x), dx〉 (A.148)
= W aot +
N∑
i=1
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−∂f (i)t,i (x), dx(i)〉 (A.149)
= W (xt)−
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
∫
x:ot→xt
〈−∂f (i)t,j (x), dx(j)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
i’s reward due to j’s strategy change
(A.150)
where ∂f
(i)
t,j (x) is a subgradient of agent i’s expected loss function with respect to
agent j’s strategy, x
(j)
t , evaluated at x. Therefore, W
a
t (xt) gives welfare minus the
rewards resulting from intra-team inefficiencies. We call this auto-welfare because it
sums the portions of the player’s welfare that can be attributed to its own strategy.
A.8 Algorithmic Game Theory: A Venn Diagram
Here, we consider cost-minimization games where Ci(s) is player i’s cost function
and C(s) =
∑K
i=1Ci(s). Player i’s strategy set is si and s−i represents the strategy
sets of all players except player i. The results of this section are summarized in
Table 2.1 in the main body of the thesis.
Definition 4 (Smooth Game). A cost-minimization game is (λ,µ)-smooth if for
every two outcomes s and s∗,
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ λ · C(s∗) + µ · C(s). (A.151)
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Definition 5 (Convex Game). A cost-minimization game is convex if Ci(si, s−i) is
convex in si ∀i.
Definition 6 (Monotone Game). A cost-minimization game is monotone if the game
dynamics are monotone. Here, we assume all players are running OMP, i.e.,
F =
( ∇s0C0···
∇sKCK
)
. (A.152)
Monotonicity requires that the symmetrized Jacobian of F be positive semidefinite:
J + J>  0.
Definition 7 (Socially-Convex Game). A cost-minimization game is socially-convex
if
1. There exists λi > 0 such that
∑K
i=1 λi = 1, g(s) =
∑K
i=1 λiCi(s) is convex in s,
and
2. Ci(si, s−i) is concave in s−i ∀i.
The definition was originally written for concave.
Theorem 6 (Monotone =⇒ Convex). If a game is monotone, it is also convex.
Proof. For each player i, we show that Ci(si, s−i) is convex in si for any fixed s−i
(i.e., s−i = s′−i). The associated map is given by Equation (A.152). Let Xi := {s, s′ ∈
X s.t. s−i = s′−i}. Starting with the definition of monotonicity, we have
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〈F (s)− F (s′), s− s′〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ X (A.153)
=⇒ 〈F (s)− F (s′), s− s′〉 ≥ 0∀ s, s′ ∈ Xi (A.154)
=
∑
j
〈Fj(s)− Fj(s′), sj − s′j〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Xi (A.155)
=
∑
j 6=i
〈Fj(s)− Fj(s′), sj − s′j︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Xi (A.156)
+ 〈Fi(s)− Fi(s′), si − s′i〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Xi (A.157)
= 〈∇Ci(s)−∇Ci(s′), si − s′i〉 ≥ 0 ∀ s, s′ ∈ Xi (A.158)
which is the definition of convexity, so Ci is convex in si.
Theorem 7 (Socially-Convex =⇒ Convex). Lemma 2.2 in the work of Even-Dar
et al. [2009] with convex swapped for concave.
Theorem 8 (Socially-Convex =⇒ λ−Monotone). A game that is socially-convex
with parameters λ implies a scaling of the game with the same parameters that is
monotone (credit to Peng Shi).
Proof. Let C ′i = λiCi and let J
′ be the Jacobian of the map, F ′, corresponding to C ′i
(see Equation (A.152)). In addition, define the following matrices
1. D such that Dii = λi
∂2Ci
∂s2i
and Dij = 0 ∀i 6= j.
2. Gk is such that ∀i Gkik = Gkki = 0 and ∀i 6= k, j 6= k, Gkij = λk ∂
2Ck
∂sisj
.
3. H is the Hessian of g(s) =
∑
k λkCk(s) (i.e., Hij =
∑
k λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
).
Note that D, −Gk, and H are all positive semidefinite matrices. This follows from
the fact that player costs are convex in their own strategies, concave in other players’
strategies, and the socially-convex condition respectively.
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Continuing the proof, for every i 6= j,
(D −
∑
k
Gk +H)ij = 0−
∑
k 6=i,j
λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
+
∑
k
λk
∂2Ck
∂sisj
(A.159)
= λi
∂2Ci
∂sisj
+ λj
∂2Cj
∂sisj
(A.160)
= (J ′ + J
′T )ij. (A.161)
Moreover, for every i = j,
(D −
∑
k
Gk +H)ii =
∂2Ci
∂s2i
−
∑
k 6=i
λk
∂2Ck
∂s2i
+
∑
k
λk
∂2Ck
∂s2i
(A.162)
= 2λi
∂2Ci
∂s2i
(A.163)
= (J ′ + J
′T )ii. (A.164)
Therefore, (J +J
′T ) = D−∑kGk +H. Each of the matrices (D,−Gk, H) is positive
semidefinite, therefore (J + J
′T )  0, hence F ′ is monotone.
A.8.1 a. Smooth
The following cost-minimization game is (1
2
, 1
2
)-smooth:
C1 = C2 = − cos(r)− cos(c). (A.165)
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = − cos(r∗)− cos(c)− cos(r)− cos(c∗) (A.166)
≤ λ · C(s∗) = − cos(r∗)− cos(c∗) (A.167)
+ µ · C(s) = − cos(r)− cos(c) (A.168)
= − cos(r∗)− cos(c)− cos(r)− cos(c∗). (A.169)
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This game is not convex, therefore, it is neither monotone nor socially-convex.
A.8.2 b. Smooth, Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r
2(sin(c) + 1.25) (A.170)
C2 = c
2(sin(r) + 1.25). (A.171)
This game is (10, 0)-smooth.
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗2(sin(c) + 1.25) + c∗2(sin(r) + 1.25) (A.172)
≤ 2.25(r∗2 + c∗2) (A.173)
λ · C(s∗) = 10[r∗2(sin(c∗) + 1.25) + c∗2(sin(r∗) + 1.25)] (A.174)
≥ 2.5(r∗2 + c∗2) (A.175)
2.25(r∗2 + c∗2) ≤ 2.5(r∗2 + c∗2). (A.176)
Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is not monotone:
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Proof.
F =
( 2r(sin(c)+1.25)
2c(sin(r)+1.25)
)
(A.177)
J = 2
( sin(c)+1.25 r cos(c)
c cos(r) sin(r)+1.25
)
(A.178)
Js = 2
( sin(c)+1.25 r
2
cos(c)+ c
2
cos(r)
r
2
cos(c)+ c
2
cos(r) sin(r)+1.25
)
(A.179)
Js
∣∣∣
r=c=−pi
4
= 2
( −√2
2
+1.25 −pi
4
cos(−pi
4
)
−pi
4
cos(−pi
4
) −
√
2
2
+1.25
)
  0. (A.180)
C1 is not concave with respect to c. Likewise, C2 is not concave with respect to
r. Therefore, this game is not socially-convex.
A.8.3 c. Smooth, Convex, Monotone
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r
2 + c2 (A.181)
C2 = r
2 + c2. (A.182)
This game is (1
2
, 1
2
)-smooth:
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2 (A.183)
λ · C(s∗) = r∗2 + c∗2 (A.184)
µ · C(s) = r2 + c2 (A.185)
r∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2 ≤ r∗2 + c2 + r2 + c∗2. (A.186)
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Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone:
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c
)
(A.187)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0. (A.188)
C1 is not concave with respect to c. Likewise, C2 is not concave with respect to
r. Therefore, this game is not socially-convex.
A.8.4 d. Smooth, Convex, Socially-Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game (inspired by modified Tail Drop
policy in routing networks) over (r, c) ∈ (0, 1]2 = X :
C1 = −1
2
(
r
r + c
) (A.189)
C2 = − c
r + c
. (A.190)
This game is (1
2
,−1)-smooth:
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = −
1
2
(
r∗
r∗ + c
)− c
∗
r + c∗
(A.191)
≤ 0 over X (A.192)
µ · C(s) = 1− 1
2
(
r
r + c
) ≥ 1
2
(A.193)
λ · C(s∗) = −1
2
(1− 1
2
(
r∗
r∗ + c∗
)) ≥ −1
2
(A.194)
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ 0 ≤ µ · C(s∗) + λ · C(s∗). (A.195)
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C1 is convex in r over X and C2 is convex in c over X , therefore the game is
convex:
Proof.
∂2C1
r2
=
c
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over X (A.196)
∂2C2
c2
=
2r
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over X . (A.197)
The corresponding map is not monotone:
Proof.
F = − 1
(r + c)2
( c
2
r
)
(A.198)
J =
1
(r + c)3
(
c c−r
2
r−c 2r
)
(A.199)
Js =
1
(r + c)3
( c r−c
4
r−c
4
2r
)
(A.200)
Det(Js) = 2rc− 1
16
(r − c)2 (A.201)
Det(Js)|r=0.01,c=1 = −0.041 ≤ 0. (A.202)
The determinant of Js is negative over a subset of the domain (e.g., r ≤ 0.01, c = 1),
therefore, Js is not positive semidefinite. Hence, F is not monotone.
Let λ1 =
2
3
and λ2 =
1
3
. Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 = −13 , which is convex in (r, c). Also,
C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is concave with respect to r, therefore, this
game is socially-convex:
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Proof.
∂2C1
∂c2
= − r
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over X (A.203)
∂2C2
∂r2
= − 2c
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over X . (A.204)
A.8.5 e. Smooth, Convex, Monotone, Socially-Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r (A.205)
C2 = c. (A.206)
This game is (1, 0)-smooth:
Proof.
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = r
∗ + c∗ (A.207)
λ · C(s∗) = r∗ + c∗ (A.208)
r∗ + c∗ ≤ r∗ + c∗. (A.209)
Clearly, C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone:
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Proof.
F =
(
1
1
)
(A.210)
J = Js =
(
0 0
0 0
)  0. (A.211)
Let λ1 = λ2 =
1
2
. Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
2
(r + c), which is convex in (r, c). Also,
C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is concave with respect to r, therefore, this
game is socially-convex.
A.8.6 f. Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r
2 +
r
c2 + 1
4
− 9
5
c (A.212)
C2 = c
2 +
c
r2 + 1
4
− 9
5
r. (A.213)
This game is not smooth:
Proof. Consider (r, c) = (0, 0) and (r∗, c∗) = (1, 1).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = 10 (A.214)
µ · C(s) = 0 (A.215)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (A.216)
10  ≤ 0. (A.217)
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C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is not monotone:
Proof.
F =
( 2r+ 1
c2+14
2c+ 1
r2+14
)
(A.218)
J =
( 2 − 2c
(c2+14 )
2
− 2r
(r2+14 )
2
2
)
(A.219)
Js =
( 2 − c
(c2+14 )
2
− r
(r2+14 )
2
− r
(r2+14 )
2
− c
(c2+14 )
2
2
)
(A.220)
Js
∣∣∣
r=c= 1
4
=
(
2 −5.12
−5.12 2
)
  0. (A.221)
This game is not socially-convex because C1 is not concave with respect to c and
likewise for C2 and r. For example, C1(r = 1, c) = 1 +
1
c2+ 1
4
− 9
5
c is not concave with
respect to c.
A.8.7 g. Convex, Monotone
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r
2 + c2 − 2 (A.222)
C2 = r
2 + c2 + r + c− 2. (A.223)
This game is not smooth:
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Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1,−1) and (r∗, c∗) = (−1, 1).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = 2 (A.224)
µ · C(s) = 0 (A.225)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (A.226)
2  ≤ 0. (A.227)
C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone:
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c+1
)
(A.228)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0. (A.229)
This game is not socially-convex because C1 is not concave with respect to c and
likewise for C2 and r.
A.8.8 h. Convex, Socially-Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game (inspired by modified Tail Drop
policy in routing networks) over (r, c) ∈ (0, 1]2 = X :
C1 = −1
2
(
r
r + c
) +
3
4
(A.230)
C2 = − c
r + c
. (A.231)
This game is not smooth:
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Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1, 1) and (r∗, c∗) = (1
2
, 1
2
).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) =
1
4
(A.232)
µ · C(s∗) = 0 (A.233)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (A.234)
1
4  
≤ 0. (A.235)
C1 is convex in r over X and C2 is convex in c over X , therefore the game is
convex:
Proof.
∂2C1
r2
=
c
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over X (A.236)
∂2C2
c2
=
2r
(r + c)3
≥ 0 over X . (A.237)
The corresponding map is not monotone:
Proof.
F = − 1
(r + c)2
( c
2
r
)
(A.238)
J =
1
(r + c)3
(
c c−r
2
r−c 2r
)
(A.239)
Js =
1
(r + c)3
( c r−c
4
r−c
4
2r
)
(A.240)
Det(Js) = 2rc− 1
16
(r − c)2 (A.241)
Det(Js)|r=0.01,c=1 = −0.041 ≤ 0. (A.242)
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The determinant of Js is negative over a subset of the domain (e.g., r ≤ 0.01, c = 1),
therefore, Js is not positive semidefinite. Hence, F is not monotone.
Let λ1 =
2
3
and λ2 =
1
3
. Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
6
, which is convex in (r, c). Also,
C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is concave with respect to r, therefore, this
game is socially-convex:
Proof.
∂2C1
∂c2
= − r
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over X (A.243)
∂2C2
∂r2
= − 2c
(r + c)3
≤ 0 over X . (A.244)
A.8.9 i. Convex, Monotone, Socially-Convex
Consider the following cost-minimization game:
C1 = r
2 − 1 (A.245)
C2 = c
2 + r + c− 1. (A.246)
This game is not smooth:
Proof. Consider (r, c) = (1,−1) and (r∗, c∗) = (−1, 1).
K∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = 2 (A.247)
µ · C(s) = 0 (A.248)
λ · C(s∗) = 0 (A.249)
2  ≤ 0. (A.250)
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C1 is convex in r and C2 is convex in c, therefore the game is convex.
The corresponding map is monotone:
Proof.
F =
(
2r
2c+1
)
(A.251)
J = Js =
(
2 0
0 2
)  0. (A.252)
Let λ1 = λ2 =
1
2
. Then λ1C1 + λ2C2 =
1
2
(r2 + c2 + r + c − 2), which is convex
in (r, c). Also, C1 is concave with respect to c and C2 is concave with respect to r,
therefore, this game is socially-convex.
A.9 Concave Games
Several well known concave (utility) games are (convex loss) monotone. We test
the following games for monotonicity and interpret the path integral loss over their
fields.
A.9.1 Linear Cournot Competition
In linear Cournot competition, N firms compete for customers by adjusting the
quantity of goods they produce, xi. Firms pay a cost for producing those goods,
ci(xi), which is assumed to be a convex function in xi. The prices for goods are set
by the consumer demand markets according to a price function, p(x) = a− b∑k xk,
with a, b > 0. The firms attempt to maximize their utility or profit functions, ui(x) =
xip(x) − ci(xi). Here, we show that the map associated with the game, F (x) =
{−∂u0
∂x0
, . . . ,−∂uN
∂xN
}, is monotone.
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First we derive the first and second partial derivatives:
∂ui
∂xi
= p(x)− bxi − ∂ci
∂xi
(A.253)
∂2ui
∂x2i
= −2b− ∂
2ci
∂x2i
(A.254)
∂2ui
∂xixj
= −b. (A.255)
These derivatives, in turn, define the Jacobian, Jac(F ), which can be decomposed
into a constant matrix with all entires equal to b and a diagonal matrix consisting
of b + ∂
2ci
∂x2i
. A constant matrix with positive entries b is rank-1 with eigenvalues
{Nb} + {0}N−1. The cost functions, ci, are assumed to be convex, therefore, the
diagonal matrix is positive-definite. This implies that the sum of the two symmetric
matrices is positive definite. It follows that F is monotone.
Let v(t) = o+ (x− o)t and dv = (x− o)dt. Then the path integral over −F is
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∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∫ 1
0
∑
i
(a− bvi(t)− b
∑
k
vk(t))(xi − oi)dt−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o))
(A.256)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
(a− bvi(t)− b
∑
k
vk(t))dt−
∑
i
ci(x) (A.257)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
(a− boi − b(xi − oi)t− b
∑
k
ok + (xk − ok)t)dt
−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (A.258)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(at− boit− b(xi − oi)t
2
2
− b
∑
k
okt+ (xk − ok)t
2
2
)
∣∣∣1
0
−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (A.259)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(a− boi − b
2
(xi − oi)− b
∑
k
ok +
1
2
(xk − ok))
−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o)) (A.260)
=
∑
i
(xi − oi)(a− boi + xi
2
− b
∑
k
ok + xk
2
)−
∑
i
(ci(x)− ci(o))
(A.261)
=
∑
i
xip(zi)− ci(x)−
∑
i
oip(zi)− ci(o) (A.262)
where zi =
1
2
(oi + xi +
∑
k
ok + xk).
So auto-welfare is calculating profits with player specific prices. Specifically, each
player’s price is set as a deviation from the average supply of o and x. If o is set
to the origin, zi is half the total market supply except with player i’s supply at full.
More generally, if player i chooses to flood the market with good, xi, auto-welfare
computes its contribution to the sum with a lower price point.
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A.9.2 Linear Resource Allocation
In a resource allocation game, N users share a communication channel with finite
capacity (e.g., C = 1). Each user i submits a bid, xi ∈ [ > 0, 1], to the communication
network which then allocates a fraction of the communication channel to each user
according an allocation function, Mi(x) = xi/
∑
k xk. Each user plays to maximize
its utility, ui(x) = ψi(Mi(x))−αixi, with αi > 0. Here, we consider a simplified value
function, ψi(z) = βz, with β > 0 and show that the map associated with the game,
F (x) = {−∂u0
∂x0
, . . . ,−∂uN
∂xN
}, is monotone.
First we derive the first and second partial derivatives:
∂Mi(x)
∂xi
=
1∑
k xk
[
1− xi∑
k xk
]
(A.263)
∂Mi(x)
∂xj
=
1∑
k xk
[
0− xi∑
k xk
]
(A.264)
∂2Mi(x)
∂x2i
= − 1
(
∑
k xk)
2
[
2− 2xi∑
k xk
]
(A.265)
∂2Mi(x)
∂xixj
= − 1
(
∑
k xk)
2
[
1− 2xi∑
k xk
]
(A.266)
∂2ui
∂x2i
= β
∂2Mi(x)
∂x2i
(A.267)
∂2ui
∂xixj
= β
∂2Mi(x)
∂xixj
. (A.268)
These derivatives, in turn, define the Jacobian, Jac(F ), which can be decomposed
into a rank-1 matrix, M , with constant rows and an identity matrix, IN . Let zi =
xi/
∑
k xk ∈ (0, 1]:
Jac(F )ij =
β
(
∑
k xk)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
1− 2zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mij
+ I(i = j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IN
]
. (A.269)
We can prove Jac(F ) is monotone by showing 1
2
(Jac(F ) + Jac(F )>)  0. As a first
step, we’ll lower bound the eigenvalues of a symmetrized M :
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M
(s)
ij =
1
2
(M +M>)ij (A.270)
= 1− (zi + zj) is at most rank-2 (A.271)
=⇒ λ(M (s)) = {λlo, λhi}+ {0}N−2 (A.272)
Tr(M (s)) = λlo + λhi = N − 2 (A.273)
||M (s)||1 = ||M (s)||∞ = |1− 2zi|+
∑
j 6=i
|1− (zi + zj)| (A.274)
= |1− 2zi|+
∑
j 6=i
1− (zi + zj) (A.275)
and zi, zj > ,
∑
k
zk = 1 =⇒ zi + zj < 1
= |1− 2zi|+ (N − 2)(1− zi) ≤ N − 1 (A.276)
ρ(M (s)) = ||M (s)||2 ≤
√
||M (s)||1||M (s)||∞ = N − 1 Holder’s inequality
(A.277)
Assume minλ(M (s)) = λlo < −1 =⇒ maxλ(M (s)) = λhi > N − 1 contradicts ρ(M (s))
(A.278)
=⇒ minλ(M (s)) ≥ −1. (A.279)
The eigenvalues of M (s) are lower bounded by −1, therefore, the eigenvalues of the
sum of M (s) and an identity matrix are lower bounded by 0:
J (s) =
1
2
(Jac(F ) + Jac(F )2) =
β
(
∑
k xk)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
[
M (s) + 1N
]
(A.280)
=⇒ minλ(J (s)) ≥ 0 (A.281)
=⇒ F is monotone √. (A.282)
Next, we’ll compare welfare and auto-welfare. For the moment, consider welfare
with αi = 0:
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W =
∑
i
ui = β
∑
i
xi∑
k xk
= β. (A.283)
Notice that without αi, welfare regret,
∑
tW (xt) −W (x∗), is identically zero and is
a pointless quantity to maximize. If we include αi,
W =
∑
i
ui = β −
∑
i
αixi, (A.284)
whose maximizer has a simple closed-form solution for any αi > 0: xi = . This
result is independent of the parameters of the utility functions, β and αi. Next, we’ll
compute auto-welfare to contrast. Let v(t) = o + (x − o)t and dv = (x − o)dt. The
critical component of auto-welfare is the path integral. Then
∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∫ 1
0
∑
i
( β∑
k vk(t)
[
1− vi(t)∑
k vk(t)
]
− αi
)
(xi − oi)dt (A.285)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β∑
k vk(t)
[
1− vi(t)∑
k vk(t)
]
(xi − oi)dt−
∑
i
∫ 1
0
αi(xi − oi)dt
(A.286)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β(xi − oi)∑
k ok + (xk − ok)t
[
1− oi + (xi − oi)t∑
k ok + (xk − ok)t
]
dt−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi)
(A.287)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
β(xi − oi)∑
k ok + t
∑
k(xk − ok)
[
1− oi + t(xi − oi)∑
k ok + t
∑
k(xk − ok)
]
dt
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (A.288)
=
∑
i
β(xi − oi)
∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)
[
1− oi + t(xi − oi)
so + t(sx − so)
]
dt−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi).
(A.289)
Breaking apart the left integrand, we first compute the following:
139
∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)dt =
ln(so + t(sx − so))
sx − so
∣∣∣1
0
=
ln(sx/so)
sx − so . (A.290)
We’ll use integration by parts on the other part. Let u = oi + t(xi − oi), dv =
(so + t(sx − so))−2dt, v = − 1sx−so (so + t(sx − so))−1, and du = xi − oidt. Then
∫ 1
0
oi + t(xi − oi)
(so + t(sx − so))2dt =
∫ 1
0
udv = uv
∣∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
vdu (A.291)
uv
∣∣∣1
0
= − oi + t(xi − oi)
(sx − so)(so + t(sx − so))
∣∣∣1
0
(A.292)
=
oi
so(sx − so) −
xi
sx(sx − so)) (A.293)
−
∫ 1
0
vdu =
∫ 1
0
1
sx − so (so + t(sx − so))
−1(xi − oi)dt (A.294)
=
xi − oi
sx − so
∫ 1
0
1
so + t(sx − so)dt (A.295)
=
xi − oi
sx − so
ln(sx/so)
sx − so . (A.296)
Combining the two results, we find
∫
v:o→x
〈−F (v), dv〉 =
∑
i
β(xi − oi)
[ ln(sx/so)
sx − so (1−
xi − oi
sx − so ) +
xi
sx(sx − so) −
oi
so(sx − so)
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (A.297)
=
∑
i
β
xi − oi
sx − so
[
ln(sx/so)(1− xi − oi
sx − so ) +
xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi)
(A.298)
= β ln(sx/so)
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so − β ln(sx/so)
∑
i
(
xi − oi
sx − so )
2
+ β
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so
[xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi) (A.299)
= β ln(sx/so)
(
1− ||x− o||
2
2
(sx − so)2
)
+ β
∑
i
xi − oi
sx − so
[xi
sx
− oi
so
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − oi).
(A.300)
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Let W ao = 0 and o = x
∗, then
W a(x) = β ln(sx/sx∗)
(
1− ||x− x
∗||22
(sx − sx∗)2
)
+ β
∑
i
xi − x∗i
sx − sx∗
[xi
sx
− x
∗
i
sx∗
]
−
∑
i
αi(xi − x∗i ).
(A.301)
Finding a closed-form solution for a global optimizer of Equation (A.301) seems
daunting not to mention the fact that the optimizer, x∗, appears in the optimization
function. Fortunately, Theorem 4 states that a global optimizer of Equation (A.301)
is also a solution the corresponding VI(F,X = [, 1]N). If we assume x = x∗ lies in
the interior of X , then F (x∗) = 0:
F (x) = β
1∑
k xk
(1− xi∑
k xk
)− αi = 0 =⇒ xi = sx(1− αi sx
β
) (A.302)
sx =
∑
i
xi = sx
∑
i
(1− αi sx
β
) =⇒ sx
[∑
i αi
β
sx + (1−N)
]
= 0 (A.303)
=⇒ sx = 0 or β(N − 1)∑
i αi
. (A.304)
Combining the two results, we find that the global optimizer is
x∗i =
β(N − 1)∑
k αk
(
1− αi∑
k αk
(N − 1)
)
. (A.305)
As the cost coefficients, αi, grow relative to the revenue coefficients, β, the op-
timal bid size drops. Also, as the number of users, N , increases, the optimal bid
size increases, albeit with diminishing returns. Hence, auto-welfare has a rich depen-
dence on the utility parameters and number of users, which is very different from the
complete independence given by welfare.
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The linear lower bound on auto-welfare regret is given by
regretWa = −regret1 ≥ 〈−F (x), x− x∗〉 (A.306)
=
∑
i
[
βγi
xi∑
k xk
− αixi
]
−
∑
i
[
βγi
x∗i∑
k xk
− αix∗i
]
(A.307)
where γi = (1− xi∑
k xk
) (A.308)
=
∑
i
uγi (x)−
∑
i
uγi (x
∗) (A.309)
where uγi is the original utility function, ui, with “revenues” (ψi(Mi(x))) reweighted
by γi. In this case, auto-welfare regret is actually computing standard welfare with
reweighted “revenues”. High revenues are weighted lower and low revenues are
weighted higher, which naturally encourages a more even distribution of resources.
A.9.3 Congestion Control Protocols
Similar utility functions can be used to model a congestion control protocol with
a tail-drop policy. In this game, a router drops packets if the total number of packets
exceeds the network capacity (e.g., C = 1). In this case, the utility functions are
defined piecewise:
ui(x) =

xi
∑
k xk ≤ 1
β xi∑
k xk
− (β − 1)xi
∑
k xk > 1.
(A.310)
For
∑
k xk ≤ 1, the utility functions are linear, thus the Jacobian of the associated
game map, F (x) = {−∂u0
∂x0
, . . . ,−∂uN
∂xN
}, is a zero matrix, which is positive semidefinite.
Monotonicity for the second case follows the same proof as for the linear resource
allocation game above.
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A.10 Machine Learning Network Motivation
The example presented in Subsection 2.7.2 demonstrates our proposed no-regret
algorithm on a cloud-based machine learning network. Our network is motivated by
expectations of the next era of machine learning. Data is often the difference between
a high performing model and a mediocre one; for some data hungry models (e.g., deep
learning), Big Data launches them to state-of-the-art results. We expect Big Data to
drive a mature digital supply chain capable of supporting an economy where producers
provide data for consumers (i.e., machine learning models) to consume. Unlike the
present, this commodity will not be transferred into local storage for consumption on
personal machines; rather, it will be transmitted in batches, immediately consumed
for training, and discarded to allow room for the next batch. Our model of a cloud-
based machine learning network (MLN) is trivially adapted from the service oriented
internet (SOI) model proposed in the work of Nagurney and Wolf [2014]. In the
original SOI model, service providers (e.g., Netflix, Amazon) stream content (e.g.,
movies, music). In our MLN model, service providers (e.g., Twitter, Wikipedia)
stream machine learning data. Service providers control the quantity of data (i.e., #
of samples × # of features) flowing through the market. Network providers charge
service providers a fee for transmitting their data to consumers. The price different
consumer markets are willing to pay service providers to stream data over a network of
a certain quality is given by demand functions, price(quantity,quality). Given these
relationships, service providers and network providers attempt to maximize their
profits by varying their respective controls (quantity,quality) over the network. These
relationships are parameterized so that we can instantiate ten five-firm networks by
drawing parameters from uniform distributions over predefined ranges (code available
@ github.com/all-umass/VI-Solver).
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A.11 GTD Algorithms
The gradient temporal difference learning algorithm (GTD) is a Reinforcement
Learning algorithm that can be used to evaluate a target policy by observing a sepa-
rate behavior policy. The GTD update rules are
yt+1 = yt + αt(b− Aθt −Myt) (A.311)
θt+1 = θt + αt(A
>yt) (A.312)
where M = I or M is a covariance matrix. Either way, M is symmetric positive
definite.
These update rules can be derived from a two-player game with appropriate agent
loss functions, f (i). For example, if
f (1)(y, θ) = −y>(b− Aθ) + 1
2
y>My (A.313)
f (2)(y, θ) = −θ>A>y, (A.314)
then online simultaneous gradient descent with F = [∇yf (1),∇θf (2)] gives the same
updates as GTD. Consider rewriting this update as [yt+1, θt+1] = [yt, θt]−αF ([yt, θt]).
Then
F =
(My+Aθ−b
−A>y
)
(A.315)
=
(
M A
−A> 0
)(
y
θ
)
+
( −b
0
)
(A.316)
= Jx+ d (A.317)
Js =
(
M 0
0 0
)  0. (A.318)
Therefore, F is monotone.
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By Theorem 2, the corresponding path integral loss that these dynamics bound is
f(x) =
1
2
[x>J>x+ x>(J − J>)x∗ − x∗>J>x∗] + d>(x− x∗) (A.319)
=
1
2
(y>My − y∗>My∗) + y>Aθ∗ − y∗>Aθ − b>(y − y∗) (A.320)
=
1
2
||y||2M , (A.321)
where y∗ = 0 and Aθ∗ − b = 0. A measure of how well θ is performing is missing
from the loss. This confirms our theoretical motivation for using the modified path
integral loss displayed below:
f(x) =
1
2
[xˆ>J>xˆ+ xˆ>(J − J>)x∗ − x∗>J>x∗] + d>(xˆ− x∗) (A.322)
+
1
2
[x>J>x+ x>(J − J>)xˆ− xˆ>J>xˆ] + d>(x− xˆ) (A.323)
= ||y||21
2
M+ηˆAA> + ||b− Aθ||2ηˆI − 〈y, b− Aθ〉ηˆM (A.324)
where ||v||2A = z>Az and 〈u, v〉A = u>Av. Note that this modified loss contains terms
that encourage Aθ = b, y = 0, and y to align with Aθ− b. In the GTD algorithms, y
was originally introduced as an auxiliary variable to estimate E[ρδφ] = b− Aθ, so it
is reassuring that the modified loss contains these terms.
A.12 Constant-Linear GANs
The Constant-Linear GAN is a Wasserstein-type GAN with constant generator
and linear discriminator. The minimax objective is
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = Ex∼pdata(x) [d
>x]− Ez∼pz(z)[d>Gz] (A.325)
where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, d ∈ Rn, G ∈ Rn×m.
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For simplicity of exhibition, we will estimate the expectations with a single sample
x ∼ pdata(x) and z ∼ pz(z), however, the result applies to batches as well. The
minimax objective simplifies to
min
G
max
d
V (G, d) = d>(x−Gz) (A.326)
=
∑
i
di(xi −
∑
j
Gijzj). (A.327)
Let g =

G11
...
G1m
Gi1
...
Gim
...

be a flattened version of the matrix G.
Also, let A =

z1 0 · · ·
zj 0 · · ·
zm 0 · · ·
0 z1 · · ·
0 zj · · ·
0 zm · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·

∈ Rmn×n.
Then,
146
F =

−d1z1
−d1zj
−d1zm
...
−dizj∑
j G1jzj − x1∑
j Gijzj − xi∑
j Gnjzj − xn

(A.328)
=
0mn×mn −A
A> 0n×n

g
d
+
 0
−x
 (A.329)
= Jγ + b (A.330)
Js =
(
0 0
0 0
)  0. (A.331)
Therefore, F is monotone. If G and d are regularized with α|| · ||22, then F is strongly
monotone with parameter α.
In the subsequent section (Appendix A.13), we show that the corresponding path
integral loss that OEG bounds is
V (Gˆ, d∗)− V (G∗, dˆ) + V (G, dˆ)− V (Gˆ, d). (A.332)
The minimax objective is linear in the random variables x and z, which allows
us to move weights outside the expectations. Let b = G[:,−1] denote the last column
and G[:,:−1] the preceding of the columns. We’ll assume p(z) has mean zero and x has
mean µ. The objective simplifies to
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min
G
max
d,||d||≤1
V (G, d) = d>(E[x]−G[:,:−1]E[z]−G[:,−1]) (A.333)
min
b
max
d,||d||≤1
V (b, d) = d>(µ− b) (A.334)
min
b
V (b) =
(µ− b)>(µ− b)
||µ− b|| = 0 (A.335)
⇒ b = µ, d = 0. (A.336)
Therefore, affine GANs only learn the mean of the distribution.
A.13 Path Integral Loss for Minimax Games
Here we evaluate the path integral loss for minimax games:
min
x1
max
x2
V (x1, x2) (A.337)
dV = 〈 ∂V
∂x1
, dx1〉+ 〈 ∂V
∂x2
, dx2〉 (A.338)
f(x) =
∫
z:o→x
〈F (z), dz〉 (A.339)
=
∫
z:o→x
〈∂V
∂z1
, dz1〉+ 〈−∂V
∂z2
, dz2〉 (A.340)
=
∫
z1:o1→x1
z2:o2→o2
dV −
∫
z1:o1→o1
z2:o2→x2
dV (A.341)
= V (x1, o2)− V (o1, o2)− V (o1, x2) + V (o1, o2) (A.342)
= V (x1, o2)− V (o1, x2). (A.343)
Similarly, the modified path integral loss is
f(x) = V (xˆ1, o2)− V (o1, xˆ2) + V (x1, xˆ2)− V (xˆ1, x2). (A.344)
A.14 Composition of Monotone Fields
Let F and G be monotone maps from Rn → Rn. Consider the composition F ◦G.
The composition of monotone fields is not necessarily monotone. Take F = G = Ix,
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where I is the identity matrix. Then F ◦ G = Ix2 where the power is applied
elementwise. This field represents the gradient of 1
3
x3, which is a non-convex function,
therefore F ◦G is non-monotone.
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APPENDIX B
LINEAR QUADRATIC GANS AND
CROSSING-THE-CURL
This appendix supplements Chapter 3, but also provides additional material for
the curious reader.
B.1 A Survey of Candidate Theories Continued
In this section, we survey several alternative theories for studying GANs. Ulti-
mately, we select Variational Inequalities based on our research.
B.1.1 Algorithmic Game Theory
Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) offers results on convergence to equilibria when
a game, possibly online, is convex [41], socially-convex [33], or smooth [97]. A convex
game is one in which all player losses are convex in their respective variables, i.e.
fi(xi, x−i) is convex in xi. A socially-convex game adds the additional requirements
that 1) there exists a strict convex combination of the player losses that is convex and
2) each player’s loss is concave in the variables of each of the other players. In other
words, the players as a whole are cooperative, yet individually competitive. Lastly,
smoothness ensures that “the externality imposed on any one player by the actions of
the others is bounded” [97]. In a zero-sum game such as Equation (3.1), one player’s
gain is exactly the other player’s loss making smoothness an unlikely fit for studying
GANs.
150
B.1.2 Differential Games
Differential games [13, 38] consider more general dynamics such as x¨ = −F (x),
not just first order ODEs, however, the focus is on systems that separate control, u,
and state x, i.e. x˙ = −F (x(t), u(t), t). More specific to our interests, Differential Nash
Games can be expressed as Differential VIs, a specific class of infinite dimensional VIs
with explicit state dynamics and explicit controls; these, in turn, can be framed as
infinite dimensional VIs without an explicit state.
B.1.3 Equivalence of Monotonicity to Euclidean Contraction
Strongly-monotone maps are equivalent to contraction operators with respect to
Euclidean distance. Consider the following iterative update:
xk+1 = G(xk). (B.1)
Assume the operator G is known to be a (1 − γ)-contraction (γ ∈ (0, 1)) with
respect to the distance function, D:
D(G(x);G(y)) ≤ (1− γ)D(x; y) =⇒ D(G(x);G(y))D(x; y) ≤ (1− γ)D(x; y)2.
(B.2)
If D is Euclidean distance, then
||G(x)−G(y)||||x− y|| ≤ (1− γ)||x− y||2. (B.3)
Rewrite the update to better fit the form of variational inequality updates:
xk+1 = xk − η
(xk −G(xk)
η
)
. (B.4)
where F (x) = x−G(x)
η
.
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If G(x) is a (1− γ)-contraction. Then
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 = 1
η
||x− y||2 − 1
η
〈G(x)−G(y), x− y〉 (B.5)
≥ 1
η
(||x− y||2 − ||G(x)−G(y)||||x− y||) by Cauchy-Schwarz
(B.6)
≥ 1
η
(||x− y||2 − (1− γ)||x− y||2) (B.7)
=
γ
η
||x− y||2 > 0. (B.8)
Therefore, F is strongly monotone with parameter γ
η
.
In addition,
||F (x)− F (y)|| = ||x−G(x)
η
− y −G(y)
η
|| (B.9)
≤ 1
η
[
||x− y||+ ||G(x)−G(y)||
]
by triangle-inequality (B.10)
≤ 1
η
[
||x− y||+ (1− γ)||x− y||
]
by contraction (B.11)
=
2− γ
η
||x− y||. (B.12)
Therefore, F is also smooth with parameter 2−γ
η
.
Assume the mapping F is strongly monotone with parameter γ and smooth with
parameter β, i.e., ||F (x)− F (y)|| ≤ β||x− y||. As before, define G(x) = x− ηF (x).
Then
||G(x)−G(y)||2 = 〈G(x)−G(y), G(x)−G(y)〉 (B.13)
= 〈(x− ηF (x))− (y − ηF (y), (x− ηF (x))− (y − ηF (y)〉 (B.14)
= ||x− y||2 − 2η〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉+ η2||F (x)− F (y)||2 (B.15)
≤ (1− 2ηγ + η2β2)||x− y||2. (B.16)
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In order for G to be a contraction, |1− 2ηγ+ η2β2| must be less than 1. This implies
that 0 < η < 2γ
β2
. If this condition is met, then G is a
√
1− 2ηγ + η2β2-contraction.
If η is set optimally to γ
β2
, then G is a
√
1− γ2
β2
-contraction.
B.2 Nash Equilibrium vs VI Solution
Theorem 9. Theorem 3.1 Repeated from Cavazzuti et al. [2002]. Let (C,X ) be a
cost minimization game with player cost functions Ci and feasible set X . Let x∗ be a
Nash equilibrium. Let F = [∂C1
∂x1
, . . . , ∂CN
∂xN
]. Then
〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ ({x∗ + IX (x∗)} ∩ X )︸ ︷︷ ︸
X ′
⊆ X (B.17)
where IX (x∗) is the internal cone at x∗ (defined on p. 494). The internal cone
represents the smallest pointed cone containing the union of all possible unilateral de-
viations by players from the equilibrium point. Note that X ′ ⊆ X . When Ci(xi,x−i)
is pseudoconvex in xi for all i, this condition is also sufficient. Note that this is implied
if F is pseudomonotone, i.e. pseudomonotonicity of F is a stronger condition.
To summarize the main takeaway, if 〈F (x∗), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X , i.e., x∗ solves
V I(F,X ), and F is pseudomonotone, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
B.3 Table of Maps Considered in Analysis
All maps corresponding to the (w1, b)-subsystem in Table B.1 maintain the desired
unique fixed point, F (x∗) = 0, where x∗ = (w∗1, b
∗) = (0, µ).
For the (w2, a)-subsystem, all maps except Flin with certain settings of (α, β, γ)
and Fcon maintain the desired unique fixed point, x
∗ = (w∗2, a
∗) = (0, σ). Fcon intro-
duces an additional spurious fixed point at
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Name Map
F [−∇φV ;∇θV ]
Fw1,b [b− µ,−w1]>
Fw1,balt [b− µ+ ρkw1,−w1]>
Fw1,bunr [b− µ, ρk∆k(b− µ)− w1]>
Fw1,breg [b− µ,−w1 + 2η(b− µ)]>
Fw1,bcon [w1, b− µ]>
Fw1,beg [w1, b− µ]>
Fw1,bcc [w1, b− µ]>
Fw1,bηcc [b− µ+ ηw1,−w1 + η(b− µ)]>
Fw1,blin [α(b− µ) + (β + γ)w1,−αw1 + (β + γ)(b− µ)]>
Fw2,a [a2 − σ2,−2w2a]>
Fw2,aalt [a
2 − σ2, 2ρka3 − 2a(ρkσ2 + w2)]>
Fw2,aunr [a
2 − σ2, 4ρk∆ka3 − 2a(2ρk∆kσ2 + w2)]>
Fw2,areg [a
2 − σ2,−2w2a+ 4ηa(σ2 + a2)]>
Fw2,acon [a
2 − σ2 + 4βw2a2, 2aβ(a2 − σ2) + 4βw22a− 2w2a]>
Fw2,aeg [4w2a
2, 2a(a2 − σ2)− 4w22a]>
Fw2,acc [4w2a
2, 2a(a2 − σ2)]>
Fw2,aeg′ [w2,
a2−σ2−2w22
2a
]>
Fw2,acc′ [w2,
a2−σ2
2a
]>
Fw2,alin [α(a
2 − σ2) + 4(β + γ)w2a2, 2a(β + γ)(a2 − σ2) + 4(β − γ)w22a− 2αw2a]>
FW2,Acc 2[∀i < N :
∑
d≤iAidANd − ΣiN ,∀i < N : −
∑
d<N AdiWdN ]
>
Table B.1: Table of vector field maps where V is the minimax objective, ρk is a
stepsize, ∆k is # of unrolled steps, Σ is the sample covariance matrix, N is the row
of A being learned, and α, γ, β, η are hyperparameters.
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a =
√
−3 +√9 + 32σ2β2
16β2
, (B.18)
w2 =
σ2 − a2
4βa2
. (B.19)
Fcon is a special case of Flin where α = 1, β = 1, and γ = 0.
B.4 Minimax Solution to Constrained Multivariate LQ-GAN
is Unique
Proposition 9. Assume z ∼ p(z) and y ∼ p(y) are both in Rn. If W2 is constrained
to be symmetric and A is constrained to be of Cholesky form, i.e., lower triangu-
lar with positive diagonal, then the unique minimax solution to Equation (3.6) is
(W ∗2 , w
∗
1, A
∗, b∗) = (0,0,Σ1/2, µ) where Σ1/2 is the unique, non-negative square root of
Σ.
Proof.
V (G,D) = Ey∼N (µ,Σ)
[
y>W2y + w>1 y
]
+ Ez∼N (0,In)
[
− (Az + b)>W2(Az + b)− w>1 (Az + b)
]
(B.20)
= Ey∼N (µ,Σ)
[∑
i
∑
j
W2ijyiyj +
∑
i
w1iyi
]
(B.21)
− Ez∼N (0,In)
[∑
i
∑
j
W2ij(bi +
∑
k
Aikzk)(bj +
∑
k
Ajkzk) +
∑
i
w1i(bi +
∑
k
Aikzk)
]
.
(B.22)
Taking derivatives and setting equal to zero, we find that the fixed point at the
interior is unique:
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W˙2 = Ey∼N (µ,Σ)
[
yy>
]
− Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(Az + b)(Az + b)>
]
(B.23)
w˙1 = Ey∼N (µ,Σ)
[
y
]
− Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(Az + b)
]
(B.24)
A˙ = Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(W2 +W
>
2 )Azz
> + (W2 +W>2 )bz
> + w1z>
]
(B.25)
b˙ = Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(W2 +W
>
2 )Az + (W2 +W
>
2 )b+ w1
]
. (B.26)
Setting derivatives equal to zero:
w˙1 = µ− b = 0⇒ b = µ (B.27)
W˙2 = Ey∼N (µ,Σ)
[
(y − µ)(y − µ)> + µy> + yµ> − µµ>
]
− Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(Az + b)(Az + b)>
]
(B.28)
= Σ + µµ> − Ez∼N (0,In)
[
Azz>A> + Azb> + b(Az)> + bb>
]
(B.29)
= Σ + µµ> − AA> − bb> = Σ− AA> = 0⇒ A = Σ1/2 (B.30)
A˙ = Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(W2 +W
>
2 )Azz
> + (W2 +W>2 )bz
> + w1z>
]
(B.31)
= (W2 +W
>
2 )A = 0⇒ W2 +W>2 = 0⇒ W2 = −W>2 = 0 (B.32)
b˙ = Ez∼N (0,In)
[
(W2 +W
>
2 )Az + (W2 +W
>
2 )b+ w1
]
(B.33)
= (W2 +W
>
2 )b+ w1 = w1 = 0. (B.34)
The last implication in Equation (B.30) follows because A is constrained to be of
Cholesky form, i.e., lower triangular with positive diagonal, and every symmetric
positive definite matrix has a unique Cholesky decomposition.
The second to last implication of Equation (B.32) follows because A = Σ1/2 is
necessarily full rank. Note this implies A> is also full rank. The null space of a full
rank matrix is the zeros vector, which implies W2 + W
>
2 = 0. W2 is symmetric, so
this implies W2 = 0.
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B.5 Divergence of Simultaneous Gradient Descent for the
(w1, b)-Subsystem
Consider the case where the mean of p(z) is zero:
Fw1,b = [b,−w1] = Jw1,bx, (B.35)
Jw1,b =
 0 1
−1 0
 , (B.36)
xk = [w1,k, bk]
>, (B.37)
xk+1 = xk − ρkFw1,b(xk), (B.38)
x∗ = [0, 0]. (B.39)
We will show that simultaneous gradient descent always produces an iterate that is
farther away from the equilibrium than the previous iterate, i.e. ||xk+1− x∗||2/||xk −
x∗||2 > 1.
||xk+1 − x∗||2/||xk − x∗||2 = ||xk − ρkJw1,bxk||2/||xk||2 (B.40)
= ||(I − ρkJw1,b)xk||2/||xk||2 (B.41)
=
x>k (I − ρkJw1,b)>(I − ρkJw1,b)xk
x>k xk
(B.42)
=
x>kMxk
x>k xk
Rayleigh quotient of M (B.43)
≥ λmin(M), (B.44)
where
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M = (I − ρkJw1,b)>(I − ρkJw1,b) (B.45)
=
1 + ρ2k 0
0 1 + ρ2k
 , (B.46)
λmin(M) = 1 + ρ
2
k > 1. (B.47)
Therefore, simultaneous gradient descent diverges from the equilibrium of the (w1, b)-
subsystem for any step size scheme, ρk.
B.6 Derivation of Crossing-the-Curl
Here, we derive our proposed technique in 3-D, however, the result of the derivation
can be computed in arbitrary dimensions:
(∇× F )× F = −F × (∇× F ) (B.48)
= −v × (∇× F ) where v = F (B.49)
= −∇F (v · F ) + (v · ∇)F where ∇F is Feynman notation (B.50)
= −
(
v1
[∂F1
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂F1
∂xn
]
+ . . .+ vn
[∂Fn
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂Fn
∂xn
])
(B.51)
+
(
v1
∂
∂x1
+ . . .+ vn
∂
∂xn
)
F (B.52)
= (J − J>)F. (B.53)
B.7 Monotonicity: Definitions and Requirements
For all x ∈ X and x′ ∈ X ,
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〈F (x)− F (x′), x− x′〉(> 0,≥ s||x− x′||2) ≥ 0 (strictly, s-strongly)-monotone,
(B.54)
〈F (x′), x− x′〉 ≥ 0 =⇒ 〈F (x), x− x′〉(> 0) ≥ 0 (strictly-)pseudomonotone,
(B.55)
〈F (x′), x− x′〉 > 0 =⇒ 〈F (x), x− x′〉 ≥ 0 quasimonotone. (B.56)
While we used these definitions in our analysis for certain cases, the following
alternate requirements proposed in [22] made the complete analysis of the system
tractable. We restate them here for convenience. Note that we what we refer to as
condition (B) in the main body of the paper is actually a stronger version of condition
(C) below with v = (x∗ − x)/t.
Consider the following conditions:
(A) For all x ∈ X and v ∈ Rn such that v>F (x) = 0 we have v>J(x)v ≥ 0.
(B) For all x ∈ X and v ∈ Rn such that F (x) = 0, v>J(x)v = 0, and v>F (x+t˜v) > 0
for some t˜ < 0, we have that for all t¯ > 0, there exists t ∈ (0, t¯] such that t ∈ Ix,v
and v>F (x+ tv) ≥ 0.
(C) For all x ∈ X and v ∈ Rn such that F (x) = 0 and v>J(x)v = 0, we have that
for all t¯ > 0, there exists t ∈ (0, t¯] such that t ∈ Ix,v and v>F (x+ tv) ≥ 0.
Theorem 10 ([22], Theorem 3). Let F : X → Rn be differentiable on the open convex
set X ⊂ Rn.
(i) F is quasimonotone on X if and only if (A) and (B’) hold.
(ii) F is pseudomonotone on X if and only if (A) and (C’) hold.
B.8 A Comparison of Monotonicity and Hurwitz
The monotonicity and Hurwitz properties are complementary.
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B.8.1 Hurwitz Does Not Imply Quasimonotonicity
Let F (x) = Jx, J =
 1 4
−1 1
, S =
 0 1
−1 0
, and v = SJx = [−x1 + x2,−x1 −
4x2]
>. Then λ1,2(J) = 1± 2i so J is Hurwitz, and
[v>Jv]
∣∣∣
(−1,1)
= [x21 + 3x1x2 + x
2
2]
∣∣∣
(−1,1)
= −1, (B.57)
which, by condition (A), implies F is not quasimonotone.
B.8.2 Monotonicity Does Not Imply Hurwitz
Let F (x) = Jx and J =
 0 1
−1 0
. Then λ1,2(J) = ±i so J is not Hurwitz, but
J + J> =
0 0
0 0
  0, λ1,2 = 0, (B.58)
so F is monotone.
B.8.3 Monotonicity and Hurwitz Can Overlap
Let F (x) = Jx and J =
1 0
0 1
. Then λ1,2(J) = 1 so J is Hurwitz and
J + J> =
1 0
0 1
  0, λ1,2 = 1, (B.59)
so F is monotone.
Proposition 10 ((Strict, Strong)-Monotonicity Implies Hurwitz). If F is differen-
tiable and strictly-monontone, then the Jacobian of F , J , is Hurwitz. If F is differ-
entiable and s-strongly-monotone, then J is Hurwitz with min(R(λ)) ≥ s.
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Proof. Assume A is a real, square matrix and A is either positive definite or strongly-
positive definite, i.e. v>Av  0 or v>Av  s||v||2 with v ∈ Cn. Let ∗ denote the
conjugate transpose and note that 〈u,w〉 = u∗w. Let λ = a + bi be a potentially
complex eigenvalue of A and v be its corresponding eigenvector, i.e. Av = λv. We
aim to prove that if A satisfies the above assumptions, then a > 0, i.e., A is Hurwitz.
〈(A+ A>)v, v〉 = 〈Av, v〉+ 〈A>v, v〉 (B.60)
〈A>v, v〉 = (A>v)∗v (B.61)
= v∗(A>)∗v (B.62)
= v∗(Av) because A is real (B.63)
= 〈v, Av〉 (B.64)
0 < ( or s||v||2 ≤)〈1
2
(A+ A>)v, v〉 (B.65)
=
1
2
(〈Av, v〉+ 〈v, Av〉) (B.66)
=
1
2
((a+ bi)〈v, v〉+ (a+ bi)〈v, v〉) (B.67)
=
1
2
[(a+ bi)||v||2 + (a− bi)||v||2] (B.68)
= a||v||2 (B.69)
⇒ a > 0 or a ≥ s. (B.70)
If F is (strictly, strongly)-monotone, then the Jacobian of F is a real, square, (positive
definite, strongly-positive definite) matrix, therefore, it matches the above assump-
tions. Hence, the conclusion follows.
B.9 Crossing-the-Curl Can Make Monotone Fields, Non-
Monotone
Here, we provide examples of negative results for Crossing-the-Curl. This is to
emphasize that our proposed technique can cause problems if not used with cau-
161
tion. The headings below describe the before and afters when applying our proposed
technique to the map F (x) = Jx.
Monotone to Non-Monotone.
J =
 4 1
−1 1
 (B.71)
Jsym =
4 0
0 1
 , λ1,2 = 4, 1 (B.72)
Jsymcc =
2 3
3 2
 , λ1,2 = 5,−1 (B.73)
Increase in condition number: κ = 11/5→ 4.
J =
 1 1/4
−1 1
 (B.74)
Jsym =
 1 −3/8
−3/8 1
 , λ1,2 = 11/8, 5/8 (B.75)
Jsymcc =
5/4 0
0 5/16
 , λ1,2 = 5/4, 5/16 (B.76)
Saddle becomes Monotone.
J =
−1 1
−1 1
 (B.77)
Jsym =
−1 0
0 1
 , λ1,2 = −1, 1 (B.78)
Jsymcc =
 2 −2
−2 2
 , λ1,2 = 4, 0 (B.79)
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Unstable point becomes stable.
J =
−2 1
−1 −1
 (B.80)
Jsym =
−2 0
0 −1
 , λ1,2 = −2,−1 (B.81)
Jsymcc =
 2 −1
−1 2
 , λ1,2 = 3, 1 (B.82)
Fw2,aeg′ becomes non-monotone.
F =
 w2
a2−σ2−2w22
2a
 (B.83)
Fcc =
−w2(a2−σ2−2w22)2a2
w22
a
 (B.84)
Tr[Jcc]
∣∣∣
w2=0,a=2σ
= −3
8
⇒ Jcc 0 (B.85)
Proposition 11. Crossing-the-Curl forces monotonicity for normal, affine fields.
Proof. Let F = Jx+ b and assume J is normal, i.e., JJ> = J>J . Then
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Fcc = (J
> − J)F (B.86)
= (J> − J)(Jx+ b) (B.87)
Jcc = (J
> − J)J (B.88)
= (J>J − JJ) (B.89)
Jsymcc =
2J>J − JJ − J>J>
2
(B.90)
=
J>J + JJ> − JJ − J>J>
2
+
J>J − JJ>
2
(B.91)
=
J>J + JJ> − JJ − J>J>
2
because J is normal (B.92)
=
−(J − J>)(J − J>)
2
(B.93)
=
(J − J>)>(J − J>)
2
(B.94)
z>Jsymcc z =
1
2
[(J − J>)z]>[(J − J>)z] (B.95)
=
1
2
||(J − J>)z||2 ≥ 0⇒ Jcc  0. (B.96)
B.10 Analysis of the (w1, b)-Subsystem
Proposition 12. Unrolled GANs and Alternating Updates are Monotone for the
(w1, b)-subsystem.
Proof. In Unrolled GANs, the generator computes the gradient of V assuming the
discriminator has already made several updates. Define the discriminator’s update
as
w1,k+1 = w1,k − ρFw1(w1,k, bk) = Uk(w1,k), (B.97)
and denote the composition of U , ∆k-times as
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U∆kk (w1,k) = Uk(· · · (Uk(Uk(w1,k)) · · · ) (B.98)
where ∆k is some positive integer. Then the update for Unrolled GANs is
w1,k+1 = w1,k − ρ∂V (w1,k, bk)
∂w1
(B.99)
bk+1 = bk − ρ∂V (U
∆k
k (w1,k), bk)
∂b
. (B.100)
In the case of the (w1, b)-subsystem, we can write these unrolled updates out explicitly.
Remember F = [b− µ,−w1]>, so
Uk(w1,k) = w1,k − ρ(bk − µ), (B.101)
U∆kk (w1,k), bk) = w1,k − ρ∆k(bk − µ). (B.102)
Plugging this back in, we find
w1,k+1 = w1,k − ρ(bk − µ) (B.103)
bk+1 = bk − ρ(ρ∆k(bk − µ)− w1,k), (B.104)
where the corresponding map is F unr = [bk − µ, ρ∆k(bk − µ) − w1,k]. Taking a look
at the Jacobian, we find
Junr =
 0 1
−1 ρ∆k
 (B.105)
Junrsym =
0 0
0 ρ∆k
  0. (B.106)
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Now, consider alternating updates:
w1,k+1 = w1,k − ρ(bk+1 − µ) (B.107)
= w1,k − ρ(bk − ρ(−w1,k)− µ) (B.108)
bk+1 = bk − ρ(−w1,k). (B.109)
Here, we considered updating b first, but the (w1, b)-subsystem is perfectly symmetric,
so the analysis holds either way. If w1 is updated first, this is equivalent to Unrolled
GAN with ∆k = 1 (see Equation B.104). The Jacobian is
Jalt =
 ρ 1
−1 0
 (B.110)
Jaltsym =
ρ 0
0 0
  0. (B.111)
The Jacobian’s for Unrolled GAN and alternating descent are both positive semidef-
inite, therefore, their maps are monotone (but not strictly-monotone). Note that
these results imply neither is Hurwitz either because both Jacobians exhibit a zero
eigenvalue.
Proposition 13. Flin, Fcc, Feg, and Fcon are strongly-monotone for the (w1, b)-
subsystem (includes multivariate case). F and Freg are monotone, but not strictly
monotone. Moreover, Flin, Fcc, Feg, Fcon, and Freg are Hurwitz for the (w1, b)-
subsystem (includes multivariate case). F is not Hurwitz.
Proof. We start with the original map, Fw1,b, and its Jacobian.
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F =
b− µ
−w1
 (B.112)
J =
 0 I
−I 0
 (B.113)
J = Jsym =
0 0
0 0
  0 (B.114)
The symmetrized Jacobian is positive semidefinite, therefore this system is monotone.
Also, the real parts of the eigenvalues of its Jacobian are zero, therefore, J is not
Hurwitz.
Now we analyze Fw1,bcc , F
w1,b
eg , and F
w1,b
con , which as discussed in the main body, are
equivalent.
Fcc = Feg = Fcon =
 w1
b− µ
 (B.115)
J = Jsym =
I 0
0 I
  1 (B.116)
The symmetrized Jacobian is positive definite with a minimum eigenvalue of 1, there-
fore this system is 1-strongly-monotone. By Proposition 10, the Jacobians of these
maps are Hurwitz for the (w1, b)-subsystem.
Now we analyze the generalization Fw1,blin = (αI − βJ> − γJ)Fw1,b.
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Flin =
 α(b− µ) + (β + γ)w1
−αw1 + (β + γ)(b− µ)
 (B.117)
J =
(β + γ)I αI
−αI (β + γ)I
 (B.118)
Jsym =
(β + γ)I 0
0 (β + γ)I
  β + γ (B.119)
The symmetrized Jacobian is positive definite with a minimum eigenvalue of (β+ γ),
therefore this system is (β+γ)-strongly-monotone. By Proposition 10, Jw1,blin is Hurwitz
for the (w1, b)-subsystem.
Now we analyze the regularized-gradient algorithm, Fw1,breg .
Freg =
 b− µ
−w1 + 2η(b− µ)
 , η > 0 (B.120)
Jreg =
 0 I
−I 2ηI
 , λ1,2 = η ±√η2 − 1⇒ R(λ1,2) > 0 (B.121)
Jregsym =
0 0
0 2ηI
  0 (B.122)
Therefore, this map is monotone (but not strictly or strongly-monotone). Also, the
real parts of the eigenvalues of its Jacobian are strictly positive, therefore, Jw1,breg is
Hurwitz.
Note that for Fcc, Feg, Fcon, and Flin, J is symmetric, therefore, F is the gradient
of some function, f(w1, b) =
1
2
(w21 + (b−µ)2). Also, note that the standard algorithm
with step size ρk =
1
k+1
is equivalent to the standard running estimate of the mean:
µk+1 =
k
k+1
µk +
1
k+1
xk where xk is the k-th sample.
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B.11 A Linear Combination of F , JF , and J>F is Not Quasi-
montone for the 1-d LQ-GAN
The Jacobian of Flin, written below, will be useful for the proof. The proof
proceeds by process of elimination, ruling out different regions of the space [α, β, γ] ∈
R3 by showing that any Flin with those constants is not quasimonotone.
(αI + βJ> − γJ)F =

α 0 −2(β + γ)a −2(β + γ)b
0 α 0 −(β + γ)
2(β + γ)a 0 α− 2(β − γ)w2 0
2(β + γ)b (β + γ) 0 α− 2(β − γ)w2


−σ2 + a2 + b2
b
−2w2a
−2w2b− w1

(B.123)
=

α(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4(β + γ)w2(a2 + b2) + 2(β + γ)w1b
αb+ (β + γ)(2w2b+ w1)
2a(β + γ)(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4(β − γ)w22a− 2αw2a
2(β + γ)b(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + (β + γ)b+ (2(β − γ)w2 − α)(2w2b+ w1)

(B.124)
Specifically, we first consider the sign of β+γ. Lemma 6 rules out negative values.
Lemma 7 rules out positive values when σ2 ≤ 1/2, and Lemma 8 rules out positive
values when σ2 > 1/2. Corollary 2 concludes that β + γ = 0.
Next, given β + γ = 0, we consider the sign of α. Lemmas 9 and 10 rule out
positive values of α when β is greater than or less than or equal to zero respectively,
i.e., α cannot be positive. Similarly, Lemmas 11 and 12 rule out negative values of
α when β is less than or greater than or equal to zero respectively, i.e., α cannot be
negative. Corollary 3 concludes that α = 0.
Lastly, given that β + γ = α = 0, Lemmas 13 and 14 prove that β cannot be
greater than or less than or equal to zero respectively. Corollary 4 concludes that
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β = γ = 0. Therefore, the only quasimonotone linear combination is the trivial one
resulting in F = 0, which completes the proof.
Lemma 6. For Flin to be quasimonotone, β + γ must not be strictly less than zero,
i.e. β + γ<0.
Proof. Consider
y = [0, 0, σ,−σ] (B.125)
x = [0, 0, σ, σ] (B.126)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = 2σFb(y) = −2σ2(β + γ)(1− 2σ2 + 2σ2 + 2σ2) (B.127)
= −2σ2(β + γ)(1 + 2σ2) (B.128)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = 2σFb(x) = 2σ2(β + γ)(1 + 2σ2) (B.129)
If (β+γ) < 0, then this system is not quasimonotone. Therefore, assume (β+γ) ≥ 0
from now on.
Lemma 7. If σ2 ≤ 1
2
, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β+γ must not be strictly greater
than zero, i.e. β + γ>0.
Proof. We will use a different parameterization of Flin for this part of the proof.
Jskew = (J
> − J)/2 (B.130)
Jsym = (J
> + J)/2 (B.131)
β = (βˆ + γˆ)/2 (B.132)
γ = (βˆ − γˆ)/2 (B.133)
βˆ = β + γ (B.134)
γˆ = β − γ (B.135)
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The linear combination is now defined as
(αI + βˆJskew + γˆJsym)F =

α 0 −2βˆa −2βˆb
0 α 0 −βˆ
2βˆa 0 α− 2γˆw2 0
2βˆb βˆ 0 α− 2γˆw2


−σ2 + a2 + b2
b
−2w2a
−2w2b− w1

(B.136)
=

α(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4βˆw2(a2 + b2) + 2βˆw1b
αb+ βˆ(2w2b+ w1)
2aβˆ(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22a− 2αw2a
2βˆb(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + βˆb+ (2γˆw2 − α)(2w2b+ w1)

(B.137)
In order for a system to be quasimonotone, we require condition (A) (among other
properties). We will now show that this property is not satisfied for Flin with βˆ > 0
by considering two different cases.
Case 1: Consider the (w2, a)-subsystem. Let
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v =

0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

Flin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4βˆw2(a2 + b2) + 2βˆw1b
αb+ βˆ(2w2b+ w1)
2aβˆ(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22a− 2αw2a
2βˆb(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + βˆb+ (2γˆw2 − α)(2w2b+ w1)

(B.138)
=

−2aβˆ(−σ2 + a2 + b2)− 4γˆw22a+ 2αw2a
0
α(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4βˆw2(a2 + b2) + 2βˆw1b
0

(B.139)
Above, we premultiply Flin by a skew symmetric matrix, which ensures v
>Flin =
F>linAskewFlin = 0.
The relevant portion of the Jacobian of Flin is
Jw2,alin =
 4βˆ(a2 + b2) 2aα + 8βˆw2a
8γˆw2a− 2αa 2βˆ(−σ2 + 3a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22 − 2αw2
 (B.140)
Consider x = [0, 0, cσ, 0] and both βˆ and α fixed.
v>Jw2,alin v = lim
c→0+
2βˆ(−1 + c2)2σ6[α2(−1 + 3c2) + 8βˆ2c4σ2] (B.141)
= −2βˆσ6α2 ≥ 0 (B.142)
This implies either α = 0 or βˆ ≤ 0 for the system to be quasimonotone.
Case 2: Consider the (a, b)-subsystem. Let
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v =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0

Flin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4βˆw2(a2 + b2) + 2βˆw1b
αb+ βˆ(2w2b+ w1)
2aβˆ(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22a− 2αw2a
2βˆb(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + βˆb+ (2γˆw2 − α)(2w2b+ w1)

(B.143)
=

0
0
−2βˆb(−σ2 + a2 + b2)− βˆb− (2γˆw2 − α)(2w2b+ w1)
2aβˆ(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22a− 2αw2a

(B.144)
The relevant portion of the Jacobian of Flin is
Ja,blin =
2βˆ(−σ2 + 3a2 + b2) + 4γˆw22 − 2αw2 4abβˆ
4abβˆ 2βˆ(−σ2 + a2 + 3b2) + βˆ + 2w2(2γˆw2 − α)

(B.145)
Consider α = 0 and x = [0, 0, σ
10
, σ
2
]. Then
v>Ja,blinv = βˆ
3σ4 (−1.44 + 4.46842σ2 − 3.37146σ4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 ∀ σ2∈(0,1/2]
(B.146)
Then α = 0 ⇒ βˆ ≤ 0. In either case, βˆ must be nonpositive. Therefore, βˆ =
β + γ>0.
Alternate Proof for Lemma 7. Part of the proof in Lemma 7 looks at the limit in
which a approaches 0. One might presume a simple fix is to constrain a to be larger
173
than some small value, e.g., 1e-10, and use a large βˆ value. Here, we show that even
using a = σ
100
breaks quasimonotonicity. The variance of the data distribution is
assumed to be unknown, which would make it very difficult to select a proper lower
bound for a that maintains quasimonotonicity within the feasible region.
Consider x = [0,−1, σ
100
, σ
2
] and the (a, b)-subsystem as in Lemma 7. Then
v>Jv =
(
− 5.9976βˆσ2
)
α2 +
(
βˆ2σ3(−5.9976 + 8.9976σ2)
)
α
+ βˆ3σ4(−1.4994 + 4.4997σ2 − 3.375σ4). (B.147)
If βˆ > 0, then this is a concave quadratic form in α. To find where this function
is positive, we need to find its roots.
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α± =
−
(
βˆ2σ3(−5.9976 + 8.9976σ2)
)
2
(
− 5.9976βˆσ2
) (B.148)
±
√
A−B
2
(
− 5.9976βˆσ2
) (B.149)
where (B.150)
A =
(
βˆ2σ3(−5.9976 + 8.9976σ2)
)2
(B.151)
B = 4
(
− 5.9976βˆσ2
)(
βˆ3σ4(−1.4994 + 4.4997σ2 − 3.375σ4)
)
(B.152)
√
A−B2 = βˆ4σ6(5.99762 − (2)(5.9976)(8.9976)σ2 + 8.76162σ4) (B.153)
+ 4(5.9976)βˆ4σ6(−1.4994 + 4.4997σ2 − 3.375σ4) (B.154)
= βˆ4σ6
(
5.99762 − (4)(1.4994)(5.9976) + (5.9976)[(4.4997)(4)− (2)(8.9976)]σ2
(B.155)
+ [8.99762 − (4)(5.9976)(3.375)]σ4
)
(B.156)
= βˆ4σ6
(
0.02159136σ2 − 0.01079424σ4
)
(B.157)
= βˆ4σ8
(
0.02159136− 0.01079424σ2
)
(B.158)
√
A−B
2(−5.9976βˆσ2) = −βˆσ
2
√
(0.02159136− 0.01079424σ2)/(22 ∗ 5.99762) (B.159)
= −βˆσ2
√
0.00015006002− 0.00007502σ2 (B.160)
−b
2a
=
−
(
βˆ2σ3(−5.9976 + 8.9976σ2)
)
2
(
− 5.9976βˆσ2
) (B.161)
= βˆσ(−1
2
+ 0.75010004001σ2) (B.162)
α± = βˆσ
(
− 1
2
+ 0.75010004001σ2 ± σ
√
0.00015006002− 0.00007502σ2
)
(B.163)
α2 > βˆ2σ2(−0.48 + .751σ2)2 assuming σ2 < 1/2 (B.164)
βˆ2 <
1
σ2(−0.48 + .751σ2)2α
2 (B.165)
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The α root with smaller magnitude provides an upper bound for βˆ2.
Now consider again x = [0, 0, σ
100
, 0] and Equation (B.141) with c = 1
100
.
v>Jlinv = 2βˆ(−1 + c2)2σ6[α2(−1 + 3c2) + 8βˆ2c4σ2] (B.166)
βˆ2 ≥ α2 1− 3c
2
8c4σ2
(B.167)
βˆ2 >
12496250
σ2
α2 (B.168)
This provides a lower bound for βˆ2.
βˆhi − βˆlo = α2
( 1
σ2(−0.48 + .751σ2)2 −
12496250
σ2
)
(B.169)
=
α2
σ2
( 1
(−0.48 + .751σ2)2 − 12496250
)
(B.170)
<
α2
σ2
(
95− 12496250
)
assuming σ2 < 1/2 (B.171)
< 0 (B.172)
The upper bound we require for βˆ is greater than the lower bound, therefore, no
βˆ will satisfy quasimonotonicity.
Lemma 8. If σ2 > 1
2
, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β+γ must not be strictly greater
than zero, i.e. β + γ>0.
Proof. For this proof, we make use of the traditional definition of quasimonotonicity.
Consider
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c =
1
2
√
σ2 − 1
2
(B.173)
y = [0, 0, c,−c] (B.174)
x = [0, 0, c, c] (B.175)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = 2cFb(y) = −2(β + γ)c2(1 + 2c2 + 2c2 − 2σ2) (B.176)
= −2(β + γ)c2(1 + σ2 − 1
2
− 2σ2) = −2(β + γ)c2(1
2
− σ2) (B.177)
= 2(β + γ)c2 (σ2 − 1
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
, (B.178)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = 2cFb(x) = −2(β + γ)c2 (σ2 − 1
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (B.179)
If (β + γ) > 0, then this system is not quasimonotone. In either case, (β + γ)>0.
Corollary 2 (Flin requires β+γ = 0 for quasimonotonicity.). Together, Lemmas 6, 7
and 8 imply that (β + γ) must be 0 to satisfy quasimonotonicity.
Lemma 9. If (β + γ) = 0 and α > 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β must not be
strictly greater than zero, i.e. β>0.
Proof. For this proof, we make use of the traditional definition of quasimonotonicity.
Consider
177
y = [0, 0, cσ, 0], c > 1 (B.180)
x = [1, 0, (c−
√
c2 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
σ, 0] (B.181)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = Fw2(y)−
√
c2 − 1σFa(y) = ασ2
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−1 + c2) (B.182)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = Fw2(x)−
√
c2 − 1σFa(x) (B.183)
= ασ2(−1 + (c−
√
c2 − 1)2)−
√
c2 − 1σ(8β(c−
√
c2 − 1)σ − 2α(c−
√
c2 − 1)σ)
(B.184)
= ασ2(−1 + (c−
√
c2 − 1)2 + 2(c−
√
c2 − 1)
√
c2 − 1)− 8(c−
√
c2 − 1)
√
c2 − 1σ2β
(B.185)
= ασ2(−1 + c2 − 2c
√
c2 − 1 + c2 − 1 + 2c
√
c2 − 1− 2(c2 − 1))− 8(c
√
c2 − 1− c2 + 1)σ2β
(B.186)
= −8 (c
√
c2 − 1− c2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
σ2β. (B.187)
If (β + γ) = 0 and α > 0, then β ≤ 0 for the system to be quasimonotone.
Lemma 10. If (β + γ) = 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, α must not be strictly
greater than zero, i.e. α>0.
Proof. We will assume α > 0, which by Lemma 9 implies β ≤ 0. This will lead to a
contradiction. Consider
y = [1, 0, 4σ, 0] (B.188)
x = [0, 0, 2σ, 0] (B.189)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = −Fw2(y)− 2σFa(y) = −15ασ2 − 2σ(32σβ − 8σα) (B.190)
= ασ2 − 64βσ2, (B.191)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = −Fw2(x)− 2σFa(x) = −3ασ2. (B.192)
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If (β+γ) = 0 and α > 0 (implies β ≤ 0), then 〈F (y), x−y〉 > 0 and 〈F (x), x−y〉 < 0,
which breaks quasimonotonicity. Therefore, α>0.
Lemma 11. If (β + γ) = 0 and α < 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β must not be
strictly less than zero, i.e. β<0.
Proof. Consider
y = [0, 0, cσ, 0], c > 1 (B.193)
x = [−1, 0, (c+
√
c2 − 1)σ, 0] (B.194)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = −Fw2(y) +
√
c2 − 1σFa(y) = −ασ2
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−1 + c2) (B.195)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = −Fw2(x) +
√
c2 − 1σFa(x) (B.196)
= −ασ2(−1 + (c+
√
c2 − 1)2) +
√
c2 − 1σ(8β(c+
√
c2 − 1)σ + 2α(c+
√
c2 − 1)σ)
(B.197)
= ασ2(1− (c+
√
c2 − 1)2 + 2
√
c2 − 1(c+
√
c2 − 1)) + 8(c+
√
c2 − 1)
√
c2 − 1σ2β
(B.198)
= ασ2(1− c2 − c2 + 1− 2c
√
c2 − 1 + 2c
√
c2 − 1 + 2c2 − 2) (B.199)
+ 2
√
c2 − 1(c+
√
c2 − 1))β (B.200)
= 2
√
c2 − 1(c+
√
c2 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
β. (B.201)
If α < 0, then β ≥ 0 to maintain quasimonotonicity.
Lemma 12. If (β + γ) = 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, α must not be strictly less
than zero, i.e. α<0.
Proof. We will assume α < 0, which by 11 implies β ≥ 0. This will lead to a
contradiction.
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y = [−1, 0, cσ, 0], c = 1
4
(B.202)
x = [0, 0, dσ, 0], d =
3
2
(B.203)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = Fw2(y) + (d− c)σFa(y) = ασ2
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−1 + c2) +(d− c)σ(8cσβ + 2cσα)
(B.204)
= ασ2(−1 + c2 + 2c(d− c)) + 8c(d− c)σ2β (B.205)
= ασ2(−1− c2 + 2cd) + 8c(d− c)σ2β (B.206)
= − 5
16
ασ2 + 40σ2β, (B.207)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = Fw2(x) + (d− c)σFa(x) = ασ2 (−1 + d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(B.208)
=
5
4
ασ2. (B.209)
If (β+γ) = 0 and α < 0 (implies β ≥ 0), then 〈F (y), x−y〉 > 0 and 〈F (x), x−y〉 < 0,
which breaks quasimonotonicity. Therefore, α ≥ 0.
Corollary 3. Together, Corollary 2 and Lemmas 9-12 imply that α must equal zero
for Flin to be quasimonotone.
Lemma 13. If (β + γ) = 0 and α = 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β must not be
strictly greater than zero, i.e. β>0.
Proof. Consider
y = [1, 0, 1, 0] (B.210)
x = [1,−7, 2, 1] (B.211)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = −7Fw1(y) + Fa(y) + Fb(y) = 8β (B.212)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = −7Fw1(x) + Fa(x) + Fb(x) = 16β + 4β(2− 7) (B.213)
= −4β (B.214)
If β > 0, then this system is not quasimonotone. Therefore, β ≤ 0.
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Lemma 14. If (β + γ) = 0 and α = 0, for Flin to be quasimonotone, β must not be
strictly less than zero, i.e. β<0.
Proof. Consider
y = [1, 0, 2, 0] (B.215)
x = [1, 1, 1, 1] (B.216)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = Fw1(y)− Fa(y) + Fb(y) = −16β (B.217)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = Fw1(x)− Fa(x) + Fb(x) = −8β + 12β = 4β (B.218)
If β < 0, then this system is not quasimonotone. Therefore, β ≥ 0.
Corollary 4 ((β + γ) = 0, α = 0⇒ β = γ = 0). Together, Lemmas 13 and 14 imply
that β = 0, which, along with Corollary 2, imply that γ = 0 as well.
Corollary 5. [α = β = γ = 0] Together, Corollaries 2 and 3, and 4 imply that there
is no non-trivial linear combination that induces a quasimonotone LQ-GAN system.
Corollary 6. Fcc, Feg, Fcon, and F are not quasimonotone for the LQ-GAN system.
Proof. These maps are all linear combinations of F , JF and J>F , therefore, by
Corollary 5, they are not quasimonotone for the LQ-GAN system.
B.12 Analysis of the (w2, a)-Subsystem
Note that if a map is not quasimonotone for the (w2, a)-subsystem, then it is
not quasimonotone for the full system. This is because an analysis of the (w2, a)-
subsystem is equivalent to an analysis of a subspace of the full system with w1 = b = 0.
Proposition 14. F is not quasimontone for the (w2, a)-subsystem. Also, its Jacobian
is not Hurwitz.
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Proof.
F =

−σ2 + a2 + b2
b
−2w2a
−2w2b− w1

(B.219)
y = [σ, 0, 3σ, 0] (B.220)
x = [3σ, 0, 5σ, 0] (B.221)
〈F (y), x− y〉 = 2σFw2(y) + 2σFa(y) = 2σ(−σ2 + 9σ2) + 2σ(−6σ2) (B.222)
= 4σ3 (B.223)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = 2σFw2(x) + 2σFa(x) = 2σ3(−1 + 25) + 2σ3(−30) (B.224)
= −12σ3 (B.225)
Therefore, F is not quasimonotone.
The Jacobian of F for the (w2, a)-subsystem is
Jw2,a =
 0 2a
−2a −2w2
 . (B.226)
The trace of Jw2,a is strictly negative for w2 > 0, which implies J
w2,a has an eigenvalue
with strictly negative real part. Therefore, Jw2,a is not Hurwitz.
Proposition 15. Freg is not quasimonotone for the (w2, a)-subsystem. Also, its Ja-
cobian is not Hurwitz.
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Proof.
Freg =

−σ2 + a2 + b2
b
−2w2a+ 4ηa(−σ2 + a2 + b2)
−2w2b− w1 + 4ηb(−σ2 + a2 + b2) + 2ηb

(B.227)
In order for a system to be quasimonotone, we require condition (A) (among other
properties). We will now show that this property is not satisfied for the gradient-
regularized system.
Consider the point x = [w2, 0, a, 0] and let v be defined as follows:
v = [2w2a
2 + 4ηa2(σ2 − a2), 0, a(a2 − σ2), 0] (B.228)
where v is actually derived by considering the field formed by crossing the curl for
the 2-D subspace with w2 and a only.
F>regv is 0 as expected.
F>regv = −2w2a2(σ2 − a2)− 4ηa2(σ2 − a2)2 + 2w2a2(σ2 − a2) + 4ηa2(σ2 − a2)2
(B.229)
= 0 (B.230)
It suffices to consider the submatrix of the Jacobian corresponding to w2 and a
only when computing v>Jv:
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12
v>Jreg =
[
2w2a
2 + 4ηa2(σ2 − a2) a(a2 − σ2)
] 0 a
−a −w2 − 2η(σ2 − 3a2)

(B.231)
=
[
−a2(a2 − σ2) 2w2a3 + 4ηa3(σ2 − a2)− w2a(a2 − σ2) + 2ηa(a2 − σ2)(3a2 − σ2)
]
(B.232)
=
[
−a2(a2 − σ2) w2a(a2 + σ2) + 2ηa(a2 − σ2)2
]
(B.233)
1
2
v>Jregv =
[
−a2(a2 − σ2) w2a(a2 + σ2) + 2ηa(a2 − σ2)2
]2w2a2 + 4ηa2(σ2 − a2)
a(a2 − σ2)

(B.234)
= −2w2a4(a2 − σ2) + 4ηa4(a2 − σ2)2 + w2a2(a2 + σ2)(a2 − σ2) + 2ηa2(a2 − σ2)3
(B.235)
= w2a
2(a2 − σ2)[−2a2 + (a2 + σ2)] + 2ηa2(a2 − σ2)2[2a2 + (a2 − σ2)]
(B.236)
= −w2a2(a2 − σ2)2 + 2ηa2(a2 − σ2)2(3a2 − σ2) (B.237)
If w2 > 0 and a <
σ√
3
, then there isn’t an η ≥ 0 that will make this system
quasimonotone.
The Jacobian of Fw2,areg for the (w2, a)-subsystem is
Jw2,areg =
 0 2a
−2a −2w2 − 4η(σ2 − 3a2)
 . (B.238)
The trace of Jw2,a is strictly negative for w2 > 0 and a < σ/
√
3, which implies Jw2,areg
has an eigenvalue with strictly negative real part. Therefore, Jw2,areg is not Hurwitz.
Proposition 16. Funr is not quasimonotone or Hurwitz for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Also, its Jacobian is not Hurwitz.
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Proof. We consider Unrolled GAN as described in [76]. Some of the necessary arith-
metic can be found in the supplementary Mathematica notebook. Define the discrim-
inator’s update as
w2,k+1 = w2,k − αFw2(w2,k, ak) = Uk(w2,k), (B.239)
where α > 0 is a step size, and denote the composition of U , ∆k-times as
U∆kk (w2,k) = Uk(· · · (Uk(Uk(w2,k)) · · · ) (B.240)
where ∆k is some positive integer. Then the update for Unrolled GANs is
w2,k+1 = w2,k − α∂V (w2,k, ak)
∂w2
(B.241)
ak+1 = ak − α∂V (U
∆k
k (w2,k), ak)
∂a
. (B.242)
In the case of the (w2, a)-subsystem, we can write these unrolled updates out explicitly.
Remember F = [a2 − σ2,−2aw2], so
Uk(w1,k) = w2,k − α(a2k − σ2), (B.243)
U∆kk (w2,k), ak) = w2,k − α∆k(a2k − σ2). (B.244)
Plugging this back in, we findw2,k+1
ak+1
 =
w2,k
ak
− αFunr, (B.245)
where the corresponding map is
Funr =
 a2 − σ2
4α∆ka3 − 2a(2α∆kσ2 + w2)
 . (B.246)
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We will use the following vector to test condition (A) for quasimonotonicity of Funr:
v =
 0 1
−1 0
Funr. (B.247)
Computing v>Junrv and evaluating at (w2 = 1, a = σ
2√
3
) gives
v>Junrv = −8
9
σ4 < 0, (B.248)
therefore, Funr is not quasimonotone.
If we examine the determinant of Junr and evaluate it at a =
σ√
3
, we get
Det[Junr]
∣∣∣
a= σ√
3
= −2w2, (B.249)
which is less than zero for positive w2. Therefore, the Jacobian exhibits negative
eigenvalues which means the system is not Hurwitz.
Proposition 17. Falt is not quasimonotone or Hurwitz for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Also, its Jacobian is not Hurwitz.
Proof. We consider an alternating gradient descent scheme. Some of the necessary
arithmetic can be found in the supplementary Mathematica notebook. First, we begin
with the case where the discriminator updates first. The updates are
w2,k+1 = w2,k − α(a2k − σ2) (B.250)
ak+1 = ak − α(−2akw2,k+1) (B.251)
= ak − α(−2akw2,k + 2akα(a2k − σ2)) (B.252)
= ak − α(2αa3k − 2ak(ασ2 + w2,k)), (B.253)
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where α > 0 is a step size. The corresponding map is
Falt =
 a2 − σ2
2αa3 − 2a(ασ2 + w2)
 . (B.254)
Note the similarity to the Unrolled GAN map Equation (B.246). The maps are
equivalent if ∆k = 1/2. Unrolled GANs was shown to be not quasimonotone for any
∆k, therefore, Falt is not quasimonotone as well.
If we examine the trace of Jalt and evaluate it at (w2 = 5ασ
2, a = σ), we get
Tr[Jalt]
∣∣∣
(w2=5ασ2,a=σ)
= −6ασ2, (B.255)
which is strictly negative. Therefore, the Jacobian exhibits negative eigenvalues which
means the system is not Hurwitz.
Now, consider the generator updating first. The updates are
w2,k+1 = w2,k − α(a2k+1 − σ2) (B.256)
= w2,k − α((ak − α(−2akw2,k))2 − σ2) (B.257)
ak+1 = ak − α(−2akw2,k), (B.258)
where the corresponding map is
Falt′ =
 a2 − σ2
2αa3 − 2a(ασ2 + w2)
 . (B.259)
Testing for condition (A) as before (see Equations (B.246)- (B.248)), we find that
v>Jalt′v = −1
2
σ4w2 + 4ασ
4w22 + 16c
2σ4w32 + 16c
3σ4w42 + 8c
4σ4w52. (B.260)
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Using Descartes’ Rule of Signs [29], we can determine that this expression has exactly
one positive root for w2. This implies that v
>Jalt′v changes sign locally around this
root when varying w2, which means v
>Jalt′v < 0 for some positive w2. Therefore Falt′
is not quasimonotone.
If we examine the determinant of Jalt′ and evaluate it at (w2 = 1, a = σ), we get
Det[Jalt′ ]
∣∣∣
(w2=1,a=σ)
= −8α(1 + 2α(2 + α(2 + α)))σ2, (B.261)
which is less than zero for positive w2. Therefore, the Jacobian exhibits negative
eigenvalues which means the system is not Hurwitz.
B.12.1 Monotonicity of Fcc, Feg, and Fcon for the (w2, a)-Subsystem
The following propositions concern the monotonicity of Fcc, Feg, and Fcon for the
(w2, a)-subsystem. The field and Jacobian for Flin will be helpful for proofs of their
properties.
Fw2,alin =
 α(−σ2 + a2) + 4(β + γ)w2a2
2a(β + γ)(−σ2 + a2) + 4(β − γ)w22a− 2αw2a
 (B.262)
Jw2,alin =
 4(β + γ)a2 2αa+ 8(β + γ)w2a
8(β − γ)w2a− 2αa 2(β + γ)(−σ2 + 3a2) + 4(β − γ)w22 − 2αw2
 (B.263)
Proposition 18. Fcon = F + βJ
>F is not quasimontone for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Also, its Jacobian is not Hurwitz.
Proof. This corresponds to Flin with α = 1, β = β, γ = 0. We consider three cases.
Let
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Fw2,acon =
 (−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw22a− 2w2a
 , (B.264)
Jw2,acon =
 4βa2 2a+ 8βw2a
8βw2a− 2a 2β(−σ2 + 3a2) + 4βw22 − 2w2
 , (B.265)
v =
0 −1
1 0

 (−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw22a− 2w2a
 (B.266)
=
−2aβ(−σ2 + a2)− 4βw22a+ 2w2a
(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
 . (B.267)
Case 1: Consider x = [0, 2σ]. Then
v>Jw2,acon v = 18βσ
6(11 + 128β2σ2), (B.268)
which implies β ≥ 0 for the system to be quasimonotone.
Case 2: Consider x = [0, 1/2σ]. Then
v>Jw2,acon v =
9
32
βσ6(−1 + 2β2σ2), (B.269)
which, combined with above, implies β ≥ 1√
2σ
≈ 0.707
σ
for the system to be quasi-
monotone.
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Case 3: Consider x = [2σ, σ]. Then
v>Jw2,acon v = 64βσ
6(1 + 4βσ(1− 7βσ)). (B.270)
The quantity in parentheses must be positive for this system to be quasimonotone.
This quantity is a concave quadratic form with an upper root of ≈ 0.273
σ
. This implies
β ≤≈ 0.273
σ
for the system to be quasimonotone.
The last two results cannot be satisfied by a single β, therefore, this system is not
quasimonotone.
For completeness, we analyze the limit where the F term is ignored. Consider
a = cσ.
v>Jw2,acon v = 16c
4(1 + 6c2 − 119c4)σ8 (B.271)
This is negative for c = 1, therefore, this system is not quasimonotone.
The trace of Jw2,acon is strictly negative for w2 = 0 and a < σ/
√
5, which implies Jw2,acon
has an eigenvalue with strictly negative real part. Therefore, Jw2,acon is not Hurwitz.
Proposition 19. Fcon = βJ
>F is not quasimontone for the (w2, a)-subsystem. Also,
its Jacobian is not Hurwitz.
Proof. This corresponds to Flin with α = 0, β = β, γ = 0. We consider two cases.
Fw2,acon =
 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw22a
 (B.272)
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Jw2,acon =
 4βa2 8βw2a
8βw2a 2β(−σ2 + 3a2) + 4βw22
 (B.273)
v =
0 −1
1 0

 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw22a
 (B.274)
=
−2aβ(−σ2 + a2)− 4βw22a
4βw2a
2
 (B.275)
Case 2: Consider x = [0, cσ]. Then
v>Jw2,acon v = 16β
3c4σ8(c2 − 1)2 (B.276)
which, for c 6= 1, implies β ≥ 0 for the system to be quasimonotone.
Case 2: Consider x = [2cσ, cσ]. Then
v>Jw2,acon v = −16β3c4σ8(−1− 6c2 + 119c4) (B.277)
which, for c = 1, implies β ≤ 0 for the system to be quasimonotone. Combined with
above, this implies β = 0 for the system to be quasimonotone. In conclusion, βJ>F
is not quasimonotone.
The trace of Jw2,acon is strictly negative for w2 = 0 and a < σ/
√
5, which implies Jw2,acon
has an eigenvalue with strictly negative real part. Therefore, Jw2,acon is not Hurwitz.
191
Proposition 20. Feg = F − γJF requires γ →∞ to be pseudomonotone for (w2, a)-
subsystem
Proof. This corresponds to Flin with α = 1, β = 0, γ = γ. We consider two cases.
Fw2,aeg =
 (−σ2 + a2) + 4γw2a2
2aγ(−σ2 + a2)− 4γw22a− 2w2a
 (B.278)
Jw2,aeg =
 4γa2 2a+ 8γw2a
−8γw2a− 2a 2γ(−σ2 + 3a2)− 4γw22 − 2w2
 (B.279)
v =
0 −1
1 0

 (−σ2 + a2) + 4γw2a2
2aγ(−σ2 + a2)− 4γw22a− 2w2a
 (B.280)
=
−2aγ(−σ2 + a2) + 4γw22a+ 2w2a
(−σ2 + a2) + 4γw2a2
 (B.281)
Case 1: Consider y = [σ, 3σ] and x = [3σ, 5σ]. Then
〈F (y), x− y〉 = 2σFw2(y) + 2σFa(y) = 2σ3
[
8 + 36γσ + 48γσ − 12γσ − 6
]
(B.282)
= 4σ3(1 + 36σγ) (B.283)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = 2σFw2(x) + 2σFa(x) = 12σ3(−1 + 60σγ) (B.284)
Then γ ≤ − 1
36σ
≈ −0.027
σ
or γ ≥ 1
60σ
≈ 0.017
σ
for the system to be quasimonotone.
Case 2: Consider y = [σ, 20σ] and x = [20σ, 5σ]. Then
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〈F (y), x− y〉 = 19σFw2(y)− 15σFa(y) = σ3(8181− 207800σγ) (B.285)
〈F (x), x− y〉 = 19σFw2(x)− 15σFa(x) = 32σ3(108 + 4825σγ) (B.286)
Then γ ≥ 8181
207800σ
≈ 0.039
σ
or γ ≥ 108
4825σ
≈ −0.022
σ
for the system to be quasimonotone.
The latter condition is more lenient, so the former is unnecessary.
For the system to be quasimonotone in both scenarios, we require that γ ≥ 1
60σ
.
This implies γ must be arbitrarily large for small σ. In the limit, the effect of F on
the system is negligible. We consider this limit next.
Proposition 21. Feg = −γJF is pseudomonotone for (w2, a)-subsystem.
Proof. Consider x = [w2, cσ] w.l.o.g.
Note this system is 2-D, therefore, there is only 1 vector v (aside from scaling)
that is perpendicular to F .
v>Jv = 16c4σ6((−1 + c2)2σ2 + 2(1 + c2)w22) ≥ 0 ∀ c > 0, w2 (B.287)
〈F (x), x− x∗〉 = 2cσ2((−1 + c)2(1 + c)σ2 + 2w22) ≥ 0 ∀ c > 0, w2 (B.288)
This satisfies conditions (A) and (C), therefore, this system is pseudomonotone.
Proposition 22. Feg = F − γJF is pseudomonotone for the constrained (w2, a)-
subsystem.
Proof. We consider α = 1 in this case and let the user define a feasible region for which
they are confident the equilibrium exists: w2 ∈ [wmin2 , wmax2 ] and a ∈ [amin, amax]—the
most important bounds being those on a. We will attempt to find a value for γ that
ensures the system is pseudomonotone within this region.
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A partially sufficient (and necessary) condition for pseudomonotonicity is the fol-
lowing (see condition (C)).
〈F (x), x− x∗〉 = 2γ
(
a(a− σ)2(a+ σ) + 2aσw22
)
− (a− σ)2w2 ≥ 0 (B.289)
⇒ γ ≥
a1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a− σ)2w2
2
(
a(a− σ)2(a+ σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a0
+ 2aσ︸︷︷︸
a2
w22
) (B.290)
We can find the w2 that maximizes this equation for a given a by setting the
derivative equal to zero and taking the positive root of the resulting quadratic. The
denominator of the derivative is non-negative and only zero at equilibrium—this is
not a concern because 〈F (x), x− x∗〉 = 0 at equilibrium. Continuing and looking at
the numerator of the derivative, we find
0 = a1(a0 + a2d
2)− 2a1a2d2 (B.291)
= a1(a0 − a2d2) (B.292)
d∗ =
√
a0/a2 (B.293)
=
√
(a− σ)2(a+ σ)
2σ
. (B.294)
If we plug that back into the lower bound for γ, we get
γ ≥ |a− σ|
3
√
a+ σ/
√
2σ
4a(a− σ)2(a+ σ) (B.295)
=
|a− σ|
4
√
2aσ1/2
√
a+ σ
≤ amax
4
√
2a2min
(B.296)
≥ amax
4
√
2a2min
(B.297)
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The condition above along with the following (see condition (A)) are sufficient to
ensure pseudomonotonicity.
v>Jv = 16a4γ3((a2 − σ2)2 + 2w22(a2 + σ2)) (B.298)
+ 16γ2w2a
2(2σ2w22 + (a
2 − σ2)2) (B.299)
+ 2γ((a2 − σ2)2(3a2 − σ2) + w22(8a2σ2 − 2(a2 − σ2)2)) (B.300)
− 2w2(a2 − σ2)2 (B.301)
If w2 ≤ 0, then this quantity is greater than or equal to zero due to the result in
equation (B.287), which we have already shown to be greater than zero. Therefore,
we focus on w2 > 0. We can divide the analysis into two cases.
Consider 3a2 ≥ σ2. In this case, all coefficients of γ terms except a γ1 term and
the last term (the constant) are positive. For simplicity, we can find the value for γ
such that the first part of the β2 coefficient is greater than the two negative terms.
16w2a
2γ2(a2 − σ2)2 − 4γw22(a2 − σ2)2 − 2w2(a2 − σ2)2 (B.302)
= 2w2(a
2 − σ2)(8a2γ2 − 2w2γ − 1) ≥ 0 (B.303)
⇒γ ≥ 2w2 +
√
4w22 + 4(8a
2)
16a2
≤ w2
8a2
+
w2 +
√
8a
8a2
(B.304)
⇒ γ ≥ w
max
2
4a2min
+
1
2
√
2amin
(B.305)
Now consider 3a2 < σ2. One of the terms in the γ1 coefficient is now negative.
We will find a value for γ such that the γ3 term can drown out that negative term.
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16a4γ3(a2 − σ2)2 − 2γ(a2 − σ2)2(σ2 − 3a2) (B.306)
≥ 2γ(a2 − σ2)2(8a4γ2 − σ2) (B.307)
⇒γ ≥ σ
2
√
2a2
(B.308)
⇒γ ≥ amax
2
√
2a2min
(B.309)
Combining the results, we have that
γ ≥ max
{ amax
2
√
2a2min
,
wmax2
4a2min
+
1
2
√
2amin
}
(B.310)
Note this bound is not tight; it is just meant to provide a satisfactory estimate.
Proposition 23. Fcc = F + β(J
> − J)F requires β →∞ to be pseudomonotone for
the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Proof. This corresponds to Flin with α = 1, γ = β/2, β = β/2.
Fw2,acc =
 (−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2)− 2w2a
 (B.311)
Jw2,acc =
4βa2 2a+ 8βw2a
−2a 2β(−σ2 + 3a2)− 2w2
 (B.312)
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v =
0 −1
1 0

 (−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
2aβ(−σ2 + a2)− 2w2a
 (B.313)
=
−2aβ(−σ2 + a2) + 2w2a
(−σ2 + a2) + 4βw2a2
 (B.314)
Case 1: Consider x = [0, 2σ]. Then
v>Jw2,acc v = 18βσ
6(11 + 128β2σ2) (B.315)
implies that β ≥ 0.
Case 2: Consider x = [0, 1/2σ]. Then
v>Jw2,acc v =
9
32
βσ6(−1 + 2β2σ2) (B.316)
this, combined with above, implies that β ≥ 1√
2σ
.
This implies β must be arbitrarily large for small σ. In the limit, the effect of F
on the system is negligible. We consider this limit in Subsection 24.
Proposition 24. Fcc = (J
> − J)F is pseudomonotone for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Proof.
Fw2,acc = [8w2a
2, 4a(a2 − σ2)] (B.317)
Jw2,acc =
8a2 16w2a
0 4(3a2 − σ2)
 (B.318)
Note that the skew part of the Jacobian of F is full rank except at the boundary
(a = 0), so Fcc = (J
> − J)F maintains the same fixed points. This can be seen by
looking at Fcc above. We will simply need to constrain a to be greater than 0.
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In order for a system to be quasimonotone, we require condition (A) (among other
properties). We will now show that this property is satisfied for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Case 1: Consider the point x = [w2, a] and let v be defined as follows:
v = F = [−σ2 + a2,−2w2a]>. (B.319)
v>Fw2,acc is 0 as expected.
v>Fw2,acc = −8w2a2σ2 + 8w2a4 − 8w2a4 + 8w2a2σ2 (B.320)
= 0 (B.321)
Now, we will compute v>Jw2,acc v to see if it is greater than zero.
v>Jw2,acc =
[
−σ2 + a2 −2w2a
]8a2 16w2a
0 4(3a2 − σ2)
 (B.322)
=
[
−8σ2a2 + 8a4 16w2a(a2 − σ2)− 8w2a(3a2 − σ2)
]
(B.323)
=
[
8a2(a2 − σ2) −8w2a(a2 + σ2)
]
(B.324)
v>Jw2,acc v =
[
8a2(a2 − σ2) −8w2a(a2 + σ2)
]−σ2 + a2
−2w2a
 (B.325)
= 8a2(a2 − σ2)2 + 16w22a2(a2 + σ2) ≥ 0 (B.326)
In addition to this, proving that 〈F (x), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0 is sufficient for proving con-
dition (C).
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〈Fw2,acc (y), y − x∗〉 = 8w2a2w2 + 4a(a2 − σ2)(a− σ) ≥ 0 (B.327)
The last two terms of the sum are always the same sign due to the square function
being “monotone” and the fact that a is constrained to be non-negative. Therefore,
Fcc is pseudomonotone.
Proposition 25. Fcc = F + β(J
> − J)F is pseudomonotone for the constrained
(w2, a)-subsystem.
Proof. We consider α = 1 in this case and let the user define a feasible region for which
they are confident the equilibrium exists: w2 ∈ [wmin2 , wmax2 ] and a ∈ [amin, amax]—the
most important bounds being those on a. We will attempt to find a value for β that
ensures the system is pseudomonotone within this region.
A partially sufficient (and necessary) condition for pseudomonotonicity is the fol-
lowing (see condition (C)).
〈F (x), x− x∗〉 = 2β
(
a(a− σ)2(a+ σ) + 2a2w22
)
− (a− σ)2w2 ≥ 0 (B.328)
⇒ β ≥
a1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a− σ)2w2
2
(
a(a− σ)2(a+ σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a0
+ 2a2︸︷︷︸
a2
w22
) (B.329)
We can find the w2 that maximizes this equation for a given a by setting the
derivative equal to zero and taking the positive root of the resulting quadratic. The
denominator of the derivative is non-negative and only zero at equilibrium—this is
not a concern because 〈F (x), x− x∗〉 = 0 at equilibrium. Continuing and looking at
the numerator of the derivative, we find
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0 = a1(a0 + a2d
2)− 2a1a2d2 (B.330)
= a1(a0 − a2d2) (B.331)
d∗ =
√
a0/a2 (B.332)
=
√
(a− σ)2(a+ σ)
2a
. (B.333)
If we plug that back into the lower bound for β, we get
β ≥ |a− σ|
3
√
a+ σ/
√
2a
4a(a− σ)2(a+ σ) (B.334)
=
|a− σ|
4
√
2a3/2
√
a+ σ
≤ amax
4
√
2a2min
(B.335)
≥ amax
4
√
2a2min
(B.336)
The condition above along with the following (see condition (A)) are sufficient to
ensure pseudomonotonicity.
v>Jv = 16a4β3((a2 − σ2)2 + 2w22(a2 + σ2)) (B.337)
+ 32β2w32a
4 (B.338)
+ 2β((a2 − σ2)2(3a2 − σ2) + 8a4w22) (B.339)
− 2w2(a2 − σ2)2 (B.340)
If w2 ≤ 0, then this quantity is greater than or equal to zero due to the result in
equation (B.326), which we have already shown to be greater than zero. Therefore,
we focus on w2 > 0. We can divide the analysis into two cases.
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Consider 3a2 ≥ σ2. In this case, all coefficients of β terms except the last term
(the constant) are positive. For simplicity, we can find the value for β such that the
first part of the β3 coefficient is greater than the last term (the constant).
16a4β3(a2 − σ2)2 − 2w2(a2 − σ2)2 ≥ 0 (B.341)
⇒β ≥ 1
2
(wmax2
a4min
)1/3
(B.342)
Now consider 3a2 < σ2. One of the terms in the β1 coefficient is now negative. We
will find a value for β such that the β3 term can drown out the two negative terms.
16a4β3(a2 − σ2)2 − 2β(a2 − σ2)2(σ2 − 3a2)− 2w2(a2 − σ2)2 (B.343)
=
(a2 − σ2)2
16a4
[
β3 − 2(σ
2 − 3a2)
16a4
β − 2w2
16a4
]
(B.344)
≥ (a
2 − σ2)2
16a4
[
β3 − σ
2
8a4︸︷︷︸
a0
β − w2
8a4︸︷︷︸
a1
]
(B.345)
=
(a2 − σ2)2
16a4
[
3a
1/2
0 a
2/3
1 + 2a1a
2/3
2
]
for β = a
1/2
0 + a
1/3
1 (B.346)
≥ 0 (B.347)
⇒β ≥ a1/20 + a1/31 =
1
2
√
2
amax
a2min
+
1
2
(wmax2
a4min
)1/3
(B.348)
This last lower bound is the greatest of the three, so it suffices to set β greater
than this value to ensure the system is pseudomonotone within the given feasible
region.
Proposition 26. Flin is not monotone for the (w2, a)-subsystem (before scaling).
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Proof. Let Fw2,alin be defined as follows:
(αI + βJ> − γJ)F =
 α −2(β + γ)a
2(β + γ)a α− 2(β − γ)w2

−σ2 + a2
−2w2a
 (B.349)
=
 α(−σ2 + a2) + 4(β + γ)w2a2
2a(β + γ)(−σ2 + a2) + 4(β − γ)w22a− 2αw2a.
 (B.350)
Its Jacobian is then
Jw2,alin =
 4(β + γ)a2 2αa+ 8(β + γ)w2a
8(β − γ)w2a− 2αa 2(β + γ)(−σ2 + 3a2) + 4(β − γ)w22 − 2αw2
 (B.351)
Jsym =
4(β + γ)a2 8βw2a
8βw2a 2(β + γ)(−σ2 + 3a2) + 4(β − γ)w22 − 2αw2
 (B.352)
The trace of the symmetrized Jacobian must be non-negative to ensure monotonicity
because a negative trace implies the existence of a negative eigenvalue:
Tr = 2(β + γ)(−σ2 + 5a2) + 4(β − γ)w22 − 2αw2 ≤ 0 ∀a <
σ√
5
, w2 = 0. (B.353)
Assume β + γ > 0. If a < σ/
√
5 and w2 = 0, then the trace is less than zero.
Assume β + γ < 0. If a > σ/
√
5 and w2 = 0, then the trace is less than zero.
Assume γ = −β. Then
Tr = 8βw22 − 2αw2 = 2w2(4βw2 − α). (B.354)
If w2 < 0, then β ≤ α4w2 . If w2 > 0, then β ≥ α4w2 . Therefore, β = α4w2 , however,
β and α are constants while w2 is a variable. Therefore, α and β must equal zero to
satisfy this for all w2 proving that no monotone linear combination exists.
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Proposition 27. Flin is not Hurwitz for the (w2, a)-subsystem.
Proof. Consider Jw2,alin at w2 = 0.
Jw2,alin =
4(β + γ)a2 2αa
−2αa 2(β + γ)(−σ2 + 3a2)
 (B.355)
Tr = 2(β + γ)(5a2 − σ2) (B.356)
Det = 8(β + γ)2(−σ2 + 3a2)a2 + 4α2a2 (B.357)
If β + γ < 0, then a > σ/
√
5 implies the existence of an eigenvalue with negative
real part. If β + γ > 0, then a < σ/
√
5 implies the existence of an eigenvalue with
negative real part. If β + γ = 0, then the real part is zero.
Proposition 28. There exists an Flin′ family after scaling by 1/4a2 that exhibits strict-
monotonicity.
Proof. If we consider the same linear combinations above, but divide F by 4a2, we
can obtain a family of monotone fields (see Mathematica notebook).
The trace of the corresponding symmetrized Jacobian is
Tr =
(β + γ)(3a2 + σ2) + αw2 + 2(γ − β)w22
2a2
. (B.358)
For constant β and γ and nonzero α, there exists a value for w2 that will force the
trace to be negative, therefore α must be zero. Note that γ must be greater than or
equal to β to ensure that the trace cannot be made negative in the limit as w22 grows
to infinity.
Case 1: Consider the case where β = γ. Then for any fixed β, γ, and nonzero α,
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w2 = −(3a2 + σ2)β + γ
α
− α (B.359)
will cause the trace to be negative.
Case 2: Otherwise, consider solving the quadratic form for w2 when β + γ > 0:
w2 =
−α±√α2 − 8(3a2 + σ2)(γ − β)(β + γ)
4(γ − β) . (B.360)
For the trace to be non-negative, we need the leading coefficient of the quadratic
to be positive, i.e., γ − β > 0. We also need there to be at most 1 real root, meaning
the square root must be non-positive. If β + γ > 0, then setting a and σ using the
following formula will force the root to be positive:
3a2 + σ2 <
α2
8(γ − β)(β + γ) (B.361)
For example, set a = σ, and then set σ and w2 as follows to force the trace to be
negative:
σ =
3
4
α√
32(γ − β)(β + γ) , (B.362)
w2 = − α
4(γ − β) . (B.363)
Case 3: If β + γ ≤ 0, then the root is necessarily positive. Therefore, α must be
set to zero.
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The field and Jacobian are now wieldy enough to state:
Fw2,alin′ = (β + γ)
[
w2,
(a−σ)(a+σ)
2a
− 4
(
γ−β
β+γ
)(
w22
a
)]
, (B.364)
and
Jw2,alin′ = (β + γ)
 1 0
−2
(
γ−β
β+γ
)(
w2
a
)
1
2
+ σ
2
2a2
+
(
γ−β
β+γ
)(
w22
a2
)
 . (B.365)
The trace is now
Tr =
(β + γ)(3a2 + σ2) + 2(γ − β)w22
2a2
, (B.366)
and is non-negative as long as both β + γ ≥ 0 and γ − β ≥ 0.
The determinant is
Det =
(β + γ)2(a2 + σ2) + 4(γ − β)βw22
2a2
, (B.367)
which is non-negative as long as, in addition to the previous conditions, we have
β ≥ 0. The trace and determinant are both strictly positive if β + γ > 0.
In summary, Fw2,alin′ is strictly-monotone, i.e., J
w2,a
lin′  0, if γ ≥ β ≥ 0 and γ > 0.
Corollary 7. The Flin′ family includes Feg′ (γ = γ, β = 0) and Fcc′ (γ = β). By
Proposition 28, Feg′ and Fcc′ are at least strictly-monotone.
Proposition 29. Fw2,acc′ is
1/2-strongly monotone and Fw2,aeg′ is only strictly-monotone.
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Proof. We will look at both maps individually.
Case Fw2,acc′ : The eigenvalues of J
w2,a
cc′ are λ1 = 1 and λ2 =
1
2
(
1 + σ
2
a2
)
. Therefore,
Jw2,acc′  12 and Fw2,acc′ is 1/2-strongly monotone.
Case Fw2,aeg′ : The eigenvalues of a 2×2 matrix can be written in terms of the trace
and determinant as
λ1,2 =
Tr ±√Tr2 − 4Det
2
(B.368)
=
Tr
2
(
1±
√
1− 4Det
Tr2
)
. (B.369)
Therefore, if the term 4Det
Tr2
can be made arbitrarily small, then one of the eigen-
values can made arbitrarily close to zero. On the other hand, if this quantity has a
finite lower bound, then the eigenvalues are lower bounded as a constant multiple of
the trace.
The trace and determinant of Jw2,aeg′ are
Tr =
1
2
(
3 +
σ2
a2
)
+
w22
a2
(B.370)
Det =
1
2
(
1 +
σ2
a2
)
. (B.371)
and the quantity, Q, described is
Q =
8a2(a2 + σ2)
(3a2 + σ2 + 2w22)
2
. (B.372)
This term can be made arbitrarily small as w2 goes to infinity. To be more rigorous,
let a = σ = 1 so that Tr = 2 + w22 and Det = 1. Then
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λ1,2 =
1
2
(w22 + 2)
(
1−
√
1− 4
w22 + 2
)
(B.373)
=
1
2
top︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1−
√
1− 4
w22 + 2
)
(w22 + 2)
−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
bot
. (B.374)
An application of L’Hopital’s rule shows that
lim
w2→∞
∂top/∂w2
∂bot/∂w2
=
4
(w22 + 2)
√
1− 4
(w22+2)
2
= 0. (B.375)
The minimum eigenvalue only approaches zero in the limit, so Fw2,aeg′ is strictly-
monotone.
Claim 3. Fw2,acc′ is the gradient of the following convex function: f
w2,a
cc′ = w
2
2 +
1/2
(
(a2 − σ2)− σ2 log( a2
σ2
)
.
Proof. The Jacobian of Fw2,acc′ is symmetric and PSD, therefore it is the Hessian of
some convex function. We can integrate Fw2,acc′ to arrive at a convex function (with
arbitrary constant). Integrating Fw2,acc′ results in the following:
fw2,acc′ = w2
2 + 1/2
(
(a2 − σ2)− σ2 log (a2
σ2
))
(B.376)
Note that fw2,acc′ must be convex along the subspace with w2 = 0 as well, which implies
that
g(a||σ) = 1/2
(
(a2 − σ2)− σ2 log (a2
σ2
))
(B.377)
is convex as well. This function is of individual interest because it may serve as a
preferred alternative to KL-divergence.
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B.13 Progressive Learning of LQ-GAN
Here, we consider the stochastic setting where the GAN is trained using samples
from p(y) and p(z). There are two ways to learn both the mean and variance of a
distribution using Fw2,acc . One is to first learn the mean to a high degree of accuracy,
then stop learning the mean and start learning the variance. The other is to keep
learning the mean with an appropriate weighting of the two systems to maintain
stability. We discuss the former option first.
Proposition 30. Assume all y ∼ p(y) lie in [ylow, yhi]. After k >
(
yhi−ylow
−|µ|+
√
µ2+dσ2
)2
log[
√
2
δ1/2
]
iterations, with probability, 1 − δ, the (w1, b)-subsystem can be “shut-off” and the
(w2, a)-subsystem safely “turned-on” resulting in a 1/2-strongly-monotone F
w2,a
cc′ .
Proof. We begin by observing the symmetrized Jacobian of Fw2,acc′ :
Jw2,acc′ =
1 0
0 a
2−b2+µ2+σ2
2a2
 =
1 0
0 G
2a2
+ 1
2
 , (B.378)
where G = µ2 +σ2−b2. In order for Fw2,acc′ to be strongly monotone, we require G ≥ 0.
In other words, the square of the generator’s estimate of the mean, bk, learned from
training the (w1, b)-subsystem needs to be less than or equal to µ
2 + σ2.
Assume we are using Fw1,bcc′ with step size ρk =
1
k+1
to train the (w1, b)-subsystem.
Note that this was shown equivalent to the standard running mean in Proposition 13.
Therefore, bk = Z =
1
K
∑k
i=1 yi. Also, E[Z] = µ. Then, using Hoeffding’s inequality,
we find
Pr(|Z − E[Z]| ≥ t) ≤ 2e−
2kt2
(yhi−ylow)2 (B.379)
⇒ Pr(|bk − µ| < t) ≥ 1− 2e−
2kt2
(yhi−ylow)2 = 1− δ (B.380)
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Assume |bk − µ| < t and introduce a scalar: 0 < d < 1. Remember, we require
b2k < µ
2 + σ2. And we know µ− t < bk < µ+ t which implies
b2k < µ
2 + t2 + 2|µ|t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=dσ2
< µ2 + σ2 (B.381)
⇒ 0 = t2 + 2|µ|t− dσ2, t > 0 (B.382)
This expression has two roots for t, one positive and one negative. |bk − µ| can only
be upper bounded by a positive number, so we select the positive root.
troots =
−2|µ| ±√4µ2 + d4σ2
2
(B.383)
= −|µ| ±
√
µ2 + dσ2 (B.384)
t+ = −|µ|+
√
µ2 + dσ2 (B.385)
Plugging t+ back into equation (B.381) for t, we find that
G = µ2 + σ2 − b2k > (1− d)σ2. (B.386)
Rearranging (B.380) and plugging in t, we can derive the number of iterations
required:
k >
( yhi − ylow
−|µ|+√µ2 + dσ2
)2
log
[√2
δ1/2
]
. (B.387)
If we assume p(y) ∼ N (µ, σ2) and use a Chernoff bound, we find
Pr(|bk − µ| < t) ≥ 1− 2e−
kt2
σ2 = 1− δ (B.388)
k >
( σ
−|µ|+√µ2 + dσ2
)2
log
[2
δ
]
. (B.389)
The number of samples needed to maintain stability of the system grows as the true
mean µ deviates from zero. This is not an artifact of the concentration inequalities (it
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occurs with both), but of the parameterization of the LQ-GAN—the samples are not
mean centered before being passed to the quadratic discriminator, i.e., w2y
2 rather
than w2(y−µ)2. This may explain why batch norm is so helpful (almost required) in
stabilizing training.
Proposition 31. Assume all y ∼ p(y) lie in [ylow, yhi]. After k >
(
yhi−ylow
−|µ|+
√
µ2+dσ2
)2
log[
√
2
δ1/2
]
iterations, with probability, 1 − δ, the (w1, b)-subsystem can be up-weighted and the
(w2, a)-subsystem “turned-on”, resulting in a strictly-monotone LQ-GAN.
Proof. As before, assume we are running Fw1,bcc on the (w1, b)-subsystem and F
w2,a
cc′ on
the (w2, a)-subsystem. Also, multiply F
w1,b
cc by e > 0, i.e., increase the learning rate
by e or divide the learning rate of Fw2,acc′ by e. The full symmetrized Jacobian of this
system is:
Jcc′ =

1 0 0 0
0 e 0 0
0 0 a
2−b2+µ2+σ2
2a2
b
2a
0 0 b
2a
e

=

1 0 0 0
0 e 0 0
0 0 G
2a2
+ 1
2
b
2a
0 0 b
2a
e

(B.390)
The upper left 2× 2 block of this matrix is positive definite. In order to show the
whole matrix is positive definite, it suffices to prove the lower right block is positive
definite. The trace and determinant of that block are
Trab = 1/2 + e+
G
2a2
(B.391)
Detab =
2e(a2 +G)− b2
4a2
. (B.392)
where G = µ2 + σ2 − b2 as before. We need G ≥ 0 for Trab > 0 (for lima→0+) and
2eG ≥ b2 for Det > 0. As before, Hoeffding’s inequality says k iterations are required
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for an accurate estimate of the mean (see Equation (B.387)). And as before, we find
that G = (1− d)σ2. We will focus on the determinant condition here. Let
G = (1− d)σ2 ≥ b
2
2e
(B.393)
⇒ e ≥ b
2
2(1− d)σ2 (B.394)
⇒ e ≥ µ
2 + dσ2
2(1− d)σ2 (B.395)
or ⇒ d ≤ 1− b
2
2eσ2
(B.396)
⇒ d ≤ 1− µ
2 + dσ2
2eσ2
. (B.397)
More simply, let d = 1/2. Then set e > µ
2
max
σ2min
+ 1
2
. This ensures the trace and
determinant are both strictly positive which implies that the resulting system is at
least strictly monotone.
We can show that this system is not strongly-monotone by upper bounding the
minimum eigenvalue. To ease the analysis, let H = 2eG − b2 and note that H <
2eσ2 (see Equation (B.393)), i.e., H is finite. This allows us to upper bound the
determinant, in turn, upper bounding the minimum eigenvalue. The determinant
simplifies to
Detab =
e
2
+
H
4a2
. (B.398)
The minimum eigenvalue is upper bounded as follows:
λmin =
1
2
(
Tr −
√
Tr2 − 4Det
)
(B.399)
=
1
2
(
1/2 + e+
G
2a2
−
√
(1/2 + e+
G
2a2
)2 − 2e− H
a2
)
(B.400)
lim
a→0+
λmin =
1
2
(
1/2 + e+
G
2a2
−
√
(1/2 + e+
G
2a2
)2
)
= 0 (B.401)
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As the system continues learning a more accurate mean (iterations, k, is increas-
ing), d is effectively decreasing towards zero. In the limit limd→0+ e ≥ µ22σ2 .
Given, [ylow, yhi], we can set µmax = max(|ylow|, |yhi|). Also, note that if the
distribution is known to support  balls at the ends of the specified interval, [ylow, yhi],
with some nonzero probabilities, Plow and Phi, then we can lower bound the variance
as well. Specifically, let Plow =

2
(
p(ylow)+p(ylow+)
)
and Phi =

2
(
p(yhi)+p(yhi−)
)
.
Then
σ2 = E[(y − µ)2] =
∫ yhi
ylow
p(y)(y − µ)2dy (B.402)
≥
∫ ylow+
ylow
p(y)(y − µ)2dy +
∫ yhi
yhi+
p(y)(y − µ)2dy (B.403)
=

2
(
p(ylow) + p(ylow + )
)
(ylow − µ)2 (B.404)
+

2
(
p(yhi) + p(yhi − )
)
(yhi − µ)2 +O(2) (B.405)
≈ Plow(ylow − µ)2 + Phi(yhi − µ)2 (B.406)
≥ PlowPhi(yhi − ylow)2 = σ2min. (B.407)
B.14 Analysis of the (W2, A)-Subsystem for the N-d LQ-GAN
Let A be a lower triangular matrix with positive diagonal—A represents the gen-
erator’s guess at the square root of Σ.
Proposition 32. The 2-D LQ-GAN is not quasimonotone for Fcc or Feg with or
without scaling.
Proof. We will show that this system fails condition (A). Please refer to the Mathe-
matica notebook for our derivations of these results.
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Define the following skew symmetric matrix.
K =

0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 −1 0

(B.408)
Let vcc = KFcc and veg = KFeg. Similarly, with scaling, let vcc′ = KFcc′ and
veg′ = KFeg′ . Let
Σ =
1 1
1 100
 (B.409)
x =

W11
W12
W22
A11
A22
A21

=

0
0
0
1
0.1
0.1

(B.410)
Then
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v>ccJcc(x)v
>
cc
∣∣∣
x
= −189684 < 0 (B.411)
v>egJeg(x)v
>
eg
∣∣∣
x
= −189684 < 0 (B.412)
v>cc′Jcc′(x)v
>
cc′
∣∣∣
x
= −2.95426 · 109 < 0 (B.413)
v>eg′Jeg′(x)v
>
eg′
∣∣∣
x
= −2.95426 · 109 < 0 (B.414)
This implies that neither system is quasimonotone (with, cc′/eg′, or without,
cc/eg, scaling).
Proposition 33. The 2-D LQ-GAN with W11 and A11 already learned, i.e., W11 = 0
and A11 = A
∗
11, is not quasimonotone for Fcc or Feg.
Proof. We will show that this system fails condition (A). Please refer to the Mathe-
matica notebook for our derivations of these results.
Define the following skew symmetric matrix.
K =

0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0

(B.415)
Let vcc = KFcc and veg = KFeg. Let
Σ =
1 1
1 100
 (B.416)
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x =

W12
W22
A22
A21

=

0
0
0.1
0.1

(B.417)
Then
v>ccJcc(x)v
>
cc
∣∣∣
x
= −189684 < 0 (B.418)
v>egJeg(x)v
>
eg
∣∣∣
x
= −189684 < 0 (B.419)
This implies that neither system is quasimonotone.
Proposition 34. The 3-D LQ-GAN with the diagonal of A already learned, i.e.,
Aii = A
∗
ii, is not quasimonotone for Fcc or Feg with or without scaling.
Proof. We will show that this system fails condition (A). Please refer to the Mathe-
matica notebook for our derivations of these results.
Define the following skew symmetric matrix.
K =

0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 −1 0

(B.420)
Let vcc = KFcc and veg = KFeg. Let
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Σ =

0.2 0.15 0.5
0.15 0.9 0.8
0.5 0.8 2
 (B.421)
x =

W12
W13
W23
A21
A31
A32

=

10
10
10
0.1
0.2
−0.5

(B.422)
Then
v>ccJcc(x)v
>
cc
∣∣∣
x
= −1024.26 < 0 (B.423)
v>egJeg(x)v
>
eg
∣∣∣
x
= −242766 < 0 (B.424)
This implies that neither system is quasimonotone.
Proposition 35. The N-d LQ-GAN with all but a single row of A fixed is strictly-
monotone for Fcc, Feg, and Fcon.
Proof. First, note that the Cholesky decomposition of Σ, denoted by A∗, obeys the
follow equation:
0 = Σij −
i∑
d=1
A∗idA
∗
jd (B.425)
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where i < j. Σ is symmetric, so Σji can be recovered as Σij. This allows us to remove
1 degree of freedom from the system by defining the diagonal term in a single row of
A in terms of the other entries in the row:
Aii =
√√√√Σii − i−1∑
d=1
A2id (B.426)
where as before Aii must be greater than zero. We assume that Σii has already been
learned by Crossing-the-Curl as described in the main body. The condition Aii > 0
can be ensured by constraining
∑i−1
d=1 A
2
id ≤ Σii−  with  1—this can be achieved
with a simple ball projection.
Consider learning a single row of A, specifically ANi with i < N ; ANN is recovered
as discussed above and AN,i>N = 0 by definition of the Cholesky decomposition. We
will also set all W2ij = W2ji equal to zero except where i xor j equals N . This has
the effect of fixing parts of the system irrelevant for solving the Nth row of A. For
ease of exposition, we will drop the “2” subscript of W2 in what follows.
We will begin by writing down the map for the entire system and then simplifying
using the constraints and assumptions discussed above:
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FW2 = AA
> − Σ (B.427)
=

A211 A11A21 A11A31 · · ·
A11A21 A
2
21 + A
2
22 A21A31 + A22A32 · · ·
A11A31 A21A31 + A22A32 A
2
31 + A
2
32 + A
2
33 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .

−

S11 S12 S13 · · ·
S12 S22 S23 · · ·
S13 S23 S33 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .

(B.428)
FA = −2W2A (B.429)
= −2

A11W11 + A21W12 + A31W13 + · · · A22W12 + A32W13 + · · · A33W13 + · · · · · ·
A11W12 + A21W22 + A31W23 + · · · A22W22 + A32W23 + · · · A33W23 + · · · · · ·
A11W13 + A21W23 + A31W33 + · · · A22W23 + A32W33 + · · · A33W33 + · · · · · ·
...
...
...
. . .

.
(B.430)
We are only interested in learning the Nth row of A. Take N = 3 for example.
Notice that the 3rd row of A, A3:, only contains the following W2 terms: W13,W23.
The rest are set to zero as mentioned earlier. The reason for this will become apparent
soon. We fix all other entries to zero to highlight the relevant subsystem below:
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FW2 = AA
> − Σ (B.431)
=

0 0 A11A31 − S13 · · ·
0 0 A21A31 + A22A32 − S23 · · ·
A11A31 − S13 A21A31 + A22A32 − S23 0 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .

(B.432)
FWi<N = 2
(∑
d≤i
AidANd − SiN
)
(B.433)
FA = −2W2A (B.434)
= −2

0 0 0 · · ·
0 0 0 · · ·
A11W13 + A21W23 A22W23 0 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .

(B.435)
FAN>i = −2
(∑
d<N
AdiWdN
)
. (B.436)
Notice that the map FW2 is zero only if Equation (B.425) is satisfied for ΣiN and
WdN = 0 for all d < N . Therefore, setting all other entries of W2 as prescribed
simplified the system, while maintaining the correct fixed point.
In order to determine the monotonicity of this system, we need to compute the
Jacobian of F = [FW2 ;FA]:
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J =
∂FWi<d∂Wk<d ∂FWi<d∂Ad>k
∂FAd>i
∂Wk<d
∂FAd>i
∂Ad>k
 (B.437)
= −2
(d− 1)× 0 −Ai≥k
Ak≥i (d− 1)× 0
 (B.438)
= −2

0 0 −A11 0
0 0 −A21 −A22
A11 A21 0 0
0 A22 0 0

for N = 3 (B.439)
= −2
 0 −A:d−1
A>:d−1 0
 (B.440)
which is skew-symmetric and constant with respect to the variables being learned:
W2,i<N and AN>i. Therefore, J + J
> = 0 is PSD, which implies F is monotone. The
fact that J is constant along with Proposition 11 imply that Fcc = Feg = Fcon = −JF
are also monotone:
Fcc = Feg = Fcon = 2
−A:d−1FAd>i
A>:d−1FWi<d
 . (B.441)
Note that the component of Fcc corresponding to the dynamics of A, is indepen-
dent of W2. This means the dynamics are now decoupled from W2 and can be run
separately. By inspecting the symmetrized Jacobian of Fcc we can show that it is a
block matrix composed of positive definite matrices:
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Jsym =
1
4
(J − J>)>(J − J>) (B.442)
= J>J = −JJ (B.443)
=
A:d−1A>:d−1 0
0 A>:d−1A:d−1
 . (B.444)
A:d−1A>:d−1 is positive definite because A is constrained to be of Cholesky form.
Moreover, the eigenvalues of A>:d−1A:d−1 are the same as A:d−1A
>
:d−1, therefore both
blocks are positive definite. This implies the entire matrix Jsym is positive definite
which means Fcc = Feg = Fcon are strictly monotone. Note that we do not require
A:d−1 = A∗:d−1 for strict monotonicity. In practice, the system will actually be both
strongly-monotone and smooth. This is because A is constrained with a projection
onto a ball and the diagonal of A is restricted to be larger than . These two con-
ditions guarantee a nonzero, finite minimum and maximum value for the eigenvalues
of A:d−1A>:d−1—the minimum corresponds to strong-monotonicity and the maximum
corresponds to smoothness.
Unlike the (w2, a)-subsystem where monotonicity depends on the accuracy of the
learned mean, this system is monotone as long as A:d−1 is PSD which is guaranteed
from the form we have prescribed to A. This result suggests learning the rows of A in
succession, and each subsystem is guaranteed to be strictly monotone. Note that the
variance, i.e., diagonal of Σ, will be slightly off the true value if the mean, µ, is not
first learned perfectly. The learned A will then be slightly off the true A∗ and errors
will compound, but still not affect monotonicity. The subsystems corresponding to
each row of A can be revisited to learn the entries of A more accurately. Permuting
the dimensions of x such that the dimensions corresponding to highest variance are
learned first may ensure subsystems with maximal strong-monotonicity. We leave a
detailed examination to future research.
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B.15 An O(N/k) Algorithm for LQ-GAN
Here we present pseudocode for solving the stochastic LQ-GAN. The maps corre-
sponding to learning the mean and variance by Crossing-the-Curl are both strongly
convex and can therefore be solved with a simple projected gradient method. We
argued in the previous section that the map associated with learning the covariance
terms is strongly-monotone and smooth, not only strictly monotone. In practice, we
found that a projected Extragradient algorithm [55] gave better results. The full
procedure is outlined in Algorithm 5. Replace sample estimates with the true µ and
Σ for the deterministic LQ-GAN.
222
Algorithm 8 Crossing-the-Curl for LQ-GAN
Input: Sampling distribution p(y), max iterations K, batch size B, lower bound on
variance σmin
(1) Learn Mean
µ0 = [0, . . . , 0]
>
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
µˆ = 1
B
∑B
s=1(ys ∼ p(y))
µk =
k
k+1
µk−1 + 1k+1 µˆ, i.e., µk = µk−1 − ρkF bcc with step size ρk = 1k+1
end for
(2) Learn Variance
σ0 = [1, . . . , 1]
>
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
σˆ2 = 1
B
∑B
s=1[(ys ∼ p(y))− µK ]2
F acc′ = (σ
2
k − σˆ2)/(2σk)
σk = clip(σk−1 − 1k+1F acc′ , σmin,∞)
end for
(3) Learn Covariance
A0 = LT (IN), i.e., lower triangular part of identity matrix
A0,11 = σK,1
for all d = 2, . . . , N do
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K do
ys ∼ p(y), s = 1, . . . , B
Σˆ = 1
B
∑B
s=1(ys − µK)>(ys − µK)
FWi<d = 2
(∑
j≤iAk−1,ijAk−1,dj − Σˆid
)
FAcc = A
>
k−1,:d−1FWi<d where Ak−1,:d−1 refers to the top left d− 1× d− 1 block
of Ak−1
Aˆk,d: = Ak−1,d: − 1k+1FAcc where Ak−1,d: refers to the dth row of Ak excluding
the diagonal
if
∑
j Aˆ
2
k,dj > σ
2
K,d − σ2min then
Aˆk,dj = Aˆk,dj · σK,d/
√∑
j Aˆ
2
k,dj + σ
2
min
end if
FWi<d = 2
(∑
j≤iAk−1,ijAˆk,dj − Σˆid
)
FAcc = A
>
k−1,:d−1FWi<d where Ak−1,:d−1 refers to the top left d− 1× d− 1 block
of Ak−1
Ak,d: = Ak−1,d: − 1k+1FAcc where Ak−1,d: refers to the dth row of Ak excluding
the diagonal
if
∑
j A
2
k,dj > σ
2
K,d − σ2min then
Ak,dj = Ak,dj · σK,d/
√∑
j A
2
k,dj + σ
2
min
end if
end for
AK,dd =
√
σ2K,d −
∑
j A
2
K,dj
end for
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B.15.1 Convergence Rate
As mentioned above, the maps for learning the mean and variance are both
strongly convex which implies a O(1/k) stochastic convergence rate for each, the
sum of which is still O(1/k).
In practice, the maps for learning each row of A are strongly-monotone and smooth
(see last paragraph of proof of Proposition B.14) which implies a O(1/k) stochastic
convergence rate for each as well. Because this technique consists of N + 1 steps for
learning the full N -d LQ-GAN, it requires kˆ = Nk iterations which, in total, implies
a O(N/k) stochastic convergence rate.
Hidden within this analysis is the fact that each iteration of learning the mean
and variance is O(N) in terms of time-complexity and each iteration for learning each
row of A is O(N2), therefore this entire procedure is O(N3/k) in terms of FLOPS.
This is expected as the complexity of a Cholesky decomposition to compute A = Σ1/2
is also O(N3). Note that unlike the complexity of computing F each iteration which
can be mitigated with parallel computation, the sequential nature of the stagewise
procedure cannot be amortized which is why we report a O(N/k) convergence rate
and not O(1/k).
Another subtle point is that the LQ-GAN is locally monotone about the equilib-
rium. Recall from Theorem D.1 on p.26 in the work of Nagarajan and Kolter [2017]
that the Jacobian at the equilibrium is of the following form (remember our definition
for the Jacobian is the negative of theirs):
J =
 JDD JDG
−J>DG 0
 (B.445)
where JDD is positive definite. The symmetrized Jacobian is then
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Jsym =
1
2
(J + J>) =
JDD 0
0 0
  0. (B.446)
This implies F is monotone where F = [∇VA,b;−∇VW2,w1 ]. Therefore, we can use
stagewise procedure in Algorithm 5 to converge to a local neighborhood about the
equilibrium, constrain the system to this neighborhood with a projection (which will
guarantee smoothness of the map), and then continue with an Extragradient method
applied to the full system. The local convergence rate will still be O(1/k) with O(N3)
iteration complexity due to the matrix multiplications required in computing F (see
Proposition 9).
B.16 Deep Learning Specifications and Results
We also experimented on common neural-net driven tasks. We tested Flin with
(α, β, γ) = (1, 10, 10−4) on a mixture of Gaussians and (α, β, γ) = (1, 10, 0.1) on
CIFAR10 against Fcon, i.e., (α, β, γ) = (1, 10, 0). Introducing a small −JF term can
help accelerate training (see Figure B.1).
Figure B.1: Fcon (top) vs Flin (bottom) on a mixture of Gaussians (left) and CIFAR10
(right). Each column of images corresponds to an epoch with epochs increasing left
to right.
B.16.1 Images at End of Training for Mixture of Gaussians
See Figure B.2.
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Figure B.2: Fcon (top row) vs Flin (bottom row) on a mixture of Gaussians. Contour
plots of discriminator along with samples in red shown for Fcon (left) and Flin (right).
B.16.2 Mixture of Gaussians Network Architectures
Both the generator and discriminator are fully connected neural networks. The
relevant hyperparameters for setting up the GAN are itemized below.
• batch size 512
• divergence Wasserstein
• disc optim Adam
• disc learning rate 0.001
• disc n hidden 16
• disc n layer 4
• disc nonlinearity ReLU
• gen optim Adam
• gen learning rate 0.001
• gen n hidden 16
• gen n layer 4
• gen nonlinearity ReLU
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• betas [0.5, 0.999]
• epsilon 1e-08
• max iter 5001
• z dim 16
• x dim 2
Fcon was used with β = 1.0 and Flin was used with (α, β, γ) = (1.0, 1.0, 0.001).
B.16.3 Images at End of Training for CIFAR10
See Figure B.3.
Figure B.3: Fcon (top row) vs Flin (bottom row) on CIFAR10. Images generated at
final iteration shown for Fcon (left) and Flin (right).
B.16.4 CIFAR10 Network Architectures
Both the generator and discriminator are convolutional neural networks; we copied
the architectures used in [74]. The generator consists of a linear layer, followed by
4 deconvolution layers (5 × 5 kernel, 2 × 2 stride, leaky ReLU, 64 hidden channels),
followed by a final linear layer with a tanh nonlinearity. The discriminator consists
of 4 convolution layers (5 × 5 kernel, 2 × 2 stride, leaky ReLU, 64 hidden channels)
followed by a linear layer. The relevant hyperparameters for setting up the GAN are
itemized below.
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• batch size 64
• divergence JS
• disc optim RMSprop
• disc learning rate 0.0001
• gen optim RMSprop
• gen learning rate 0.0001
• betas [0.5, 0.999]
• epsilon 1e-08
• max iter 150001
• z dim 256
• x dim 1024
Fcon was used with β = 10.0 and Flin was used with (α, β, γ) = (1.0, 10.0, 0.0001).
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APPENDIX C
GENERATIVE MULTI-ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
This appendix supplements Chapter 4 with additional experiments and descrip-
tions of their architectures.
C.0.1 Accelerated Convergence and Reduced Variance
See Figures C.1, C.2, C.3, and C.4.
Figure C.1: Generator objective, F ,
averaged over 5 training runs on
CelebA. Increasing N (# of D) accel-
erates convergence of F to steady state
(solid line) and reduces its variance, σ2
(filled shadow ±1σ). Figure C.2 pro-
vides alternative evidence of GMAN-
0’s accelerated convergence.
Figure C.2: Stdev, σ, of the genera-
tor objective over a sliding window of
500 iterations. Lower values indicate
a more steady-state. GMAN-0 with
N = 5 achieves steady-state at ≈2x
speed of GAN (N = 1). Note Fig-
ure C.1’s filled shadows reveal stdev
of F over runs, while this plot shows
stdev over time.
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Figure C.3: Generator objective, F ,
averaged over 5 training runs on
CIFAR-10. Increasing N (# of D) ac-
celerates convergence of F to steady
state (solid line) and reduces its vari-
ance, σ2 (filled shadow ±1σ). Fig-
ure C.4 provides alternative evidence
of GMAN-0’s accelerated convergence.
Figure C.4: Stdev, σ, of the genera-
tor objective over a sliding window of
500 iterations. Lower values indicate
a more steady-state. GMAN-0 with
N = 5 achieves steady-state at ≈2x
speed of GAN (N = 1). Note Fig-
ure C.3’s filled shadows reveal stdev
of F over runs, while this plot shows
stdev over time.
C.0.2 Additional GMAM Tables
See Tables C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5. Increasing the number of discriminators from 2
to 5 on CIFAR-10 significantly improves scores over the standard GAN both in terms
of the GMAM metric and Inception scores.
Score Variant GMAN∗ GMAN-1 GAN GMAN-0 GMAN-max mod-GAN
B
et
te
r→
0.184 GMAN∗ - −0.007 −0.040 −0.020 −0.028 −0.089
0.067 GMAN-1 0.007 - −0.008 −0.008 −0.021 −0.037
0.030 GAN 0.040 0.008 - 0.002 −0.018 −0.058
0.005 GMAN-0 0.020 0.008 0.002 - −0.013 −0.018
−0.091 GMAN-max 0.028 0.021 0.018 0.013 - −0.011
−0.213 mod-GAN 0.089 0.037 0.058 0.018 0.011 -
Table C.1: Pairwise GMAM metric means for select models on MNIST. For each
column, a positive GMAM indicates better performance relative to the row opponent;
negative implies worse. Scores are obtained by summing each column.
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Score Variant GMAN-0 GMAN-1 GMAN∗ mod-GAN
B
et
te
r→
0.172 GMAN-0 - −0.022 −0.062 −0.088
0.050 GMAN-1 0.022 - 0.006 −0.078
−0.055 GMAN∗ 0.062 −0.006 - −0.001
−0.167 mod-GAN 0.088 0.078 0.001 -
Table C.2: Pairwise GMAM metric means for select models on CIFAR-10. For each
column, a positive GMAM indicates better performance relative to the row oppo-
nent; negative implies worse. Scores are obtained by summing each column. GMAN
variants were trained with two discriminators.
GMAN-0 GMAN-1 mod-GAN GMAN∗
Score 5.878± 0.193 5.765± 0.168 5.738± 0.176 5.539± 0.099
Table C.3: Inception score means with standard deviations for select models on
CIFAR-10. Higher scores are better. GMAN variants were trained with two dis-
criminators.
Score Variant GMAN-0 GMAN∗ GMAN-1 mod-GAN
B
et
te
r→
0.180 GMAN-0 - −0.008 −0.041 −0.132
0.122 GMAN∗ 0.008 - −0.038 −0.092
0.010 GMAN-1 0.041 0.038 - −0.089
−0.313 mod-GAN 0.132 0.092 0.089 -
Table C.4: Pairwise GMAM metric means for select models on CIFAR-10. For each
column, a positive GMAM indicates better performance relative to the row oppo-
nent; negative implies worse. Scores are obtained by summing each column. GMAN
variants were trained with five discriminators.
GMAN-1 GMAN-0 GMAN∗ mod-GAN
Score 6.001± 0.194 5.957± 0.135 5.955± 0.153 5.738± 0.176
Table C.5: Inception score means with standard deviations for select models on
CIFAR-10. Higher scores are better. GMAN variants were trained with five dis-
criminators.
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C.0.3 Generated Images
See Figures C.5 and C.6.
Figure C.5: Sample of images generated on CelebA cropped dataset.
C.1 Related Work
A GAN framework with two discriminators appeared in the work of Yoo et al. [2016],
however, it is applicable only in a semi-supervised case where a label can be assigned
to subsets of the dataset (e.g., X = {X1 = Domain 1,X2 = Domain 2, . . .}). In con-
trast, our framework applies to an unsupervised scenario where an obvious partition
of the dataset is unknown. Furthermore, extending GMAN to the semi-supervised
domain-adaptation scenario would suggest multiple discriminators per domain, there-
fore our line of research is strictly orthogonal to that of their multi-domain discrimi-
nator approach. Also, note that assigning a discriminator to each domain is akin to
prescribing a new discriminator to each value of a conditional variable in conditional
GANs [77]. In this case, we interpret GMAN as introducing multiple conditional
discriminators and not a discriminator for each of the possibly exponentially many
conditional labels.
In Section 4.4.3, we describe an approach to customize adversarial training to
better suit the development of the generator. An approach with similar conceptual
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Figure C.6: Sample of images generated by GMAN-0 on CIFAR dataset.
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underpinnings was described in the work of Ravanbakhsh et al. [2016], however, sim-
ilar to the above, it is only admissible in a semi-supervised scenario whereas our
applies to the unsupervised case.
C.2 Softmax Representability
Let softmax (Vi) = Vˆ ∈ [minVi ,maxVi ]. Also let a = arg mini Vi, b = arg maxi Vi,
and V(t) = V ((1 − t)Da + tDb) so that V(0) = Va and V(1) = Vb. The softmax
and minimax objective V (Di, G) are both continuous in their inputs, so by the in-
termediate value theorem, we have that ∃ tˆ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. V(tˆ) = Vˆ , which implies
∃ Dˆ ∈ D s.t. V (Dˆ, G) = Vˆ . This result implies that the softmax (and any other
continuous substitute) can be interpreted as returning V (Dˆ, G) for some Dˆ selected
by computing an another, unknown function over the space of the discriminators.
Note that this result holds even if Dˆ is not representable by the architecture chosen
for the dicriminator’s neural network.
C.3 Unconstrained Optimization
To convert GMAN∗ minimax formulation to an unconstrained minimax formula-
tion, we introduce an auxiliary variable, Λ, define λ(Λ) = log(1 + eΛ), and let the
generator minimize over Λ ∈ R instead.
C.4 Boosting with AdaBoost.OL
Note that the online AdaBoost algorithm [14] does not require knowledge of the
weak learner’s slight edge over random guessing (P (correct prediction) = 0.5 + γ ∈
(0, 0.5]), and in fact, allows γ < 0. This is theoretically crucial because our weak
learners are deep nets with unknown, possibly negative, γ’s.
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Figure C.7: Example of images generated across four independent runs on MNIST
with boosting.
C.5 Experimental Setup
All the experiments were conducted using architecture similar to DCGAN [92]. We
use convolutional transpose layers [121] for the generator G and strided convolutions
for the discriminator D except for the input of the generator and the last layer of the
discriminator.
We use the single step gradient method as in the work of Nowozin et al. [2016].
Batch normalization [48] was used in each of the generator layers. The different
discriminators were trained with varying dropout rates from [0.3, 0.7].
Variations in the discriminators were effected in two ways. We varied the architec-
ture by varying the number of filters in the discriminator layers (reduced by factors
of 2, 4 and so on), as well as varying dropout rates. Secondly we also decorrelated
the samples that the disriminators were training on by splitting the minibatch across
the discriminators.
Specifics for the MNIST architecture and training are:
• Generator latent variables z ∼ U (−1, 1)100
• Generator convolution transpose layers as follows:
(4, 4, 128) , (8, 8, 64) , (16, 16, 32) , (32, 32, 1)
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• Base Discriminator architecture: (32, 32, 1) , (16, 16, 32) , (8, 8, 64) , (4, 4, 128).
• Variants have either convolution 3 (4, 4, 128) removed or all the filter sizes
are divided by 2 or 4. That is, (32, 32, 1) , (16, 16, 16) , (8, 8, 32) , (4, 4, 64) or
(32, 32, 1) , (16, 16, 8) , (8, 8, 16) , (4, 4, 32).
• ReLu activations for all the hidden units. Tanh activation at the output units
of the generator. Sigmoid at the output of the Discriminator.
• Optimization was done using Adam [59] with a learning rate of 2 × 10−4 and
β1 = 0.5.
• MNIST was trained for 20 epochs with a minibatch of size 100.
• CelebA and CIFAR were trained over 24000 iterations with a minibatch of size
100 each iteration.
The code was written in Tensorflow [1] and run on Nvidia GTX 980 GPUs.
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APPENDIX D
ANALYZING NON-MONOTONE GAMES
This appendix supplements Chapter 5.
D.1 BoA Algorithm Pseudocode
We present the boundary of attraction algorithm from the work of Armiyoon and
Wu [2014] for convenience.
Algorithm 9 Boundaries of Attraction (BoA) Algorithm
INPUT: VI(F,X ).
1: Initialize grid X over state space X
2: Initialize P (x), x ∈ X to uniform distribution
3: Initialize hash D
4: repeat
5: Sample x0 from P (x)
6: Compute Lyapunov exponent (LE) for x0
7: Compute LEs for neighbors of x0
8: if ∃i, j s.t. LE(xi) 6= LE(xj) then
9: Save (xi, xj) to D[LE(xi)]
10: Save (xj, xi) to D[LE(xj)]
11: end if
12: Update P (x) according to heuristic
13: until Frequency of boundary detection < threshold
D.2 Polynomial Coefficients for Demand Function Qij
We list the coefficients for β defined for the demand function Qij below in Ta-
ble D.1.
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β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
8 -20 26 -19 7 -1
Table D.1: The polynomial function coefficients, β, for tc = 1. Viable coefficients
can be derived for any tc ∈ [1, 3.8] (see supplementary Mathematica file for deriva-
tion). Outside of that range, the demand function begins to lose properties such as
monotonicity and/or the existence of the elastic/inelastic region.
D.3 Individual Cloud Profit Functions Non-Concave
The individual cloud profit functions may be non-concave. Consider H11 =
10, H12 = 1, α11 = 1, α12 = 1/10, c1 = 1, d1 = 1, dr = 1,
∑
i′ 6=i pi′ = 2. Then
pi1(p1, d1) = (10e
−( p
2
1
p1+2
)2
+ e
−( 1
10
p21
p1+2
)2
)(p1 − 1). (D.1)
Figure D.1 shows the function.
Figure D.1: Individual profit functions may be non-concave.
D.4 Model Parameters for Scenario 1
Below, we have listed the parameters that define the market for Scenario 1.
c1 c2 c3 c4
1.05 1.10 0.95 1.15
Table D.2: Cloud cost function coefficients.
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αij Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4
Client 1 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.38
Client 2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.31
Client 3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.26
Client 4 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.34
Table D.3: Client preferences.
Hij Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4
Client 1 11 11 11 11
Client 2 9 9 9 9
Client 3 6 6 6 6
Client 4 12 12 12 12
Table D.4: Client scale factors.
D.5 Model Parameters for Scenario 2
In scenario 2, the first client refocuses their loyalty towards the newly introduced
green tech cloud, cloud 5. All other parameters remain the same.
αij Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4
Client 1 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.27
Client 2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.31
Client 3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.26
Client 4 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.34
Table D.5: Business preferences.
D.6 Model Parameters for BoA Demonstration
These are the parameters that define the market for the BoA demonstration.
Everything remains the same from scenario 1; the only changes come with the addition
of cloud 5.
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c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1.05 1.10 0.95 1.15 1.20
Table D.6: Cloud cost function coefficients.
αij Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4 Cloud 5
Client 1 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.38
Client 2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31
Client 3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.26
Client 4 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.34
Table D.7: Client preferences.
Hij Cloud 1 Cloud 2 Cloud 3 Cloud 4 Cloud 5
Client 1 11 11 11 11 11
Client 2 9 9 9 9 9
Client 3 6 6 6 6 6
Client 4 12 12 12 12 12
Table D.8: Client scale factors.
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